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Abstract 
 
This thesis questions the phenomenological force and function of mourning in the 
fiction of Charlotte Brontë and George Eliot, bringing together models of contemporary 
visuality with modalities of loss, to emphasise a dialectic of affective pain as intimate vision. 
While Victorian visual culture has been substantially addressed by recent scholarship, there 
remains a paucity of investigation into what I read as an optic chiasmus of altered modes of 
seeing and modes of feeling. With a focus on two of the key novelists of the period, I have 
selected four novels that are fascinated by the nature of warped vision and blindness, 
questioning how literature might depict mourning in a world newly crowded by the visual. 
From this starting point, I examine the ways in which both novelists appropriated optical 
tropes to articulate the lived experience of a traumatised consciousness. The mourning 
subject becomes the site of specular, phantasmal inquiry in their works, and thus my own 
method follows the conditions of this connection. This particularised account of the themes 
of loss and mourning has not been significantly addressed in the scholarship, despite the 
fact that all four texts explicitly emphasise subjective trauma. How is the private and 
intimate altered by the fluid specularity of the new optics of the period?  
 
Weaving together nineteenth-century physics, optics, and visual technologies with 
changing notions of subjectivity and the experience of consciousness, my work foregrounds 
the phenomenological depictions of visualised suffering in the novels. Exploring the 
intersection of the technologized Victorian eye and the feeling, grieving subject, I draw out 
the transitivity of optical fragmentation that Brontë and Eliot manipulate to extend the 
textual scope of elegiac representation. By looking closely at the slippage of socio-cultural 
modes of vision and inner life, I argue that the precarious nature of the visual became a 
space in which both writers could articulate a phenomenology of loss.  
Taking Brontë’s fears for her father’s encroaching blindness as a point of departure, 
I begin with Jane Eyre (1847), conventionally read as a narrative of resolute visual authority. 
Through a series of close readings, I draw out the anxiety that shadows the novel’s depiction 
of the eye. I am interested in the ways the biographical meets the socio-cultural in Brontë’s 
discourse of vision, and Jane Eyre’s theme of blindness is a fruitful place of entry into that 
query.  
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   Villette (1853) was written after Brontë’s visits to London’s Great Exhibition and 
offers a distinct engagement with the Victorian visual culture, employing a more 
sophisticated and complex imbrication of the private and the social modes of visualised loss. 
This chapter explores how Brontë’s most devastating and final work accommodates the 
problem of the mourning subject in a hyper-visual sphere.  
 
In the second half of the thesis, I turn to Eliot’s The Lifted Veil (1859) and Romola (1862-
3), two works which have traditionally garnered the least amount of critical attention, often 
described as misplaced in the author’s oeuvre. In The Lifted Veil the various epistemological 
crises of the mid-century moment find expression in Eliot’s horrifying first-person account 
of delimited, inescapable sensory experience. Contravening the established critical view of 
the tale, with an emphasis on the protagonist’s preternatural visionary capacities, I focus on 
Eliot’s use of the terms of Victorian lens culture to elucidate the blind spots of this first-
person narrative.   
In Romola, Eliot depicts a heroine who imagines more profoundly than her 
counterparts what it might mean to live with the endlessness of mourning. Taking up Eliot’s 
exploration of phenomenal embodiment, which contrasts with the empirical, observational 
aesthetic of traditional realism, I point to the tension that defines the sensory life in the 
novel.     
Through being attentive to the correspondences of mourning and decentralized 
perspectival geographies, I argue for a closer look at the phenomenally descriptive in its own 
right as performing a different ontology of radical loss.  
 
Keywords: Mourning, loss, vision, blindness, phenomenology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  4 
Contents 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments         4 
 
Introduction: The Eye/I of Mourning      7 
 
1. “My inward dimness of vision”: Jane Eyre and the phenomenology of loss  57 
 
2. “I sealed my eyes”:  Visions of loss in Charlotte Brontë’s Villette   104 
 
3. ‘A painful want of light’: The uncanniness of darkness in George Eliot’s  
     The Lifted Veil           158 
 
4. ‘Speaking Brokenly’: George Eliot’s Romola      214 
 
Conclusion: Hypnogogia         272 
 
Bibliography           281 
 
 
 
 
  5 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
The idea for this thesis began in discussions with Professor Vanessa Smith some time 
before beginning the doctorate, and her enthusiasm for the project gave me the confidence to 
pursue it. Vanessa’s affinity for and deep knowledge of the Brontës has been a significant 
source of pleasure for me, and it is to her that this work is indebted. I am certain that without 
her tireless support, her patience with my (sometimes eccentric) ways of thinking and 
commitment to phenomenology, this thesis would never have materialised. She has been to me 
much more than an intellectual counsel, offering professional guidance, most certainly, but also 
the much trickier giving of compassionate understanding during my long period of illness. I 
regard it as a privilege to have had the benefit of her insights.  
 
Although he has now retired from active academic life, conversations with Associate 
Professor David Brooks some years ago taught me to understand literature from the bones first. 
David knows the rich poetry of words and, what is rarer still, can communicate his depth of 
practice to undergraduates in a way that is inspiring to witness.  
 
Dr Bruce Isaacs provided on several occasions a much-needed morale boost, 
reorienting my thinking along lines that might balance creativity with sound argument. A few 
comments he made on the emotional and intellectual value of writing a doctorate were 
invaluable, and I drew sustenance from his advice when doubts loomed.  
 
I have been incredibly fortunate during my time at university to have found an 
intellectual home amongst brilliant young scholars, some of whom have become very dear to 
  6 
me, and it is to this group of people that I now turn. To Gabriella Edelstein, whose emotional 
wisdom and illimitable friendship are soul-enriching. To Dan Dixon, for the way your mind 
works; to Kimberley Dimitriades; Russell Coldicutt; Rachel Kennedy; to Sam Matthews, and 
to Niklas Fischer: for your friendship, your intellectual badinage, your patient submission to 
my offerings of home-made cakes, and much more - I cannot adequately express my gratitude.  
To my father, Peter: you have been the less visible, but no less prominent force behind 
whatever success I have found. Thank you, thank you, thank you.  
 
The writing of a thesis is a many-sided thing. It is demanding, yes, exhausting, most 
definitely, but the world has been utterly un-made and re-structured through the ideas to which 
I have been exposed as a result. It has been the most formative experience of this writer’s life, 
and a matter of survival in the deepest sense of that word.  
For, without books ….    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
  
  8 
Introduction 
The Eye / I of Mourning 
 
“The eye made the Victorians particularly verbose.”1 
 
In his Lectures on Light, a series of talks delivered in 1872-3, physicist and philosopher 
John Tyndall – who delivered popular and highly fashionable lectures during his tenure at 
London’s Royal Institution – described the new theories of light exciting natural philosophers 
and non-specialists alike. The real subject of these lectures is the eye, and Tyndall takes a 
romantic view of what he regards as the most intriguing of human organs. ‘A long list of 
indictments might indeed be brought against the eye,’ he observes, ‘its opacity, its want of 
symmetry, its lack of achromatism, its absolute blindness’; indeed, he goes on, the eye was 
once described by ‘an eminent German philosopher’ as ‘an instrument so full of defects’ that 
one ‘should send it back with the severest censure’. Tyndall concludes, however, by investing 
the act of seeing with an enigmatic allure, for ‘the eye is not to be judged from the standpoint 
of theory. As a practical instrument, and taking the adjustments by which its defects are 
neutralised into account, it must ever remain a marvel to the reflecting mind.’2 Tyndall’s rich 
verb ‘reflecting’ here captures the transitive power of consciousness, at once mirroring the seen 
world, and reckoning with the images of everyday encounter. Tyndall’s larger body of work is 
an indexing of ocular reflections and the interceptions of the eye, and, despite his 
epistemological rigour, exudes a fascination with the experiential poetics of the act of seeing. 
He encourages his audience to experiment with their own ocular abilities by manufacturing 
rudimentary camera obscura models out of domestic materials. Pleasure could be found in 
                                                        
1 Chris Otter, The Victorian Eye: A Political History of Light and Vision in Britain 1800-1910 (Chicago: Chicago UP, 
2008), 22.  
2 John Tyndall, Lectures on Light (New York: Arno Press, 1980), 17.  
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creating superimposed images of bent light-waves and the reflections of ‘angular velocity.’3 
Implicit in his descriptions is an acknowledgement of the analogue of subjective experience 
and embodiment that any such home-made device could represent – the capacity for illusion, 
specular enchantment, and the deceptions that inhere in what appear to be objective properties 
of space. The aporia of vision is rendered as homely device and the sensations of embodiment 
are rendered at a remove, but the metaphorical resonance is clear: it is the volatile dialectic 
between the visible and the invisible, that space of instability, which has become the site of 
interest.   
For John Locke, the philosopher who did most to influence sensationalist theories of 
perception in eighteenth and nineteenth-century England, the camera obscura was suggestive 
of the human sensorium: 
External and internal sensation are the only passages that I can find of 
knowledge to the understanding. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the 
windows by which light is let into this dark room. For, methinks, the 
understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only 
some little opening left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of 
things without; would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay 
there and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion it would very much 
resemble the understanding of man in reference to all objects of sight.4     
 
Locke intended the trope to demonstrate the untroubled status of the eye’s perceptive ability. 
As M. H. Abrams writes, Locke was ‘able to levy upon a long tradition of ready-made parallels 
in giving definition to his view of the mind in perception as a passive receiver for images 
                                                        
3 Tyndall, Lectures on Light, 18-19.  
4 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. John W. Yolton (London: Dent, 11967), II, XI, 129. 
Original emphasis.   
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presented ready-formed from without’.5 Descartes claimed that the darkened chamber pierced 
by an aperture emitting light, represented the soul’s transparent translation of what it sees: ‘The 
objects we look at do imprint quite perfect images of themselves on the back of our eyes’.6 
Like Descartes, Locke believed in the eye’s nobility, understanding the etymology of the 
Enlightenment as the rational illumination of thought.7 That kind of untroubled verticality of 
outer world and inner impressions may perhaps not seem problematic to us, who, as inheritors 
of an excessively visualised world, are now contracted to the visible via digital technologies 
that all but eradicate perceptive anomalies. By the early decades of the nineteenth-century, 
however, any such faith in vision’s power to translate the visible world into knowledge was 
dramatically undermined. This was accompanied by a shift in the representation of psychic 
metaphors, from the mind as the passively reflective surface of a mirror, to an active projector 
of images.8 The ubiquitous camera obscura model came to symbolise an urgent query: what is 
the status and function of human perception and how should vision —  the primary sensation 
— be understood as knowledge of the objective world?  
This thesis interrogates ocular metaphors as discursive networks of embodied mourning 
in mid-Victorian fiction. My intention is to explore the conditions that would complicate the 
widely-used metaphor of the affective mind as a camera obscura (to take one example), which 
for the nineteenth-century imagination was a figuration of a complex ontological dilemma: of 
interiority and exteriority, of the inner psyche and the outer casement of the body.  
                                                        
5 M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition, (London: Oxford UP, 
1960), 57.  
6 The camera obscura model of consciousness appears in a range of texts, from Descartes to Newton. In the 
‘Optics,’ (1637) Descartes writes: ‘Suppose a chamber is all shut up apart from a single hole, and a glass lens is 
placed in front of this hole with a white sheet stretched at a certain distance behind it so that the light coming 
from objects outside forms images on the sheet. Now it is said the chamber represents the eye; the hole, the 
pupil.’ Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings, trans. John Cottingham, et. al., (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1988), 63.  
7 Jay, Downcast Eyes, 84-5. 
8 Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, 57.  
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Locke’s polite phrasing of the mind’s occasional pictorial order is suggestive, but 
ultimately contrary to, the kind of optical dialect which the novels at the heart of this study 
explore to palpable effect. The neat patterns of the mind’s eye become for the Victorian writer, 
an elusive figment of a nostalgic past. Moreover, the dark room of the psyche is transformed 
from a utile and transparent rhetorical figure, to a master psychological trope of embodied 
affect. Haunted by the long shadow of Hume’s scepticism — the philosopher who famously 
consigned metaphysics to the flames, denying the truth of anything beyond the fact of one’s 
perceptive impressions9 — the Victorian intellectual was left with the riddles of phenomenal 
sensation. Kant’s chiasmus of sensible impressions, ‘we have no knowledge antecedent to 
experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins’10, was similarly frustrating for the 
Victorians. As Felicia Bonaparte points out, the English mind was not satisfied with Kant’s 
attempt to secure phenomenological knowledge: ‘what they wanted was knowledge of 
noumena, the objective truth of reality,’11 what phenomenology would later pursue as a return 
to the things themselves, the primal essence of matter.12 But Kant admitted only of reason’s 
need to orient itself in the field of objects, ‘in that immeasurable space of the supersensible, 
which for us is filled with dark night.’13 Kant’s transcendentalism established as forever out of 
reach the essence of things beyond their subjective appearances. Departing from what he felt 
to be an erroneous distinction between sensible and intelligible impressions as merely one of 
logic, Kant claimed of objects instead that ‘[i]t does not merely concern their [logical] form as 
being either clear or confused. It concerns their origin and content. It is not that by our 
                                                        
9 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Charles W. Hendel (New York: Liberal Arts 
Press, 1957), 173. 
10 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd ed., trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 
1934), 25. 
11 Felicia Bonaparte, ‘The Poetics of Poesis: the making of nineteenth-century English Fiction (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2015), 57. 
12 To ‘return to the things themselves’ is Husserl’s famous description of the phenomenological method.  
13 Kant, ‘What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?’, in Religion and Rational Theology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10.  
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sensibility we cannot know the nature of things in themselves in any save a confused fashion; 
we do not apprehend them in any fashion whatsoever.’14  
 
In this introductory chapter, I illustrate how the shift in what Walter Benjamin describes 
as an optical (un)conscious15 that occurred in the early decades of the nineteenth-century, 
became the dominant idiom for Victorian novelists. The wider thesis will explore these insights 
in relation to the work of two key novelists, Charlotte Brontë (1816-1855) and George Eliot 
(1819-1880), and this introduction also sketches my approach to their texts. This shift came 
partly in response to what Martin Jay has described as the ‘visual pollution’ of the mid-
nineteenth century, the sudden proliferation in the industrialised urban space of ocular 
attraction: the sheeted glass of shopfronts; advertisements; artificial lighting; and the resulting 
fever for daguerreotypes, lithography, and general ‘bric-o-bracomania’:  a ‘cult of images,’ to 
evoke Baudelaire.16 Kate Flint has shown that the Victorians ‘were fascinated with the act of 
seeing, with the question of the reliability – or otherwise – of the human eye, and with the 
problems of interpreting what they saw.’17 Jonathan Crary argues that nothing short of an 
epistemological revolution occurred during the nineteenth century, productive of a 
quintessentially modern observer. Vision was no longer a receptacle, as enforced by the 
classical model of perception, but was instead an object of knowledge. There was, he writes, 
‘an uprooting of vision from the stable and fixed relations’ of the camera obscura model of 
perception; a ‘new valuation of visual experience’ in which vision was radically abstracted, its 
                                                        
14 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 56. This is in contradistinction to the phenomenological method, as set out by 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who writes: ‘Descartes and particularly Kant detached the subject, or consciousness, 
by showing that I could not possibly apprehend anything as existing unless I first of all experienced myself as 
existing in the act of apprehending it. They presented consciousness, the absolute certainty of my existence 
for myself, as the condition of there being anything at all’. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. 
Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1962), ix. 
15 Walter Benjamin conceives of an ‘optical unconscious,’ unveiled ‘for the first time,’ by the photographic 
camera. See ‘A Short History of Photography,’ Screen 13.1 (March 1972), 7.  
 
16 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes, 122. Baudelaire, Mon coueur mis à nu, cited in Martin Jay, 145.  
17 Kate Flint, The Victorians and the Visual Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1. 
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referents uncertain. ‘It is a moment when the visible escapes from the timeless order of the 
camera obscura and becomes lodged … within the unstable physiology and temporality of the 
human body.’18 While there are divergences regarding the concept of a nineteenth-century 
observer, there is unequivocal consensus amongst cultural historians that the flood of visual 
stimuli worked a profound alteration in subjectivity, reified in what Lindsay Smith terms ‘a 
poetics of sight,’ reconfiguring the character of literature; vision was suddenly complicated by 
notions of artificiality and reproduction. There was a ‘reappraisal of the ‘unseen’ as ‘relations 
between the visible and the invisible, the empirical and the transcendental,’ were brought to 
public consciousness.19 Crucially, that alteration was characteristically diverse and 
heterogeneous. There were of course infinite levels of perception, and as Flint reminds us, the 
drive to reveal the invisible was not a homogenous urgency, but a contested space. Sally 
Shuttleworth has shown that Brontë was fascinated and troubled by the line demarcating the 
visible from the invisible.20  Indeed much Victorian art was conceived as ‘a challenge to the 
adequacy of representation, to the sufficiency of the visible.’21 Much of the new science of 
optics emerging at mid-century influenced contemporary fiction, spreading into a range of 
cultural discourses. The fascination with all things ocular was increasingly used as a trope of 
feeling, and objects that came to be commonplace in modernity, such as spectacles and 
telescopes, and indeed the eye itself (artificial eyes being a popular item of exotica), acquired 
significant fetishistic and metaphorical status.  Queen Victoria and Lord Alfred Tennyson, two 
famous sufferers of cataracts, remarked upon meeting one another on ‘‘the darkened state of 
the world’’. ‘[N]either was in any doubt,’ writes Asa Briggs, ‘that seeing or not-seeing and 
                                                        
18 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), 14 and 70. 
19 Lindsay Smith, Victorian Photography, Painting and Poetry: The Enigma of Visibility in Ruskin, Morris and the 
Pre-Raphaelites (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3 and 13. 
20 Sally Shuttleworth, Charlotte Brontë and Victorian Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 17. 
21 Flint, Visual Imagination, 25. 
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feeling were closely related.’22 The new science of optics had all the excitement pertaining to 
any novelty, and for Victorians, the eye was undoubtedly the most important organ, attaining 
a quasi-magical power of penetration and understanding, but imbued too with unmistakable 
flaws, not least its own fragility and vulnerability to failure. The eye and its burgeoning 
technological innovations — spectacles, telescopes, microscopes, opthalmoscopes, 
kaleidoscopes — were placed within the discursive boundaries of a cultural fixation, which 
found its way into literary discourse.23 Terry Castle has shown that, through a series of 
rhetorical displacements, phantasmagorical spectacle moved from the purely mechanic, the 
matter of two lanterns, side-by-side, and the screen, lodging itself firmly in the Victorian 
subjective:  
 
Plunged in darkness and assailed by unearthly sounds, spectators were 
subjected to an eerie, estranging, and ultimately baffling spectral parade. The 
illusion was apparently so convincing that surprised audience members 
sometimes tried to fend off the moving “phantoms” with their hands or fled 
the room in terror…. Translated into a metaphor for the imagery produced 
by the mind, the phantasmagoria retained this paradoxical aspect … indeed, 
nineteenth-century empiricists frequently figured the mind as a kind of magic 
lantern, capable of projecting the image-traces of past sensation onto the 
internal “screen” or backcloth of the memory …. The mind became a 
                                                        
22 Asa Briggs, Victorian Things, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 106. 
23 Martin Jay explores in great detail the changes reshaping perspective during this period in his book 
Downcast Eyes (see note 10). ‘[T]he nineteenth-century was among the most visual periods of Western 
culture, the most given to ideals of precise observation – a spectator-view shared by novelists, painters, 
scientists…and poets,’ he writes. ‘By the nineteenth-century, what many have called the hegemonic scopic 
regime of the modern era, Cartesian perspectivalism, was beginning to waver as never before,’ due largely 
but not solely to ‘the extraordinary changes in our capacity to see wrought by technology’ (113).  
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phantom-zone – given over, at least potentially, to spectral presences and 
haunting obsessions.24 
 
 
 
Mourning as lived loss 
 
  My argument is in two stages: first, to explore the conditions of technologized 
visuality that I have begun to outline above; second, to argue that this ocular flux became the 
privileged space in which Brontë and Eliot could narrate the phenomenology of loss and 
mourning. The history of these intertwined terms stretches to encompass a diverse range of 
discursive and analytical traditions. Much of the psychoanalytical literature seeks to define 
separately the respective conditions of loss, mourning and grief, most famously in Freud’s 
essay, ‘Mourning and Melancholia,’ which I consider in detail in chapter two. While 
acknowledging the value of Freud’s distinction between two states of loss (a binary which 
Freud destabilised in other writings), this present work is not interested in partitioning the terms 
of suffering in such a way. It presents a model of diffusive affect in which all three linguistic 
frames overlap, similar to the optical palimpsests I follow in Brontë and Eliot’s texts. In this 
regard, my working conception of mourning follows the ‘pluri-linguistic’ model set out by 
Jennifer Rushworth in her recent study of discourses of mourning, in which she emphasises a 
movement between the poles of emotion, whereby ‘the term mourning … acts a synonym for 
grief and the anguish of bereavement … a generic term for an experience that encompasses 
both the work of mourning and melancholia.’25 The interchangeability of these terms in my 
                                                        
24 Terry Castle, “Phantasmagoria: Spectral Technology and the Metaphorics of Modern Reverie,” Critical 
Inquiry 15 (Autumn, 1988), 30.  
25 Jennifer Rushworth, Discourses of Mourning in Dante, Petrarch, and Proust (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2016), 3.  
  16 
thesis, then, reflects this fluid notion of mourning, a model that I suggest parallels the 
phenomenology of these emotions as they touch perceptivity and consciousness. Kathleen 
Woodward also questions the dichotomous formulations of mourning and grief, suggesting that 
rather than ask what feeling constitutes which term, we should turn our theoretical lens to 
consider their affectivity. By asserting our mourning, she wonders, ‘do we not also mean that 
we feel lost ourselves, that in our grief we have lost our sense of direction? … that we have 
been lost?’ Woodward argues for a third sphere, a ‘something in between mourning and 
melancholia, … grief that is interminable but not melancholic in the psychoanalytic sense, a 
grief that is lived in such a way that one is still in mourning but no longer exclusively devoted 
to mourning.’26 While Woodward isolates the death of a loved one as the condition of mourning 
that most interests her, I do not claim for mourning a single cause, but rather a range of objects 
as catalyst. The novels I read here present mourning as an excess, an assault on the subject that 
leaves the protagonist with the sensation of feeling lost; to evoke Woodward, an inarticulate, 
place-less topography that emerges, I suggest, as a meta-discourse of the eye. The ‘space 
between’ mourning and melancholia, then, can best be understood in the oeuvres of Brontë and 
Eliot as a visualised space, in excess, in which the tensions of a variegated suffering are 
explored.   
According to Matthew Ratcliffe the phenomenology of grief is not easily 
accommodated by the synchronicity of narrative; indeed grief, unlike most or even all other 
emotional states, is unique in its failure to cohere, to make meaning, to form a narratable whole. 
‘Narratives that are formed during profound grief often fail to hang together; they lack a shape 
that narrated-life more usually has. There is a degree of fragmentation, a sense of having lost 
one’s way,’ he writes, in terms that echo Woodward’s phrasing. More than this, mourning 
                                                        
26 Kathleen Woodward, ‘Freud and Barthes: Theorising Mourning, Sustaining Grief,’ Discourse 13.1 (Autumn-
Winter 1990-1), 95-6. 
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profoundly re-shapes the self’s phenomenal engagement with the world, a sense that one is 
bereft not only of the thing lost, but the very structure in which the presence of the other existed. 
In other words, it is not only the experience of being that is fragmented in mourning, but the 
perception of the world as a whole.27 The emphasis is on discontinuity and the splitting of 
phenomenological patterns and ways of being. These terms of description are strikingly similar 
to those that characterise the conditions pertaining to the technologised eye of early to mid-
nineteenth century, making it easier for us to see how and why novelists such as Brontë and 
Eliot might choose to employ optical metaphors to figure the damaged perceptual 
phenomenology of grief.  
In his book on the fantasm and phenomenology, Peter Schwenger sets out the terms of 
a constructive critique that is generated from the images of a text, defending what he describes 
as ‘textual visualisation as interpretation,’ from those sectors of scholarship that might regard 
it as irrelevant or hostile to critical work.  Schwenger reads and writes criticism by a progressive 
‘filling-in’ of the visual scene, interpreting the text’s visual dynamic, which, ‘[f]or most literary 
critics was anathema, posing a real threat to any discipline with claims to rigour. The … objects 
of study lose their coherence and autonomy, evaporating into impressionistic mist.’ There has 
been, however, a recent turn back to a visual poetics, Schwenger claims, whereby we can read 
impressions as impressions to respond to the fantasmatic images of a work.28 The affectivity 
that interests Schwenger is, as he writes, not the loss generated by certain objects, ‘but of the 
representations by which they are always necessarily mediated … by the systems of 
perception. In a move that is parallel to the body’s use of multiple senses to apprehend an 
object,’ Schwenger constructs his critique from a range of aesthetic examples, displaying the 
problem of the image.29 That phenomenological model of literary analysis is my own 
                                                        
27 Matthew Ratcliffe, ‘Grief and the Unity of Emotion,’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41.1 (2017), 7.  
28 Peter Schwenger, Fiction and Fantasm: On Textual Envisioning (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999), 1-2.  
29 Peter Schwenger, The Tears of Things: Melancholy and Physical Objects (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2006), 15. Original emphasis.  
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methodology throughout this thesis, as I attempt to show the ways in which reading and 
thinking about these novels as impressions, as visualisations, reveals their respective 
investments in invisible or blind mourning. 
To attach grief - made invisible and hidden – to a dialectic of the eye, involves a 
paradoxical rhetoric of making visible the dense feel of the lived experience of loss. I wish to 
suggest that the alienating otherness of mourning overlaps stereoscopically with the new optics: 
as the act of vison was made strange, I argue, it was coupled with this haunting phenomenology 
of the ongoing-ness of mourning. From the general panoply of the spectacle, I refine my focus 
to a particular language of mournfulness, an imagistic diction of grief, which I find is viscerally 
at work in these two canonical authors. Their novels stage the traumatic incarnation of the 
perceptive consciousness at the interface of visual flux and abstracted sensory experience, 
complicating the borderline demarcating the public and private experiences of psychic crisis. I 
will take up this claim in greater detail, but I first need to discuss the cultural shift in seeing 
that occurred in the first decades of the nineteenth century.  
 
Victorian optics 
 
Since Crary’s now seminal book, Techniques of the Observer, which claimed that a 
modern subject was born in around 1820, emerging out of the profound alterations in the 
conditions of seeing instigated by a profusion of optical technology, a rich body of criticism 
has amply proved the effects of the new optics on Victorian aesthetics.30 Scholars such as Flint, 
                                                        
30 Crary’s theory of a generalized modern subject is problematic, and I have reservations about designating a 
moment when such a subject is said to have come into being, a subject moreover possessing a newly 
homogenised way of seeing. The subjective, volatile nature of the optical faculty renders unstable any 
attempt to construct an overarching theory of homogenisation. Yet his larger argument of mass visual 
revolution and its concomitant ‘autonomisation of sight’ is compelling. Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On 
Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass.,: MIT Press, 1990), 27.  
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Tom Gunning, and Helen Groth, have proved the intertwining of Enlightenment scientific 
ideology and nineteenth-century fiction, detailing the permeable relationship between the 
various philosophical, physiological and novelistic discourses circulating in the period.31 
Victorian realism was symptomatic, in fictional terms at least, of the contemporary vogue for 
an ideal dispassionate observer; the form entailed a quasi-epistemic foundation, a persuasion 
that through realist narrative the author could reach the truthful, concrete world, oddly laying 
the burden of verisimilitude upon the realist fictional text. The vagaries of sensory life seem to 
pose a problem for traditionally realist texts. Writing of Eliot, Summer J. Star has argued that 
the author’s realism strives for a phenomenological depiction of existence, rather than an 
objective facticity. ‘While most accounts of realism have been concerned with its tentative 
representations of totality … Eliot’s narratives force us to redefine realism from an inverse 
position, locating her characters’ access to reality in moments that specifically defy a totalising 
vision — in moments of liminal consciousness, of blind spots, of bodily, rather than visual 
awareness.’32 Taking up Star’s observation, I expand the critique of optics out from the 
questions of realism and language, to investigate a modality of the visual that begins from the 
inside, out. For the Victorian novelist, phenomenal discursive practices became the mode that 
richly accommodates the strains of realist representation, an expression of the material without 
neutering the transcendent. Eliot and Brontë make vivid the way grieving consciousness feels, 
and what it might be to have one’s perspectival field disoriented by loss.  
  
 
 Jane Eyre, Villette and The Lifted Veil are written in the register of the autobiographical 
voice. The autobiography obviously signposts its preoccupation with the inner life, with 
                                                        
31 Tom Gunning, ‘Hand and Eye: Excavating a New Technology of the Image in the Victorian Era,’ Victorian 
Studies 54.3 (Spring, 2012); Helen Groth, Moving Images: Nineteenth-Century Reading and Screen Practices 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2013).   
32 Summer J. Star, “Feeling Real in Middlemarch,” ELH 80.3 (Autumn, 2013), 840.  
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precisely the shaping of personhood by the material (or immaterial) conditions of the world 
outside that slippery construct called the self. Victorian writers accordingly refashioned 
scientific dialects of sensation and sense perception into metaphors of affect and emotion. 
Navigating the various spiritual crises of the age, novelists, just as scientists, engaged in 
hermeneutics, struggling to interpret the mutable substance of experience. As David Carroll 
observes, interpretation was suddenly an activity ‘in which everyone was inescapably 
involved’.33 Alan Spiegel helpfully explains the difference between the conception of the real 
in an eighteenth-century novel, and its Victorian iteration, as that between a Platonic or idealist 
notion of reality — that behind the confusion of sensory experience is a knowable world, to be 
penetrated by the reasonable mind — and the loss of any such stable forms of integrity ‘out 
there’, accessible through language.34 The question that interests me is this: what happens to 
the novel, specifically the novel of loss, when the sensual collapses into the epistemological? 
Devoid of a structural reality to give form to fictional worlds, how does the fraught 
phenomenological texture of apperception re-shape, even corrupt, the novel form? 
 
‘The nature of those fantasies which a society finds most compelling is very important,’ 
Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi observes.35 It seems appropriate to understand the Victorian 
culture of the spectacle as a fantasy of the finite self magically attaining the dream of infinity, 
liberated by the plurality of selves given back to the subject in the glittering panorama of 
modernity. But that recursive transformation came at an ontological cost, just as our own 
century’s lust for the digitally imaged and endlessly plastic self has pushed identity into a 
regressive, vicarious fantasy. My thesis takes as starting point the important critical work on 
                                                        
33 David Carroll, George Eliot and the Conflict of Interpretations: A Reading of the Novels (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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the interleaving of scientific and novelistic discourses, and redefines the more general 
associations with loss that such critiques often implicate. The obsessional optics in the work of 
Brontë and Eliot, the permeation of specular metaphors through their novels, not only permits, 
but invites such an analysis. In each of the novels selected here, mourning as I have defined it 
is at the heart of the story, and in each text it manifests as opacity and obfuscation. 
Disfigurations of vision as the phantasms of perception, physical or psychic blindness become 
a means of lending definition to ineffable loss. Vision is also a vehicle for the irresolvable 
features of mourning, the formlessness and lack of closure that can impede “successful” 
narrative conclusions. I specifically address the collation of feeling and vision. There remains 
little investigation of the connections between altered modes of seeing and modes of feeling. 
Gender and power dynamics have been substantially addressed, but not the subtle, less 
provocative realm of mournfulness, in the insistently specular mid-Victorian novel. The four 
novels I treat are fascinated by the nature of sight and blindness and, I suggest, question how 
literature might depict the private experience of deep loss in a hyper-visualised world. My 
choice of authors is not only due to their well-documented periods of depression and grief, 
although that is certainly of significance, but also because their fiction speaks of a 
dissatisfaction with both the private and social expression of bereavement. That frustration is 
reified through a distinctly specular aesthetic that works to destabilise notions of integrity and 
form. Their novels are deeply interested in the ontology of mourning.   
 I do not read the Eliot or Brontë novel in an effort to decipher its strategies of 
disempowerment or ocularcentric dynamic, or to police its subversions and/or conservatism, 
but in the hope of drawing out the immanence of the sensual body, the phenomenal 
consciousness of the inscribed self, as it is forged in acts of mourning. The entanglement of the 
grieving self in a specular paradigm — the interface of specular culture and private life — is 
the problematic nexus of the mourning subject. Produced from a modern urgency to look and 
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see, the grieving self yet insistently incorporates these same praxes of visuality and perception 
to reify and verify affect, creating a perplexing, even distressing looping of emotion-as-
perception and vice versa. What Brontë describes as the dimly-lit ‘shadow-world’ of the self,36 
our private figurations of emotional interiority, are projected as fugitive phantasms of the 
seeing mind. It is moreover a substance-less projection. In her correspondence, Brontë writes 
of the blankness of despair: ‘My reserve has its foundation not in design, but in necessity. I am 
silent because I have literally nothing to say. I might indeed repeat over and over again that my 
life is a pale blank and often a very weary burden … but what end could be answered by such 
repetition?’37 Brontë suggests the ‘burden’ of representing the banality of mourning, which she 
frames as a linguistic barrier: her emotion is made hollow by the rhetorical conventions 
available to her, which are simply vacant of meaning for her subjective experience of loss; she 
is left in the paradox of having an intolerable sadness to communicate, yet having nothing to 
say.  
Brontë’s metaphor of the ‘pale blank’ leads me to the other strand of my argument on 
perceptual distortion and affect: the metaphysical blindness peculiar to loss. The substitution 
of a denuded imaged for the desired utterance is symptomatic of a larger project of deferral and 
metonymical exchange in that author’s novels. By choosing a vacant sign to depict her loss, 
Brontë reinforces the chiasmal relation of idea and signification, both without content; the 
dissatisfying feedback loop of mourning’s struggle for voicing. In her study of affect and the 
cinematic image, Eugenie Brinkema describes the curious etymology of blindness as rooted in 
a question of troubled luminosity. The word blind derives from the ‘bases bhlendh (to glimmer 
indistinctly, to mix, confuse) and blesti (to become dark)’. ‘Blindness as an obstruction of sight 
is a relatively recent usage,’ she explains, ‘but the original sense of confusion, not sightlessness, 
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(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010), 206-7, original emphasis. 
  23 
is better suited for understanding the eye-dimming consequences of loss.’ Brinkema notes that 
the history of Western literature is suffused with examples of suffering as a loss of light, from 
the Bible, to St. Augustine, and Milton, all figuring lamentation as a ‘misery of light’. 
‘Mourning’s pain is figured as a matter of waning, dulling luminosity and troubled 
representation … sorrow slides between grief and darkness, suffering and blindness, material 
absence and absolute visual foreclosure.’38 Villette’s Lucy Snowe writes her memoirs in the 
absence of an image, ‘a face from my world taken away, for my eyes lost,’ (545) and the whole 
textual project can be read as her desperate looking for that lost figure, her lover, Monsieur 
Paul. His secret fate — is he dead? — is the source of troubled representation from which the 
text emerges, another ‘blank’ picture. ‘Eyes seek (a) being, but they do not see – for being is 
no longer there to be seen’.39 
 
 
 
A phenomenology of the eye 
 
The nineteenth-century has been characterised as one marked by a crisis of reason, and 
a consequent quest to antagonise the processes of knowledge.40 Bonaparte describes a triplet of 
existential shifts: a destabilising of the traditional terms of religious faith, in addition to a 
reconstitution of epistemological borders, and between these two upheavals, the demotion of 
reason from its medieval definition: ‘the ability to look at the world and at oneself from the 
perspective of the deity in the context of the whole universe.’ Denied this totalising perspective, 
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reason became a faculty detached from spiritual foundation, anchored instead to observation.41 
The rationalist desire made itself apparent in philosophy and poetics, and both Brontë and Eliot 
were fluent in the terms of the debate.42 At the centre of this query was the provocative nature 
and function of perception, a quandary both novelists took up directly in their writing. Brontë 
had a keen interest in natural science, well-versed in her father’s physiological texts. Eliot was 
a philosopher and literary critic before she turned to writing novels. As Rosemary Dodd points 
out, Eliot wanted to strengthen the knowledge claims of perception, and this impulse 
manifested in theoretical eclecticism.43  
In looking at a selection of texts produced between 1840 and 1862, I analyse a specific 
historical context, deliberately prior to celluloid film. It is a time when the stereoscope and 
other optical entertainments, such as the thaumotrope, kaleidoscope, and the magic lantern, 
were at the height of popularity, crossing from the laboratory to the domestic sphere with easy 
vagrancy. While there are obvious and fruitful points of intersection between the camera and 
the other, perhaps more rudimentary mass-produced optical technologies, this thesis is only 
tangentially concerned with the photographic image. My argument follows the kinetic, rather 
than the statically imagistic, whereas the generally unambiguous temporal qualities that are a 
hallmark of the photograph and its unique (apparent) mimicry of the human eye, bestow a 
stability of signification.  The photograph has been penetratingly analysed by Barthes as 
stubbornly ‘undialectical’: ‘[n]ot only is the photograph never, in essence, a memory,’ he 
writes, but it actually blocks memory, quickly becomes a counter-memory’.44 I look at optical 
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illusion, at the phantasmal and transparent over the frozen; at the images that are in a sense 
irrepressibly dialectical. I chart the aleatory and mercurial specular, particularly those images 
that exist only transitorily, with the temporality of the body — peering through the binocular 
lenses of the stereoscope, for example, or watching a magic lantern show — the ephemeral, 
visceral experiences that signified what Smith describes as a cultural investment and 
fascination with ‘the intricacies of the sense of sight’.45 The Victorians were perplexed and 
disturbed by the operation of the visual faculty. As Marina Benjamin writes, ‘spectacle and 
illusion marched hand in hand through these decades – the magic lantern and the stereoscope 
being perhaps the most popular devices that welded the act of vision to an ethos of deception.’ 
46  
 With sight shifted to a new plane, what were the grounds of the body’s awareness? In 
Embodied: Victorian Literature and the Senses, William A. Cohen claims that, ‘far from 
valorising the liberal Enlightenment subject … many Victorian writers challenged and indeed 
undermined such concepts, and they did so by grappling tenaciously with the material existence 
of the human body’. There was an ‘emphasis on the body, in all the messiness and particularity 
of its fleshy existence.’ The writers that Cohen is concerned with, a group that includes Brontë 
and Eliot, ‘present a fluid exchange between surface and depth, inside and outside – a type of 
materialism that understands the organs of … sensation not simply to model but to perform the 
flow of matter and information between subject and world’.47 Crary, on the other hand, claims 
that modernity demanded a disembodied visual capacity:  
the sense of touch had been an integral part of classical theories of 
vision in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The subsequent 
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dissociation of touch from sight occurs within a pervasive “separation 
of the senses” … in the nineteenth century. The loss of touch as a 
conceptual component of vision meant the unloosening of the eye from 
the network of referentiality incarnated in tactility and its subjective 
relation to perceived space.  
 
With the eye ‘unloosened’ and enabled a startling volition, vision becomes fetishised. The act 
of looking and the relation with the body that observes are a new source of anxiety: a distressing 
of the terms of visuality that I think is homologous to the ‘unloosening’ tendencies of grieving. 
Crary uses the stereoscope, Charles Wheatstone’s invention of the late 1830s, as a model for 
the severance of the tactile and the visual, producing a ‘denial of the body, its pulsings and 
phantasms,’ as the foundation of vision.48 I draw on the stereoscopic image in the following 
chapters as the exemplary optical apparatus that lucidly brought to life the contiguity of eye 
and instrument. But unlike Crary, I trace the stereoscopic (by which I denote a bifurcated 
picture that nonetheless gives an illusion of totality, modelling the binocular structure of the 
gaze), as an expression of morbid affect in its own right, variously incarnated in narrative. 
Peering through one of the variety of stereoscopic models, which were designed for domestic 
use, a viewer has the impression of being pulled into the image. The fallacy of depth is created 
by the movement of the viewer’s hand: one must turn a knob to collapse together the two 
images of infinitesimal variance, but the totality of absorption is spooky. Depth and space are 
prematurely resolved, radically shortened and vertiginous. The body of the spectator seems in 
the moment of viewing to merge with the object beheld.49 It is a quintessentially gothic scene, 
liminal, aporetic, and inducing a primal haunting that is at once grotesque and seductive. David 
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Brewster, an early manufacturer of the stereoscope, enthuses about the diverse applications of 
his model for entertainment purposes, such as in the cosmorama, which exhibits dissolving 
views: 
 ‘A cathedral in all its architectural beauty may be combined with the same 
building in the act of being burned to the ground … one picture gradually 
disappears, or dissolves, and the second picture gradually appears till the first 
vanishes and the second occupies its place. A great deal of ingenuity is 
displayed by the Parisian artists in the composition of these pictures, and the 
exhibition of them … never fails to excite admiration.’50 
 
 The superimposition of two conflicting scenes brings to mind Villette’s double ending: by 
refusing to resolve Monsieur Paul’s fate, both pictures — his happy life with Lucy Snowe, and 
his drowning at sea on his voyage home to her — can co-exist in a perpetual dis-equilibrium, 
neither one, nor the other.51  
The specular disenchantment and the aberrations of the perceiving body that are found 
in the novels of Brontë, Eliot, and their contemporaries, such as Hardy and Dickens, present a 
discursive dynamic that is insistent in its merging of subjective and objective apprehension of 
the material world. It is best described as a privileging of the phenomenal, and is more than a 
mere Romantic pushing back against raw materialism, although that is certainly a factor in 
play;52 it is fundamentally an existential probing of the cleavage between consciousness and 
external reality, mediated by an authorial subjectivity. 
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In his study of the sensory quality of Victorian novels, Cohen sets out the reasons why 
many novelists sought metaphors of phenomenal subjectivity: 
 
‘[A]ttending to sense perception serves several purposes. In 
physiological terms, it provides a mechanism for showing how the 
world of objects – including other bodies – enters the body of the 
subject and remakes its interior entities. In psychological terms, 
because “feelings” lie in a grey zone between physical sensations and 
emotional response, somatic and affective experiences can switch, 
blend, or substitute one for another. In a phenomenological sense, 
attending to sense perception enables embodied subjects to experience 
themselves as objects, and objects reciprocally to function as subjects, 
so as to permit a mutual perviousness between self and world. And in 
a particularly literary register, sensation affords writers a means of 
concretely representing emotions, desires, and impulses that tend – at 
least in nineteenth-century literary idioms – to be otherwise 
unrepresentably abstract or ethereal.’53  
 
 Cohen captures both the aptness and the limitations of metaphors of sensation in expressing 
the un-expressible, such as mournfulness. He invokes the difficulty inherent to realist narrative 
in particular of rendering with integrity the mercurial nature of the inner life. Peter Brooks 
summarises the contradiction of the body as it is conceived linguistically: ‘we tend to think of 
the physical body as precultural and prelinguistic: sensations of pleasure and especially of pain 
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… are generally held to be outside language’.54 Brooks points out a paradox with our entire 
discursive construct of physicality: sensations essentially give us our language of the body, yet 
the moment we begin to speak of them, we lose the body; discourse is founded on the absence 
of the body. How do we bring the outside in and reflect the inside, out? Virginia Woolf, one of 
the most eloquent writers on the dearth of metaphor for illness, addresses this question in her 
essay, On Being Ill. Woolf questions why disease or despair have not been taken up by the 
novel as grand themes, in the way that love or heroism appear to be. The sentiment is that 
desolation is content-less for the novel to consider at length, (Woolf echoes Brontë’s sense of 
grief’s linguistic impoverishment) and so ‘the assault of fever or the oncome of melancholia’ 
are neglected:   
[L]iterature does its best to maintain that its concern is with the mind; that 
the body is a sheet of plain glass through which the soul looks straight and 
clear, and, save for one or two passions such as desire and greed, is null, and 
negligible and non-existent. On the contrary, the very opposite is true. All 
day, all night the body intervenes; blunts or sharpens, colours or discolours 
… the creature within can only gaze through the pane – smudged or rosy; it 
cannot separate off from the body like the sheath of a knife … [but] of this 
daily drama of the body there is no record.55 
 
 To dwell on sorrow is thought to be deadening to the imagination, even, Woolf suggests, 
dangerous to evolutionary progress (‘buildings would cease to rise,’ and ‘there would be an 
end to music’), and so we return to the teleology of the successful narrative, the novel of 
progress.  
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Woolf omits Brontë’s Villette (1853), which painstakingly documents the agonies of 
melancholic suffering, of fever and isolation, of a nobody’s story. Villette is a meta-narrative 
about anguish, keenly self-conscious of its aberrational standing as a Victorian novel without 
a heroine suitable for romance, without a marriage, and even without a plot. Over several 
hundred pages, Brontë’s narrator, Lucy Snowe, dwells on an unnamed grief, while pointing 
out the inadequacy of her loss, its failure as narrative. Describing how she was driven, as a 
staunch Protestant, to make a confessional unburdening to a Catholic priest, for example, Lucy 
explains her act:  
‘I cannot put the case into words, but, my days and nights were grown 
intolerable; a cruel sense of desolation pained my mind: a feeling that 
would make its way, rush out, or kill me … I wanted companionship, I 
wanted friendship, I wanted counsel. I could find none of these in 
closet, or chamber, so I went and sought them in church in 
confessional. As to what I said, it was no confidence, no narrative. I 
have done nothing wrong: my life has not been active enough for any 
dark deed, either of romance or reality: all I poured out was a dreary, 
desperate complaint’ (V, 219).56  
 
Brontë voices through her heroine a fear that her novel could be read as exactly that, ‘a dreary, 
desperate, complaint’; yet she pursues the story of grief’s motions, and in doing so, re-writes 
the terms of what a novel can be. Many critics have indeed criticized Lucy Snowe’s obstinate 
morbidity, but the unmistakable poignancy of her grief has not been lost on readers. Lucy’s 
designation of her utterance as ‘no confidence, no narrative,’ is an ingenuous ploy to make a 
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case for the novel of psychic anguish, while at the same time, revealing an anxiety about its 
textual validity, as though Brontë were purchasing indemnity to speak of pain.   
 
The technologised eye 
 
Describing the proliferation of what were referred to as philosophical toys — the 
phenakiscope, thaumotrope, and kaleidoscope, among other meta-visual devices —  Gunning 
argues for the production of a new type of image in the nineteenth-century, ‘the technological 
image,’ which was as much mechanic as it was perceptual. Pointing out the phenomenological 
effects of these hallucinatory devices, he frames the resulting pictorial union of motion, 
transformation, and human agency (achieved in manipulating the effects with one’s hand, for 
example), as a site of play, ‘an inversion of meaning’. By staging a liberation of static 
representation, he argues, the composite image presented by these toys playfully points up the 
‘trick’ inherent in the eye, the binocular perspective that concretises into an apparently 
monocular picture. Such toys were a self-reflective entertainment that sparked ‘delight’ for the 
viewer.57 Yet the same fantastically unstable properties of these toys, in addition to their 
embedded self-consciousness, gave rise to a poetic re-figuring of the eye’s hidden flaw, 
gathering potency as a metaphor of elegy, rather than mere novelty. The experience of ocular 
illusion is one of antithesis. The mediating power of the instrument exposes the gaze in its 
suspiciously provisional qualities. A technological image is an abstraction of the real, and its 
disengagement from the subject mimics the way the body is atomised or made formless in loss. 
Isobel Armstrong calls the new mass-produced image a ‘lesion’;58 this way of seeing replicates, 
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or instances the wound of the subject who looks. The unfixed status of the seen figured in the 
technological image mimics the unboundedness of personhood in the unmoored optical field.  
If I seem at times in this introduction to be folding the visual into the tactile, it is because 
I wish to mark out a broader synaesthetic geography in studying visuality. At stake in the novels 
I discuss is a larger questioning of the role of perception in affective life: where does sensation 
and feeling begin and end? It is difficult to give an accurate picture of the sheer diversity of the 
materialist discussions occurring across a range of discourses during the nineteenth century. A 
collection of contemporary texts that captures that spirit of enquiry into the disjointed mysteries 
of the mind and body can be found in Jenny Bourne Taylor and Sally Shuttleworth’s anthology, 
Embodied Selves. The editors write that they are engaging in a myth-busting exercise, to 
replace the misconception of Victorian notions of self as rigid and stratified, with an insight 
into the vigorous, ‘endless’ discussions of fluid identity which were crucial to the formation of 
‘deep’ personhood at this time, ‘debates which expressed a profoundly ambivalent sense of 
self’.59 The work of Herbert Spencer provides a seminal example. A leading figure in 
materialism, whose major work, Principles of Biology (1864), made a distinct impression upon 
George Eliot, he conceived of sight in tactile terms. Spencer observed that the eye was 
fashioned from dermal matter, and, as Cohen notes, his ‘proposal that eye and skin are 
fundamentally contiguous’ implies that seeing can have the characteristics of direct, tactile 
contact.60 Other polymath intellectuals such as Spencer, George Henry Lewes, Alexander Bain, 
and James Sully among others, theorised with increasing detail the unique and eccentric 
conditions pertaining to vision. James Mill classes vision as an emotional category, instructing 
his reader to ‘acquire the habit of reflecting upon his Sensations, as a distinct class of feelings; 
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and … be prepared to mark well the distinction between them and other states of mind’.61 Bain 
goes further, describing sensations as ‘states of consciousness,’ which, nevertheless, do not 
emerge from within, but are wholly external.62 What nineteenth-century physiological and 
psychological accounts have in common is a determination to classify the senses as distinct 
impressions that are unfailingly lucid in their cause. ‘We never confound a feeling of sight with 
a feeling of sound, a touch with a smell,’ Bain writes, ‘the discrimination of them is sure and 
perfect.’63 At times, however, a synaesthetic quality belies strict causality. In The Physiology 
of Common Life, Lewes concludes his study of the visual sense with a remark on the subjective 
nature of sight:  
 
We can no longer suppose that we see the objects themselves. Our 
visual sensations are simply excited states of our sentient organism. 
Hence it is not more wonderful that a man whose eye was extirpated 
should perceive, when the other eye was closed, different images, such 
as light, circles of fire, dancing figures … floating in front of the 
eyeless orbit, than that a man whose leg has been amputated should feel 
distinct prickings in the absent toes.  
 
This, he continues, explains the phenomenon of ‘spectral illusions. It is well known that 
persons suffering from brain disease … have seen spectral objects with a vividness equal to 
that of actual vision. A black cat is seen to run up the wall; a person is seen to enter the room; 
and no assurance of the bystanders to the contrary will persuade the patient that what he sees 
so vividly is not actually present.’64  
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The phenomenon of the eidetic after-image that Lewes describes — an object that in its 
absence lingers as a trace on the retina, sometimes lurid, at other times ghosted — was itself a 
generator of a succession of rippling images in scientific literature. One of the writers who 
mined its full subjective implications was Goethe. In his Theory of Colours (1810) he outlined 
numerous experiments and variations on his theme of visual aberration and freaks of 
perception. Cataloguing ‘morbid and other extraordinary affections of the retina,’ he designates 
objective and subjective persistent images, which are conditioned by individual pathologies 
and neuroses.  If the retina is excessively impressible, this is considered by Goethe as proof of 
morbidity, (he notes a horrifying case of an after-image that persisted for ten years). ‘The 
weaker the organ the longer the impression of the image lasts,’ he concludes, implying an 
anthropomorphic quality to the eye, a common feature of optical texts of this period, as though 
that organ were a separate species. ‘The retina does not soon recover itself; and the effect may 
be considered as a kind of paralysis.’ His list of extraordinary specular events — ‘Büsch relates 
of himself that the image of an engraving, complete in all its parts, was impressed on the eye 
for seventeen minutes’ — and his persistent focus on the eccentric workings of the eye of the 
ill, deranged, or otherwise emotionally fraught, indicate the quasi-mystical force the eye had 
by this stage acquired, and its embeddedness in a range of violent or traumatic narratives of the 
dis-eased body.65    
 Charlotte Brontë frequently draws on the metaphor of what is known as persistent 
vision, the ‘lurid hieroglyphics’ of the mind’s eye. Lucy Snowe’s red-soaked vision upon 
waking after a nervous collapse (‘The returning sense of sight came upon me, red, as if it swam 
in blood’ (V, 195)) echoes Goethe’s account of a veil of red on the eyeballs of the ill: ‘Many 
sick persons, on awaking, see everything … as if through a red veil,’ a form of pathological 
                                                        
65 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Theory of Colours, trans. Charles Lock Eastlake (London: Frank Cass and Co., 
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colour. ‘The senses,’ he explains, ‘may be so influenced by an unusual state, that the whole 
nervous system, and particularly the retina, may sink into a kind of inertness,’ producing a 
vermilion image.66 In Goethe’s examples, trauma is dialectically produced as an attack on 
consciousness, an assault of rampant hues, the self besieged by the hallucinatory properties of 
the eye. If the lens can fill up like a blood-filled basin, the capacity to see is literalised as a 
mode of horror: perceiving is an encounter with the malevolent chimeras of being. As Terry 
Castle observes, through a series of linguistic shifts ‘the [nineteenth-century] mind had become 
a phantom-zone —  given over, at least potentially, to spectral presences and haunting 
obsessions. A new kind of daemonic possession became possible’. The popular spectre-shows 
of the period simulated a ‘maddening, irrational perception,’ projecting ghostly scenes that in 
their uncanniness, rendered precarious their illusionistic quality. This gap was mined by writers 
for its destabilising potential, drawing upon ‘the phantasmagoria figure precisely as a way of 
destabilising the ordinary boundaries between inside and outside, mind and world, illusion and 
reality’67: the function of the Gothic. The spectral imagination, projected in various 
technologies of abstraction, is transmogrified into a capacious symbol of optical 
disenfranchisement, which, in the novels I look at, figures the peculiar terror of the 
ungovernable, permeable human body.  
The Gothic connotations of Goethe’s veil of red are sympathetic to Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick’s reading of that garment. The ‘attributes of the veil, and of the surface generally,’ 
she writes, ‘are contagious metonymically, by touch, and a related thematic strain depicts veils, 
like flesh, as suffused or marked with blood.’68 We can trace a homological lineage of the 
bloodied retinal scene through Brontë’s Villette to Eliot’s The Lifted Veil, which concludes 
with a sensational depiction of a blood transfusion. Just as Victorian physiologists stressed a 
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nexus of sensory experience and inner states, so too can we track a nexus of the wounded mind-
body, the violent perturbations of the specular, and the gothic horrors immanent in ordinary 
experience.  
 
 Lewes recounts a personal experience of persistent sensation, which unfolds with the 
uncanny qualities of a ghost story. Walking past a familiar shop in a city street, he turned 
suddenly to look at its front: 
I was completely dazzled by the bright reflection of the sun shining on 
the new brass-plate under the window of the shop, so that for some 
seconds I could see nothing. As we walked on, I soon observed before 
me in the air the words ‘J. Johnson and Co.,’ in blood-red characters, 
which soon, however, changed to other colours. With an exclamation 
of surprise I stated the fact, and we turned back to see whether or not 
this was really the inscription on the brass-plate, and found that it was. 
The optical account of this was simple enough. The retina had been 
partly paralysed from the intense light reflected from the plate, but as I 
had turned with pain from it instantly, the part corresponding to the 
black letters on the plate had escaped; as I walked on, the red strong 
light reflected from surrounding objects on this part became contrasted 
with the darkness, as yet showing itself on all the surrounding parts of 
the disordered retina.69  
 
 Besieged by the letters that he must first have unconsciously ‘seen’, Lewes is haunted despite 
or even because of his materialist, logical containment of the eeriness of this ‘fixed vision’.  
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The whole of his lengthy explication on the precise mechanics of the eye, with its emphasis on 
technical precision and objectivity, its account of tingling nerves, pulses, and dilations (at one 
point referring to the ‘nervous character of the retina’ [331]), is self-consciously alive to the 
frisson of the visual. As Peter Garratt observes, the psychological theories of perception in 
Lewes, Bain, Ruskin and Spencer ‘question the eye exact’:  
 
They deny the clarity of the gaze, and describe the routine unreliability 
of the sensory foundations of sight; they open up the psychological gap 
into which memory and association insert contingent mental activity 
and shape what the viewer sees; and they show how feeling frequently 
shades into perception in infinitesimal ordinary ways. Above all, their 
accounts of perception stress the uncertainties latent in the mediating 
apparatuses of seeing. Such issues were central to empiricism, which 
had always presupposed a relationship between perception and 
knowledge. 
 
But a closer look at their work shows that ‘anxieties over irrationalities of the eye, the limits of 
perception, and threat of visual incoherence, all multiplied the epistemological doubt in the 
gaze for many nineteenth-century theorists’.70  
In Brontë’s fiction the after-image resists rationality, as the author manipulates 
moments of retinal disorder to evoke states that betray categorisation, creating hallucinatory 
visual scapes that conjure the destabilising effects of emotional trauma. Visual distortion, in 
other words, does not lose its mysticism in Brontë’s work, but amounts to an opaque sign of 
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the haunted psyche. The author had early begun to play with vaporous images which dispersed 
as though in a dissolving view. In a short story written in 1829, ‘An Adventure in Ireland,’ the 
protagonist finds himself in a haunted mansion for a night, where he is beset by visions, 
seeming to ‘discern something white through the darkness which surrounded me.’ With the 
‘help of reason,’ however, he masters such ‘idle fancies’. Once in bed, though, enclosed by 
semi-transparent curtains, he is tormented by a series of half-formed images which unfold one 
into the next, ambivalently registered by the narrator as both illusion and reality.71 That gothic 
romance of the juvenilia, with its crude projection of the mind’s fears, becomes in the later 
novels a sophisticated exploration of interiority: the ‘lurid hieroglyphics’ (142) written across 
the façade of Thornfield; or Bertha’s appearance on the eve of Jane’s wedding to Rochester, 
when the doppelganger of that forbidden spectre merges ambiguously with the heroine’s 
identity (‘I was aware her [Bertha’s] lurid visage flamed over mine, and I lost 
consciousness’).72     
George Eliot also weights her metaphors of visual abnormality with the fragmentations 
of the inner life, most famously in the ‘disease of the retina’ that besets Dorothea Casaubon in 
St Peter’s in Middlemarch. Her moment of desolation comes upon her as an ‘electric shock’ of 
the imagination, a swirl of images that render affect as imagery. Rome is one open-air museum 
and its sensuous, ancient ideals 
urged themselves on her with that ache belonging to a glut of confused 
ideas … Forms both pale and glowing took possession of her young 
sense, and fixed themselves in her memory even when she was not 
thinking of them, preparing strange associations which remained 
through her after-years. Our moods are apt to bring with them images 
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which succeed each other like the magic-lantern pictures of a doze […] 
Dorothea all her life continued to see the vastness of St Peter’s … and 
the red drapery which was being hung for Christmas spreading itself 
everywhere like a disease of the retina.73 
 
Here Eliot tropes on the shape-shifting pictures of the magic lantern to suggest Dorothea’s 
entrance into mourning; it is not her eye that is diseased, but her idealistic hopes in being the 
wife of Edward Casaubon, dreams now dying in a city of artefacts. What literary discursive 
practices of looking as perceiving suggest is the infinitesimal affective properties of the lens; 
that in containing the visual field, there is a similar containment of subjective states. In other 
words, there is a kind of mutual sympathy between interiority and exteriority, a synthesis of 
states, one conditioned by the other. In this phenomenological model of consciousness, the 
subjective mode extends into the object under perception, as the object wraps round the 
conscious ‘I.’ Dorothea’s chain of imagery in which forms ‘took possession of her young sense, 
and fixed themselves in her memory even when she was not thinking of them, preparing strange 
associations’ is akin to Merleau-Ponty’s cluster of image substitutions, in which it is our past 
emotional experience that determines the significance of the present image. If, as Merleau-
Ponty argues, ‘consciousness [is] defined as sensation, every mode of consciousness will have 
to derive its clarity from sensation…. Knowledge thus appears as a system of substitutions in 
which one impression announces others’.74  There is both a pleasure and a terror in recognising 
the boundlessness of perceptivity. A kind of tension is apparent, then, between the various, 
sometimes competing employment of visual metaphors in this period, and the novelist could 
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recapitulate the transcendent qualities of the gaze, or conversely, expand the threat of the retina 
to incorporate the shuddering effects of potent grief.      
Woolf’s metaphor of the body as a supposedly transparent glassy surface, from which 
the self must gaze, is particularly germane to my study. For the answer to the problem of the 
silenced affective body is partially to be found in the labile qualities of light. All of the visual 
antagonisms that I have pointed to hinge upon the matter of light, being the very substance of 
sight: ‘what light could no longer stamp upon [the] eye,’ as Jane describes it (JE, 451). When 
Jane returns to her blind lover, Rochester, she gives an impression not of his blindness, but of 
what his sightlessness looks like to her; in other words, it is an account of her anguish at 
witnessing his disability, the beginning of a series of transferences of sight and blindness 
between the couple, as though they were instancing that phenomenological porousness of 
subject and object described above by Cohen: ‘[Rochester] lifted his head and opened his 
eyelids; gazed blank, and with a straining effort, on the sky, and towards the amphitheatre of 
trees: one saw that all to him was void darkness’ (JE, 431). The ‘void darkness’ of Jane’s 
translation of his sightlessness tells us something about the ‘primal scene’ of what is called 
Newtonianism, the discovery of inverted light-waves emanating as colour, projected through 
the camera obscura of Newton’s darkroom; after Newton’s discovery, ‘[d]arkness is now 
known through light’.75 Brontë re-makes her ‘poor, obscure, plain, and little’ heroine into an 
embodiment of that light through which Rochester is taught to ‘see’ again (JE, 253). Jane is 
the emptied-out vessel of dark loss recast as a light-giving body. The story of light and its 
polarity shades into the story of the technological image, and the mourning subject; a specular 
network of reflection, refraction and doubling.  
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Blindness and the phantasmal 
 
There is apparent in these novels a primacy of the visual, and yet in staging various 
moments of impaired or denied seeing — Rochester’s maimed sight in Jane Eyre; Latimer’s 
childhood blindness in The Lifted Veil; Lucy Snowe’s refusal to reveal her past in Villette; 
Romola’s father’s blind grief for his lost son in Romola— these texts illustrate a hyper-
awareness of the conditions of embodiment that structure optics. Both Eliot and Brontë present 
a problem of the seeing subject, one that is unresolved and without resolution, manifest in a 
confusion of abstruse sensory data. The conflictual sensory dynamic that I explore is then best 
understood in its shifts from the visual, to the tactile and auditory, to smell and taste, and 
beyond, to the sensory life of other characters. I suggest that these novels invoke a sensory 
unconscious, reified in the convergence of modes of grieving and ways of seeing. While much 
of my analysis does focus on a visual dialect, I resist reinstating a hierarchy of the senses.  
 
 In Diderot’s extraordinary An Essay on Blindness (1773), he recounts his conversation 
with a blind man, a mathematician, for whom tactility is visuality. According to Diderot, the 
man discusses sight with more perspicacity than Descartes, revealing an obsession with looking 
glasses, which he has known only by touch: 
 
 ‘This blind man has no other object, but by the touch. He knows, by 
the account of others, that objects are known by means of the sight, as 
to him by the touch … he further knows, that there is no seeing one’s 
own face, though it may be touched. He must therefore conclude sight 
to be a kind of touch, reaching only to objects different from our face, 
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and at a distance from us. The touch gives him an idea only of relief: 
“therefore,” adds he, “a looking-glass is a machine representing us in 
relief out of ourselves.”’76  
 
Diderot’s privileging of tactility over visuality indicates an anti-Enlightenment challenge to the 
epistemological certainties of vision. He indicates that only through simulated blindness can a 
sighted man even begin to understand what it means to see, and that the blind have an 
instinctive, pre-visual knowledge of apprehending, which the sighted person can only ever 
appropriate; blindness becomes a sixth sense. In Eliot’s portrait of the blind scholar Bardo, in 
Romola, we see the same substitution of the tactile for the visual, but Eliot is far more sceptical 
as to Bardo’s acuity than is Diderot towards his subject. Bardo’s touch is misleading and in 
some instances, a cruel mismatching of perception and reality. Rochester’s blindness in Jane 
Eyre is altogether different; his voided sight represents his neo-vitalism, his awakening to 
knowledge. In both cases though, we find an expansion of the visual by the tactile. I think that 
these novels share the anti-visual impulse that Diderot expressed, himself an avowed 
materialist. They appreciate a kind of perceptiveness that is as much tactile as it is visual. The 
metaphors in frequent use insist on their assimilation: Villette’s Lucy Snowe, for instance, 
grieves with both eyes and hands upon waking up in her simulated bedroom in Bretton, her 
vision aching as she beholds her childhood needlework, which she finished ‘stroke by stroke 
and touch by touch’ (V, 197).  
  
Unlike Crary and other scholars in this field, I do not interpret the literary appropriation 
of scientific rhetoric in Foucauldian terms as illustrative of the nefarious operations of power 
and the making of the modern, traumatised subject-observer of spectacle. In other words, while 
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I am interested in the self-regulatory gaze, I do not embed it within a totalitarian scopic regime. 
Such arguments are often skilfully articulated and persuasive, but the casualty of focusing 
attention on institutionalised dynamics of power is precisely the valences of subjectivity that 
such critiques intend to reinstitute. Studying the body in this manner strikes me (in certain 
instances) as utilitarian, neglecting the somatic sensitivities of lived experience. In other words, 
the quiet life of the sensitised, feeling body, the mourner’s body, is further silenced in pursuit 
of a more abstract and generalised acquaintance with loss. Thus my readings of Brontë’s 
Villette, for example, resituate the text in a perspectival field that highlights the novel’s drive 
to resist, yet at the same time articulate, unspeakable grief.  
  This thesis is deeply invested in the phenomenological character of the novels and the 
transitive powers of grief. The vein of phenomenology that I think is most suggestive for a 
reading of Victorian fictions of sensuality is the twentieth-century continental philosophy of 
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, and its literary-critical incarnation in Bachelard. A philosophical 
movement rather than a distinct theoretical discipline, its proponents can essentially be grouped 
in their ‘commitment to thick, contextualised descriptions of lived experience and of the world 
as we encounter and understand it from a first-person point of view.’77 This descriptive 
subjective is antecedent to objective categorisation and reductionist theory. Phenomenology 
finds its most lucid interpretation in the work of Merleau-Ponty:  
[T]he relationship between human beings and things is no longer one 
of distance and mastery such as that which obtained between the 
sovereign mind and the piece of wax in Descartes’ famous description. 
Rather, the relationship is less clear-cut: vertiginous proximity prevents 
us both from apprehending ourselves as a pure intellect separate from 
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things and from defining things as pure objects lacking in all human 
attributes.78  
 
That ‘vertiginous proximity’ of things, the transference of emotional qualities into synthetic 
experience and vice-versa, is palpably figured in Victorian fiction, so enthralled as it is by 
materiality of both persons and objects. The fusion of the world of things, what Kate E. Brown 
theorises as ‘beloved objects’,79 and the peculiar, even disturbing ways they vitalise immaterial 
substance is crucial to the intimacy of mourning and visuality. Brontë’s extant belongings, the 
siblings’ collection of ‘little books’, and the mourning jewellery and other tokens in 
remembrance of Emily and Anne, for instance, powerfully model the dynamics of embodied 
loss that I have outlined. A visitor to the Brontë Parsonage Museum is struck by the sheer 
materiality of both Brontë’s compositional process and the haunting microscopic forms in 
which she stored her writing. To take one of the miniature books in hand is to feel the gossamer 
lightness of the wafer-like paper, minuscule prose lining the pages, illegible to the naked, 
untrained eye; Brontë had an abiding fascination with questions of representation and the self, 
and the miniature represents for her a mode both of articulating and safely containing her 
interiority. The tactility of the mourning jewellery,  with samples of her sisters’ hair, entwined 
and encased in various clasps, and their special relationship with the wearer’s body, sustaining 
the body of the dead, is another potent act of corporeal mourning as preservation: ‘it projects 
an eternalised future-past upon the subject’.80  The preciousness that inheres in wearing a 
fragment of the other upon the surface of the skin, as much tactile as it is a visual token, is 
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evocative of many such phenomenological moments in Jane Eyre and Villette.  All of which is 
to say that Charlotte Brontë early on sought a modality of loss that was indelibly somatic, 
inscribing her interior life upon the surface of the page, doubling as the dermal surfaces of her 
own body. There is a mutability between the ontological condition of the body and that of the 
text that is richly suggestive for the critic interested in the phantasmic properties of the material. 
The seeing body, the visualised body is a locus for grief’s transitive currents: the mourning 
tokens are objects that demand the gaze, an insistence of the dead beloved’s image.   
 
 
Spinozan optics 
 
The second half of this thesis introduces the effects of Spinozism, in sudden vogue in 
Victorian England. Spinoza, as I show, is crucial to understanding Eliot’s conception of the 
grieving imagination. Eliot was a dedicated scholar of Spinoza, translating both his major 
works in the 1840s. Along with her husband, George Henry Lewes, they formed a coterie of 
Spinoza devotees, a growing group of English intellectuals who championed Spinoza’s 
geometric and notoriously difficult philosophy, even as its influence was then languishing on 
the continent.81 As Rick Rylance notes, Spinoza was regarded as a ‘crucial figure’ in the mid-
1850’s, recognised as instituting the ‘‘First Crisis in Modern Philosophy,’ by shifting the 
burden of argument from ontological to psychological grounds’.82 In a piece written for The 
Fortnightly Review (one of several he wrote on Spinoza), Lewes describes the paucity of 
information on the man whom he described as ‘[g]reat, among the greatest as a Thinker,’ there 
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being no English translation of Spinoza’s works. There was, at the time when his interest was 
first ignited, ‘nothing but vague denunciation or absurd misrepresentation … [and] I happened 
to be hungering for some knowledge of this theological pariah – partly, no doubt because he 
was an outcast, for … I was then suffering the social persecution which embitters all departure 
from accepted creeds’.83 In a symmetry between Eliot and her husband, both writers turned to 
Spinoza at a period of immense personal trauma, no doubt finding in his mathematical 
fashioning of affect a meditative quality. In his recent biography of the author, Philip Davis 
points to the resonant sadness that Eliot found in Spinoza’s life and works, which, along with 
her own experiences of anguish, she threaded into her novels. ‘Always Spinoza stressed the 
damage, the diminution of the life of the self that sadness not only caused but itself constituted,’ 
he writes, a description that recalls Ratcliffe’s account of the rupturing effects of grief. Through 
Spinoza’s work: 
 ‘[Eliot] learnt to know how suffering was not some martyr-like good … but 
was, as Spinoza said, a subtraction and diminishment of her capacity for life. 
…  Her reading of Spinoza was therefore not just another apprenticeship step 
in becoming ‘a novelist of ideas’. What she found were notes towards the act 
of mental self-transformation. … What Spinoza offered was not cold 
inhuman reason but an implicitly passionate act of analysis, emotion taken 
up into thought of itself, into the capacity to think.’84  
 
Spinoza holds that grief is ‘directly evil,’ an affect that makes itself felt as a corporeal, psychic 
frailty. The body’s ‘power of acting is absolutely diminished or restrained,’ he argues, which, 
in the context of Spinoza’s monistic structure, implies nothing less than the defeat of one’s 
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purposive being (E, IV, P41, 138). There is no creative wellspring at the heart of suffering, as 
appears in other discourses of mourning;85 it is pure bondage, enslavement to a set of images 
that have lodged in the psyche.    
The impact of Spinozism is one of the under-examined features of the history of 
phenomenology, in both its nascent or prophetic presence in Victorian theories of 
consciousness, and in later developments. Two divergent strains open up in the legacy of 
Spinozism, one that accommodates the embedded-ness of the self in the world and the other 
that regards Spinoza’s staunch rationalism as a barrier to the potential solipsistic drive of 
phenomenological thinking. These threads are important for the argument I present in 
following chapters. Spinoza is not often paired with histories of Victorian visuality. Yet the 
links are undeniably fruitful; Spinoza was a lens-maker, and a friend of Christiaan Huygens 
(1629-1695), the Dutch physicist and optical inventor. As Simon During observes, this 
relationship is particularly interesting because Huygens produced a series of sketches that could 
be considered as the first conception of the magic lantern, of which he was certainly the world’s 
first manufacturer. During notes that, while Spinoza makes no explicit reference to his friend’s 
apparatus, the magic lantern was ‘potentially a danger to his philosophical system’.86 Spinoza 
conceived of Nature as a perfect materialisation of God’s substance, operating by mechanically 
symbiotic laws. Where there is deviance and aberration it is a product of the human mind’s 
delusional weakness. The matter of our imagination, writes During (paraphrasing Spinoza), 
belongs to the domain of signs, and ‘forms the matter of mutable history’. The apparatuses of 
optical illusion provide a potential threat to Spinoza’s rationalist processes because they 
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‘technologise the imagination and confer a material membrane on images … [and] it hinders 
the kind of inspection which resolves the world into adequate ideas’.87 While I shall go on in 
later chapters to contest this all-too familiar categorisation of Spinoza’s theory of the 
imagination as a resolutely fearsome thing, his referencing of Huygens is valuable as a means 
of drawing parallels between the content of Spinoza’s philosophy and his professional 
involvement with the materials of image-creation.88 Hegel, distrustful of the promise of 
transparency held by glass, nevertheless wrote admiringly of Spinoza’s lens-grinding.  
 Unlike During, I do not believe that the models of optical entertainments are 
oppositional to Spinozistic reason; on the contrary, as I argue in chapters three and four, the 
mind-body image becomes in the Ethics a compound synonymous with affect itself. The 
phenomenal is not opposed to the logical in Spinoza’s theory of the body’s power of acting, or 
the potential attainment of reason. Indeed, the imagistic, affective consciousness is the seed of 
rational introspection. One of the best examples of this can be found in Spinoza’s analogy of 
the sunlight’s reflection, in the Ethics. As he writes:  
‘An imagination is an idea which indicates the present constitution of 
the human body more than the nature of an external body – not 
distinctly of course, but confusedly. … [W]hen we look at the sun, we 
imagine it to be about two hundred feet away from us. In this we are 
deceived so long as we are ignorant of its true distance; but when its 
distance is known, the error is removed, not the imagination, that is, 
the idea of the sun, which explains its nature only so far as the body is 
affected by it. And so, although we come to know the true distance, we 
shall nevertheless imagine it as near us.’  
                                                        
87 During, ibid., 265.  
88 Hegel, while distrustful of the promise of transparency held by glass, nevertheless wrote admiringly of 
Spinoza’s lens-grinding: ‘It was no arbitrary choice that led him to occupy himself with light’. G. W. F. Hegel, 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy, cited in Armstrong, Glassworlds, 11. 
  50 
 
Thus, he concludes, ‘when the rays of the sun, falling on the surface of the water, are reflected 
to our eyes, we imagine it as if it were in the water, even if we know its true place.’ (E, IV, 
P1).89 George Eliot translates his conclusions thus: ‘And so other imaginations by which the 
mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural constitution of the body or an increase or 
diminution of its powers of action, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish in its 
presence.’90 The only means by which an imagination vanishes is by the imposition of another, 
stronger image presented to our mind’s eye, an endlessly palimpsestic process. In my reading 
Spinoza addresses the primacy and immediacy of the imagistic imagination, as well as the 
imbrication of consciousness and material substance characteristic of nineteenth-century 
visuality. My interest in Spinoza is exclusively centred upon his major work, the Ethics (1677), 
specifically the human subject’s affective enslavement to the distortions of the visual realm. In 
Spinoza’s theory of perception, I argue, Eliot found a corollary of her culture’s contemporary 
preoccupation with the imagistic, affective consciousness. I draw on Spinoza, then, in the 
service of my larger preoccupation with Victorian specularity and phenomenology, uniting the 
two to pursue an alternative critique of Eliot’s two most problematic works.   
  Some twentieth-century French phenomenologists, such as Husserl, identified in 
Spinozism a verification for the imagistic associationism that grounded their notion of a 
person’s identification with the world. In his history of the reception and fate of Spinozism in 
twentieth-century France, Knox Peden notes the countervailing antagonism that grew up 
against the supposed irrationalities of continental phenomenology, whereby the figure of 
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Spinoza was enlisted not as a vitalist, but as a severe rationalist opposed to the very notion of 
the self necessary to phenomenological thought. A ‘Spinozist rationalism, by contrast,’ Peden 
writes, ‘refused the notion of a “subject” – the cogito of Descartes’ immortal phrase “I think 
therefore I am” -  as the starting point for philosophy.’91 Of most interest to me are the specular 
networks that originate in and out of the self, however we may define that term, that confronts 
the world. How is that self constituted and destabilised, or even nullified, by the vagaries of 
optical experiment and error? A through-line can be drawn from Spinoza’s lens-making, his 
concept of the fertility and dangers of our mental images, particularly those that bind us to what 
Spinoza understands as the destructive inertness of grief, to the optics that permeate Eliot’s 
fiction. Each node of that network interrogates the material life of emotions of loss.  
My readings of Eliot’s fiction are founded on the supposition that in her novels Eliot 
infused Spinozistic principles of the imagination. Moira Gatens has defined Eliot’s fiction as 
‘attempts to practice philosophy in an alternative key,’92 and it was Spinoza’s methodical ethics 
that provided a moral, and as I argue, aesthetic framework for works such as The Lifted Veil 
and Romola. The material body, particularly the tactile body, is the surface upon which the 
existential dynamic is played out. Like Hume, Eliot famously renounced metaphysics, 
committing universal ideals to the flames, as it were, in her essay ‘The Future of German 
Philosophy’. To isolate the universal from experience, and to base upon such Platonic ideals a 
theory of knowledge, ‘is an attempt to poise the universe on one’s head, and no wonder 
dizziness and delusion are the consequence’.93 Even here, Eliot employs a characteristic 
metaphor of sensory impressions, driving further her point that any ontology needs to 
accommodate the individual body. As in her fiction, the emphasis is firmly upon the details of 
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experience, rather than the object apprehended. In her work, argues Peter Garratt, Eliot 
unsettled the distinction between imagining the world and truly seeing it, giving much space 
to doubting ‘the notion that the human eye was capable of accessing the physical world 
transparently … or of reading the world so transparently’.94  
 
 
I begin with Jane Eyre (1947), perhaps the exemplary Victorian novel of assured 
individualism, offering a heroine of fiery independence who outmanoeuvres various villains 
and Rochester’s mad wife, to triumph as a wealthy, beloved wife. It is conventionally read as 
a story of grief overcome, but in this chapter I suggest an alternative reading that emphasis 
Jane’s skilful concealing of the loss that powers her story, a mournfulness that resides in the 
text’s blind-spots. As narrator and author, Jane attempts to efface from her autobiography the 
scourge of mourning that threatens her narrative. Like Flint I am interested in studying the 
unseen and invisible,95 the underside of the legible, so as to trace the subtleties of Brontë’s 
highly nuanced depiction of the space between sight and knowledge and, what is more, the 
importance of what is not seen, pushed into the margins of the visible. I argue that in Jane Eyre 
sight comes to stand in a metonymic relation with the metaphysical, and chiefly states of 
mournfulness. The eye becomes a certain type of object, one among many objects crucial to 
the notion of Victorian selfhood, which means that it carries the inevitable association or threat 
of loss inherent in any form of possession.  
In chapter 2, I turn to Brontë’s final and most sombre novel, Villette (1851), in which 
the opacity of content merges with form. Unlike the earlier novel, Villette is consciously 
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elegiac, presenting a heroine obstinate in her largely hidden sorrows, who ‘assay[s] that 
corroding pain of long attent – that rude agony of rupture at the close, that mute, mortal wrench, 
which, in at once uprooting hope and doubt, shakes life’ (V, 567). Lucy Snowe’s narrative is 
compelled by a paradoxical optics that tropes on invisibility. By mining the specular drama, I 
draw attention to Lucy’s hidden affective life in an effort to compassionate with a heroine who 
has often been dismissed as valetudinarian, and unsatisfactory as a romantic subject. Villette’s 
manifest engagement with optics has attracted some fine criticism, yet here too we find an 
emphasis on the gaze as subject, rather than object, on the functional power or disempowerment 
of the act of looking, neglecting the scopic field as a space of deeply individualised mourning.96 
By continually staging moments of aggrieved, usually fractured sight, Brontë’s novel is 
pointing to its own visual preoccupation with in-articulable loss, which becomes a form of 
especial haunting. In Brontë’s novels, as I argue, the grieving subject is refracted through the 
ambivalences of the lens. Brontë develops in Jane Eyre and Villette a compulsive referencing 
of specular indeterminacy, in which emotional crises are mapped onto the transmogrifications 
of sensory life.  
In Villette mourning is not something supplementary to the body, but synonymous with 
the nature of the specular, like the mourning jewellery Charlotte wove. ‘I always, through my 
whole life, liked to penetrate to the real truth,’ recalls Lucy Snowe, ‘to handle the veil’ and 
‘dare the dread glance’ (552). She does indeed see through various nefarious disguises but 
discovers only a ‘network reticulated with holes’ (531), one in which, through her love for 
Monsieur Paul, she is intractably bound. Lucy’s prison is not that of the malignant state, but a 
glass prison of sorrow, out of which she does stage a transitory ‘prison break,’97 finding her 
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walls dissolve: ‘I wonder at the strange ease with which this prison has been forced. It seems 
as if I had been pioneered invisibly, as if some dissolving force had gone before me; for myself, 
I have scarce made an effort’ (536). Lucy briefly embodies the transparency of the spectral, a 
fantasy of losing her materiality that is one of her most abiding desires. ‘Villette is one blaze, 
one broad illumination,’ she cries at her most exultant (536), and her greatest yearning is to be 
a part of that luminescence. For a woman who assiduously conceals her image in the shadows, 
her story is enthralled by the luminous, to ‘a land of enchantment … a forest with sparks of 
purple and ruby and golden fire … a region, not of trees and shadow,’ but of ‘lustre’ (537).  
The phantasms of the ocular are not evocative only of the blatantly dysmorphic, but 
were of a subtly pervasive quality, too. In her poetic telling of the story of Victorian glass and 
lens culture, Armstrong emphasises the distancing and isolatory powers of a newly-glassed 
world, of which the Great Exhibition’s Crystal Palace of 1851 was the exemplar. Armstrong 
describes the confusion of responses ‘to the new production of mass-produced transparency, 
in which one’s body can be glancingly, inadvertently reflected back from the environment, 
belonging to the urban phantasmagoria outside one’s control.’98 For Wolfgang Schivelbusch, 
Joseph Paxton’s Crystal Palace introduced the visitor to a novel experience of utter 
‘evanescence’. ‘The uniform quality of the light and the absence of light-shadow contrasts 
disorient[ed] perceptual faculties used to those contrasts,’ he writes, finding it analogous to the 
way that train travel distorted the experience of speed and space.99 Both these examples, the 
vitreous architectural edifice of ‘pure abstract light-space’ and the experience of ‘abstracted, 
pure motion’ induced by mechanised travel (which finds its counterpart in the disorienting 
spatial reconfigurations of optical technologies), come together in my analysis. There is scarce 
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appreciation of Brontë as a phenomenological writer, of her granular portrayals of the sensory 
nature of being. The elegiac nature of Brontë’s exploration of vision, specifically the affinity 
between diminished or obscured sight and loss, has, to my knowledge, not been critically 
examined.   
In chapter 3 I turn to George Eliot, beginning with her most problematic text, The Lifted 
Veil (1859), a Gothic horror story of supra-sensory prophetic powers, in which the 
representation of loss is mediated through the malevolence of the lens, while the authorial 
consciousness fractures at the interface of a narratorial drive to manipulate the structure of 
temporality. Driven to madness by his ‘diseased participation in other people’s consciousness’ 
(17), the narrator-protagonist Latimer finds that a world unveiled of its mysteries is torturously 
transparent; or, so it seems. Endowed with prophetic abilities, he is plagued most by the 
irrepressibly present, by ‘the living and the loved,’ rather than the ‘mere ideas’ of his visions 
(21). In the depiction of an all-seeing, yet emotionally stunted narrator, Eliot creates an 
aperture, in which the author fuses magic-lantern optics and repressed grief in a picture of 
disenchanted illumination. While in Brontë’s novels we find the blurred, kaleidoscopic image 
of memory, ‘the curious illusion of vision’ (V, 430), The Lifted Veil enacts the spectacle of the 
image as a nascent, unformed substance, ‘like the new images in a dissolving view, or the 
growing distinctness of the landscape as the sun lifts up the veil of the morning mist.’100 
Questions of representation lie at the core of this novella, pursued in the dramatic inversion of 
conventional patterns of textual unfolding, for in Latimer’s projections the world appears 
before it is so, the signified brings into being the signifier; at least according to the resentfully 
suffering protagonist. The terms of the gothic are turned on their head: the seen is the ultimate 
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horror, much more terrifying than the concealed: ‘no matter how empty the adytum, so that the 
veil be thick enough’ (LV, 29).  
 
The final chapter discusses Eliot’s least read, and often derided historical novel, Romola 
(1861-2). Romola is a strangely conflicted text, a very painful novel for its author to write, as 
it is a difficult text to read. If Villette is a sharp howl, then Romola is a plaintive whimper – a 
slowly progressing descent into the resignation of unending loss.  In this chapter I have 
attempted to account for some of the novel’s sophisticated representation of visualised 
mourning. Romola is the most fitting novel on which to conclude, because in its depiction of a 
network of conflicting interpersonal losses, it comes closest to symbolising in its very form the 
coalescent body of mourning, an organic system of conflictual pain.  
The novel opens with visual indeterminacy, as two men, later revealed as Tito and 
Bratti, have ‘their eyes fixed on each other’ in misrecognition and confusion, the latter a man 
who makes his living selling fragments of glass.101 The commodification of the (glass) image 
is beautifully captured in Bratti’s occupation, the coloured pieces functioning as capital. Before 
Tito is named, it is his ring (which the seller contemplates stealing for sale) that defines his 
unexplained presence in Florence, and his status as outsider: ‘Young man,’ [Bratti] said, 
pointing to a ring on the finger of the reclining figure, ‘when your chin has got a stiffer crop 
on it, you’ll know better than to take your nap in street corners with a ring like that on your 
forefinger’ (R, 11). The ring makes Tito strange, marks him as foreign other, and throughout 
the text, characters struggle to place this enigmatic figure, always emphasising his alien 
heritage. He is a fallen angel, ‘with the face of Messer San Michele,’ sleeping on a street corner. 
As image without worldly antecedent, Tito’s form invokes trouble. Opening thus with an 
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invisible history — the beautiful stranger with the unknowable past — Eliot introduces a more 
concrete epistemological paradigm: scholarly knowledge. Fleeting images must be committed 
to paper, argues Bardo, unless one has the (masculine) faculty of retaining them on the mind’s 
eye. Bardo categorises Romola’s perceptive faculty as faulty: ‘I marvel at the capriciousness 
of my daughter’s memory, which grasps certain objects with tenacity and lets fall all those 
minutiae whereon depends accuracy’ (64). Bardo’s unintentional irony points up his daughter’s 
vital role in seeing for them both, and her accession into mourning is marked visually by a 
vivid interplay of blindness and sight. 
I have attempted to bring out the submerged grief in the novels of two canonical female 
authors, a grief often sacrificed, in narrative terms, to the more exigent imperatives of Victorian 
literary form and the constraints of rhetorical structures. I have tried to bring to the surface the 
occluded sensory lives of these texts, and their ensnarement in the paradoxes of visualised 
mourning, to reassess their participation in mid-Victorian optics as coded not with the 
operations of power, but with the phantasms of loss.   
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 ‘My inward dimness of vision’: Jane Eyre and the phenomenology of loss 
 
 
When I consider how my light is spent, 
 Ere half my days, in this dark world and wide, 
 And that one Talent which is death to hide 
 Lodged with me useless…102 
 
In the summer of 1846, after the publication and commercial failure of her joint 
collection of poems, and when the completion of her first novel, The Professor, had met with 
only silence from publishers, Charlotte Brontë was burdened with another, more pressing grief: 
her father Patrick’s imminent blindness. As her brother Branwell descended into premature 
death, catalysed by his married lover’s betrayal, and hurried along by alcoholism, Charlotte 
was also contending with her father’s increasing incapacity, forced to watch the encroaching 
failure of his eyesight through cataract, a disease that was seemingly unstoppable. Elizabeth 
Gaskell describes the parson’s predicament as a tragic diminishing of his authority and 
capacities: ‘He could grope his way about, and recognise the figures of those he knew well, 
when they were placed against a strong light; but he could no longer see to read.’ He continued 
to preach, however, undaunted by his diseased vision: ‘I have heard that he was led up into the 
pulpit, and that his sermons were never so effective as when he stood there, a grey, sightless 
old man, his blind eyes looking out straight before him’.103 Charlotte’s own description paints 
a more sombre picture, writing of her ‘mournful days – when papa’s vision was wholly 
obscured – when he could do nothing for himself and sat all day-long in darkness and 
inertion.’104 In an effort to prevent ensuing disaster, Charlotte procured the assistance of a 
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highly regarded eye surgeon, William James Wilson, which led to a visit to Manchester in the 
hope that Patrick might be cured of his condition.  Her anxious and detailed letters of the time 
evince a palpable distress, full of solicitude for her father, mixed with a quick knowledge of 
optical science, and a keen interest in the precise details of the operation. ‘What would I not 
give to have you here!’ she writes to Ellen Nussey, ‘[o]ne is forced, step by step, to get 
experience in the world; but the learning is so disagreeable’105; and there is this description of 
the surgical procedure, which she witnessed:  
The operation is over … Mr Wilson says he considers it quite successful 
but papa cannot yet see anything – The affair lasted precisely a quarter of 
an hour – it was not the simple operation of couching Mr Carr described 
but the more complicated one of extracting the cataract – Mr Wilson 
entirely disapproves of couching. 
Papa displayed extraordinary patience and firmness … I was in the room 
all the time, as it was his wish that I should be there – of course I neither 
spoke nor moved till the thing was done – papa is now confined to his 
bed in a dark room and is not to be stirred for four days.106 
 
In the days following Patrick’s operation, Brontë describes a surreal scene of waiting, her 
nervous watching of her father’s still-voided sight, his face wrapped in bandages, forced to lie 
in a darkened room, evocative of Locke’s camera obscura. This period of suspended hopes – 
suspended on the wavering fragility of sight – was not, however, an unproductive period for 
his daughter; indeed, it was during her fraught days in Manchester, ‘with time on her hands,’107 
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that Brontë began to write a new story. This story, Jane Eyre, would take the trope of blindness, 
and the suffering human sensorium as its thematic heart, culminating in a young woman’s 
ministering to her blind husband’s needs.   
Gaskell weaves together her description of Charlotte nursing her sightless father in a 
darkened room with observations on her subject’s own short-sightedness, attributable no doubt 
in some degree to her eccentric writing habits. Charlotte persisted in writing ‘in a minute hand, 
holding each [scrap of paper] against a piece of board, such as is used in binding books …. 
This plan was necessary for one so short-sighted as she was’.108 Foregrounding sight in this 
way, Gaskell implies a hereditary perspectival lack, as though unseeing-ness were discursively 
formed. Gaskell explicitly links the act of writing (which, in Brontë’s case, is especially 
enigmatic for its miniature-ness), and optical degradation: through the physical mechanics of 
writing, vision is literally eroded. A transposition takes place, from witnessing blindness to 
writing blindness, with emotional peril as the connective tissue. ‘An imperilled eye can charge 
the act of vision with special urgencies,’ writes Alan Spiegel,109 and it is the eye as the site of 
subjective distress for Charlotte Brontë that this chapter investigates.  
 Once back at home in Haworth, watching daily as her father’s sight oscillated between 
dark and light, Charlotte turned in earnest to write her new novel, which from that point 
progressed in a rapid flow for several weeks. These parallel events in Brontë’s life, then — 
Patrick’s depleted eyesight and the seeding and growth of a new novel — are, I suggest, 
associated, not in a relationship of causality, but certainly one of influence; for woven through 
Jane Eyre is a dialogue of vision that is contoured by a distinctly ocular anxiety. The energy 
of Brontë’s ocularcentric prose arises from a visceral horror of darkness, a darkness that I argue 
is denotative of mourning. Taking blindness– physical, psychological, and spatial – as a point 
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of origin, this chapter will illustrate the novel’s aesthetics of loss. The specular in Jane Eyre is 
fretted with an elegy of sightlessness, variations on a theme of perception that have profound 
implications for the way in which the novel contends with issues of perspective, intuition, and 
memory, with a sensitivity to the emotive modalities of vision.  
Jane Eyre engages with a contemporary preoccupation with the metaphoricity of the 
eye, entering into the Victorian obsession with all things ocular. In her study of visuality in 
nineteenth-century England, Kate Flint outlines the complex network of dialectical and 
rhetorical strands evoked by the notion of sight. For the Victorians, ‘[t]he slipperiness of the 
borderline between the visible and the invisible and the questions which it throws up about 
subjectivity, perception and point of view’ had remarkable currency.110 In this chapter I seek to 
bring Flint’s insight into conversation with Brontë’s engagement with states of loss. Using the 
physical senses as a marker raises questions about the patterns that loss intrudes upon the 
narrative consciousness, manifest in Jane Eyre in a prose that mimics the phenomenon of 
reperception, Philip Fisher’s ‘awkward term’ for a state of perception that registers ‘a slippage 
in confidence and certainty about seeing itself.’111 This movement from the eye to the body, 
specifically the grieving body, is borne out in Brontë’s novels, an ideational progression from 
materiality to metaphysics. This is not a homogenous discourse, but a multivalent one, coursed 
with contradictory voices. In his history of vision, Martin Jay points out how ‘ineluctable the 
modality of the visual actually is … in our linguistic practice,’ a cultural permeation that 
became ever more complex in the nineteenth-century, with the sudden capacity to amplify 
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naked sight into infinitude.112 What I am suggesting is that loss becomes, in Brontë’s novels, a 
‘structure of consciousness,’ inherent in the very modality of its presentation.113  
Brontë’s visual instinct was, as I have suggested, intensified by a personal resonance 
that intersects with her contemporaries’ aesthetic use of sight, pushing notions of perception 
into a subjectively fraught sphere for her protagonists, one that has less to do with power, as is 
typically argued, than it does with powerlessness.  Brontë conditions a larger cultural 
phenomenon to her own narrative purposes, turning questions of sight to reflect the intimate, 
for, as John Kucich puts it, ‘her angle of vision always returns to the personal’.114 Reversing 
Brontë’s specular prose, whereby to see is to know and possess, or to resist objectification, 
forces us to re-think her forging of unshakeable perspective and ruthless subjectivity, as being 
troubled by the instability and speciousness of vision. 
 Jane Eyre is most often conceived as a narrative of arrow-like decipherment, a heroine 
whose obstinate will uncovers the mystery at the crux of her world, banishing in the act of 
demystification Thornfield’s history of silenced suffering. The author’s preface to the second 
edition of the novel sets up just such a reception of the text, as Brontë, writing in the hand of 
Currer Bell, outlines her authorial objective ‘to scrutinise and expose -  to rase [sic] the gilding, 
and show base metal under it – to penetrate the sepulchre, and reveal charnel relics’.115 With 
emphatic verbs of revelation and exposure, Brontë retrospectively writes into her novel a 
premising of visibility, of a resolute drive toward clarity, that, in fact, is not borne out in the 
story to come. Sally Shuttleworth argues that Brontë’s ‘sexualised rhetoric of unveiling,’ 
catching the spirit of the French Revolution, is the warp and weft of Jane Eyre.116 The novel’s 
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visual aesthetic has been examined in this light, as encoded with operations of power, morality, 
and gender, the monopoly of the gaze broken down into discrete acts of empowerment or 
subjugation. There seems to be, though, a certain clinical narrowness to such readings, a 
myopic determination to understand the novel’s visuality as an assertion of the dynamics of 
the gaze. Peter Brooks writes that ‘it is sight, with its accompanying imagery of light, unveiling, 
and fixation by the gaze, that traditionally represents knowing, and even rationality itself … 
the gaze appears to be a crucial element in any epistemological project.’117 Such scholarship 
takes for granted the correlation between acts of looking and a replete subjectivity, or at least 
one that exercises self-command and control, taking in, as it were, the whole picture. Yet this 
slippage between seeing and selfhood was not quite so solid for the Victorian writer;118 indeed, 
some of the most crucial crises in Jane Eyre reveal quite the opposite, dramatising a rent in the 
subjective experience of visuality, leaving the heroine in a dangerously destabilised visual void, 
in which any specular ontology is radically in flux. In my reading of Jane Eyre, I uncouple the 
seemingly untroubled link between visuality and power, and in so doing, expand the critical 
focus towards a recognition of Brontë’s phenomenological and arguably proto-cinematic 
aesthetic.119 As we will see, the novel is not a clarion visual (re)formation (as retrospective 
telling) of an integrated subjectivity, but is instead premised upon visual deferral and emotional 
disavowal, reading more as a project of purification of Jane’s psyche from emotional shock. 
The sensory impulse becomes, in the process, disfigured by anxious control, revealing a 
carefully assembled narrative arc which nevertheless retains in its structural folds the 
inscriptions of loss it would erase. Reimagining blindness as an affect, Eugenie Brinkema 
writes that, if ‘redescribed as [such], it would be the affect of a stricken disorientation.’120 Jane 
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Eyre’s peripatetic narrative is one of continual stricken disorientation, of an increasingly 
confident attempt to cohere vision, turning her gaze in the process from object to object in an 
attempt to locate an untroubled point of reference. The deceptive quality of Jane’s perceptions, 
however, alters the ostensible equilibrium of the novel, like an afterimage that persists in the 
mind’s eye.121  
Nicholas Dames has expressed dissatisfaction with ‘anachronistic’ readings of Brontë’s 
oeuvre that take as their origin the privileging of hidden depths familiar in filmic theory. As he 
explains, the critical assumption that the gaze in the Victorian novel is weighted with 
objectification ignores the ‘implications of a science of seeing that Brontë, among others in her 
society, took seriously and that she employed consistently.’ Dames is interested in the 
phrenological gaze in Brontë’s fiction, a gaze that he argues is evacuated of mnemonic matter. 
In this reading, memory is absent in Charlotte’s fiction, effaced by a visual imperative that 
privileges the visible over all other forms. Where memory should be there is only an empty 
space, rather than repression or trauma: 
 
By dispensing with certain mental functions, most notably those 
functions which cannot be visualised by an observer, phrenology lends 
an almost untrammelled power to sight. In Brontë’s novels we see this 
cultural emphasis on sight vividly dramatized, and we see as well as 
what is missing when the body speaks for the mind …. She therefore 
provides us with a particularly clear example of a significant Victorian 
                                                        
121 Crary discusses at length the phenomenon of the afterimage, tracing its importance for nineteenth-century 
optics via Goethe’s Theory of Colours. The retinal afterimage attains during the early decades of the century 
‘the status of optical “truth”. They are no longer deceptions that obscure a “true” perception; rather they 
begin to constitute an irreducible component of human vision.’ Crary, Techniques of the Observer, 97. 
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psychological theory at work – a theory that was wedded to sight, and 
the triumph of the visible over the invisible.122 
 
Brontë’s novels are indeed fixated on the surface, and the ‘visual … is akin to an obsession,’ 
but if we follow Dames’s argument, where all that is legible accrues value by virtue of its 
exteriority, we fail to fully account for, if not diminish altogether, the blind spots of vision in 
a novel such as Jane Eyre, or Villette. What of the irruption of memory in the novel, for 
instance, that in Dames’s reading is neatly and successfully excised from the specular psyche? 
Or the paradoxical schema which foregrounds visuality, while the narrative work of the text 
strives to un-do such visibility? Brontë’s fascination with the science of phrenology 
undoubtedly informs her limning of characters and notions of personality; yet surely there is 
more to Brontë’s formulation of subjectivity than a phrenologically driven depiction of sight? 
While I agree with Dames that Jane Eyre evinces its author’s seduction by this pseudo-science 
of the body, I would question whether the gaze is in such an unproblematic relation to 
knowledge. Vision in Brontë’s novels is volatile and far from crystalline, as her fiction 
explicitly questions the efficacy of perception; and nor is it avowedly clinical.123 The narrative, 
too, is riddled with traces of sensory atomisation that resist the totalising force of perspective.  
My focus on the ocular materials of Victorian modernity, such as glass and its light-bending 
capacities, illustrates that Brontë’s specular dialectic ‘offers a subject in difficulties, rather than 
a smooth transitivity.’124 There is no immunity of the sensorium to the ravages of loss.  
Dames argues, too, for the importance of accommodating ‘different model[s] of 
visuality’ that attend to the surface of novelistic things,125 leaving a space for a further model 
                                                        
122 Nicholas Dames, Amnesiac Selves: Nostalgia, Forgetting, And British Fiction, 1810-1870 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2001),81-2. 
123 John Berger writes, ‘[t]he relation between what we see and what we know is never settled…the 
knowledge, the explanation, never quite fits the sight.’ Ways of Seeing.  
124 Armstrong, Glassworlds, 14.  
125 Dames, Amnesiac Selves, 86. 
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of visuality that I take up below, one that darkens the narrative eye, and which can be read as 
an analogue of feeling. There is indeed a ‘science of seeing,’ yet it is as rich in affective reach 
as it is concerned with epistemology, a manifold scopic regime of human feeling. The 
importance of attending to this other, phenomenological paradigm of perception in Jane Eyre 
is two-fold. First, it allows for a sensitive reading of the narrator’s history of loss, one that 
reassesses Brontë’s visual language by recuperating the lingering loss that has troubled critics 
of the novel. Second, the practice of reading that I follow responds to the determined manner 
in which the novel is deliberately calling attention to the emotional vulnerability immanent in 
the visual faculty, if not indeed all perceptive faculties. Brontë’s well-documented interest in 
the sciences and in quasi-scientific theories such as phrenology, are more than curious points 
in her biography; rather, her engagement with the ocular sciences creeps into her tropes of 
human grief, figuring sight as elegy.126  
 Jane Eyre cannily reminds her reader that her story is not to be a ‘regular 
autobiography’. Her careful logic of telling, one in which she is not bound to recount every 
event, allowing her to pass over eight years ‘almost in silence’, does not accord with the volatile 
will of memory; bound only to show pictures of her past that promise interest to her reader, 
Jane explains that ‘a few lines only are necessary to keep up the links of connection’ (83). In 
what follows, I will establish the visual praxis of these lines of memory, which can productively 
be thought of as sight-lines that function as a critical mode of making meaning in the novel. 
‘Where conditions of experience alter suddenly,’ writes Fisher, ‘the making and unmaking of 
the senses becomes in itself a crisis available to consciousness.’127 Brontë’s novels are 
interested in the crisis of consciousness at the intersection of modernity and visual culture.  
                                                        
126 This kind of transposition or sublimation could be described as a mode of repression, but that is not a 
feature that I wish to pursue. A large amount of compelling work has been written on the repressive 
techniques in not only Charlotte’s work, but in that of her siblings. See Kucich, for example, who argues that, 
in Brontë’s novels, ‘self-negating, potentially fusional libidinal impulses are reformulated as exclusively 
inward experience.’ Repression, 39.   
127 Fisher, ‘City Matters: City Minds,’ 371. 
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I 
A sensory mourning 
 
Jane Eyre begins with troubled perception. Seeking solace in a quiet corner of her Aunt 
Reed’s mansion, Gateshead, the child Jane mounts ‘into the window seat … and having drawn 
the red moreen curtain nearly close [is] shrined in double retirement.’ This careful implication 
of a gap through which the outcast child can still peek is symptomatic of the way Jane likes to 
see. ‘Folds of scarlet drapery shut in my view to the right hand; to the left were the clear panes 
of glass, protecting, but not separating me from the drear November day’ (JE, 7-8). The 
doubleness of glass is here at work, the ‘creation of internal contradiction,’ immanent in a 
substance that situates Jane both within and without.128 The fabric of the curtain, its thickness 
and vivid colour, ‘fold’ Jane’s sight in a single hue, like the solipsism of her world view. This 
is a psychic space of deep intimacy, yet not a scene of quietude.129 Red appears throughout the 
text as a disturbingly ambiguous tint, at one point turning in upon Jane to haunt her perception 
in frighteningly lurid tones when she wakes from her red-room fainting fit.130 In her study of 
Victorian glass culture, Isobel Armstrong writes that ‘red … dominates this century,’ recalling 
Ruskin’s descriptions of ‘passional redness’. Armstrong argues that colour and the image are 
entangled, dialectically, in any consideration of sight: ‘colour makes strange but yet ties us into 
the world.’ 131 Such a notion is manifest in Brontë’s palette, in the ambivalence of her crimson 
hue, its figuration as at once a tint of grief and imminent pain, as well as its seductive allure 
(Thornfield’s interior is awash in redness). The enveloping red moreen is a distinct contrast to 
                                                        
128 Armstrong, Glassworlds, 14. 
129 Gilbert and Gubar’s reading of the window nook emphasises its psychic resonance, identifying Jane’s 
dilemma in this instant as ‘whether to stay in, behind the oppressively scarlet curtain, or to go out into the 
cold of a loveless world.’ Madwoman, 340.  
130 I return to this last scene in greater detail below. Many critics have noted the prominence of the colours 
red and white in the novel, attributing them various symbolic inferences.  
131 Armstrong, Glassworlds, 272 and 275. 
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the scene outside the window, which offers ‘a pale blank of mist and cloud’: a split image, 
between interior and exterior, the mind as it is and the mind as it could be. The complexity of 
Jane’s embodied perception, heightened by the tactility of Bewick images resting in her lap132, 
can be gleaned from pausing a moment as the narrative asks us to do, and lingering on the 
sombre pictures under her observation. As Jane remembers it, her interest in Bewick is 
desultory: ‘the letter press I cared little for’, and yet, she admits, ‘there were certain 
introductory pages that, child as I was, I could not pass quite as a blank’. The nature of these 
pages are ‘those that treat of the haunts of sea-fowl; of the solitary rocks and promontories by 
them only inhabited’; turning the leaves, Jane sees ‘forlorn regions of dreary space,  - that 
reservoir of frost and snow …. Of these death-white realms I formed an idea of my own; 
shadowy, like all the half-comprehended notions that float dim through children’s brains, but 
strangely impressive’ (8). Jane’s eyes shuttle from window to page to window once again, 
figuring the fractured texture of her mind-scape. This set of images in Bewick will return in 
elaborate form later in the novel, captured vividly in the sketches that lure Rochester to the 
darkness of Jane’s imagination, but they also clearly associate image and feeling, emphasising 
a specular psychology, furthered by Jane’s sliding gaze from illustration to the view through 
the window frame. This association is the beginning of a pattern illustrative of Brontë’s 
ontology, in which Jane’s selfhood is ensnared in the images before her, her sense of being 
sliding into the scenes in Bewick, merging now with the dreary view outside the window; 
selfhood abstracted through the pictorial and loosing itself in a groundless play of images, in a 
manner similar to the merging of discrete pictures through the lens of a stereoscope. The scenes 
at Gateshead are punctuated by several such ‘window-moments’ (Armstrong’s phrase), the 
                                                        
132 There is a rich tradition of eighteenth and nineteenth-century texts which include seminal scenes of 
reading, many of which are instrumental to the emotive drive or dynamic of the story. Adela Pinch describes 
the variations of ‘literary excitement’ available to readers in the long nineteenth-century, and the very real 
dangers posed to readers of fiction if they identified too strongly with the affective life of characters. Words 
could be ‘the messengers of pain,’ if the ‘affective nature of reading’ took too strong a hold. See Pinch, Strange 
Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen (Stanford: Standford UP, 1996), 86-87. 
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most notable being Jane’s obscured view from a frost covered window onto a frigid garden, 
where she spies Mr Brocklehurst’s carriage – a picture of the outside world that will now absorb 
her in a new sphere of grief and suffering: ‘just as I had dissolved so much of the silver-white 
foliage veiling the panes, as left room to look out, I saw the gates thrown open and a carriage 
roll through’ (30). Such moments establish formal portals, framing perception as the grounds 
of subjective experience and story. Jane’s views, however, are always constricted in some way. 
As Armstrong writes, the ontological nuance of glass was a ‘knowledge immanent in 
nineteenth-century consciousness’; most glass of the period was blown by human breath, and 
thus ‘glass was the spectre’ of the glassblower’s breath.133 Jane breathing on the breath-blown 
glass – this doubling of substances (‘a substance invoking matter and spirit, and the tension 
between them’134) – awakens us to the depth of meaning invoked in Brontë’s image, a 
phenomenology of the window. There is a fusion of matter and emotional life, literalised in the 
uncertain transparency of the glass panel: for Jane, a sense of futurity, yet thwarted by the 
smudge of the glass. 
Rather than understanding this first paradigmatic scene in Lacanian terms as does Peter 
J. Bellis, who describes a jealously guarded feminine interior, hidden from the prying eyes of 
masculine objectivity, I read a very different sort of gazing, one that is no less oppressive.135 
Grief is ‘a confusion of faculties’ in Jane Eyre, and such confusion is generally signalled by 
conflicting sensory experience. Bewick’s ‘Book of Birds’ proves to be a violent object, when 
it is claimed by John Reed (‘Now I’ll teach you to rummage my book-shelves: for they are 
mine,’ [11]), turned upon Jane as a weapon, hurled at her head, drawing blood. The red blood 
of her wound recalls the false haven of the red moreen fabric, which becomes, abruptly, the 
terror chamber of the ‘red-room,’ the most significant space in the novel. Locked within, Jane’s 
                                                        
133 Armstrong, Glassworlds, 4-5. 
134 Armstrong, Glassworlds, 4-5. 
135 Bellis argues that Jane ‘is punished for asserting her visual independence’. Bellis, “In the Window-Seat: 
Vision and Power in Jane Eyre,” ELH 54.3 (Autumn 1987), 641.   
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vision acquires a new spatial awareness, as this is the first moment of elaborate spatial 
depiction. The red-room is both an architectural and psycho-space that is hauntingly re-
constructed at multiple points throughout the novel, a liminal chamber that offers a clear 
delineation of the imbrication of specularity and loss. The spatial texture of Jane’s visual 
modality, what Henri Lefebvre describes as ‘logico-epistemological space,’ that is, ‘the space 
occupied by sensory phenomena,’ can be traced to this point of origin, the primal darkness of 
the red-room.136 Once Jane crosses the threshold of the door, she enters a place of suspended 
mourning, a topsy-turvy world of distorted phantasmagoria and broken images, one that recurs 
with increasing sophistication as the narrative drives onward.137 The solipsistic function of the 
room is emphasised by the fact that any view to the outside is blocked by red drapery, so the 
space hovers uneasily out of time. Hidden away in a drawer in the wardrobe (the first of a series 
of hermetic spaces) is a miniature of Mr Reed, Jane’s uncle, and herein ‘lies the secret of the 
red-room.’ Mr Reed died here and the room’s memory of his corpse is a non-presence, to which 
Jane’s senses are all too alive. Her oddly angled vision at this point, pulled askew by the threat 
of her uncle’s haunting, blurs all correspondences into one indomitable image. Following 
Lefebvre’s form of spatiality, we might say that in this instance, it is Jane’s body, her 
phenomenal body reeling from endemic emotional pain, that generates a particularised, 
excessively visualised space.138 The narrative voice moves from internal reflection to an 
                                                        
136 In The Production of Space, Lefebvre calls for a theory of space that expresses a unity of the psychic and the 
physical, one that could house, among other elements, ‘the products of the imagination … its symbols and 
utopias’. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 11-12.  
137 Terry Castle describes the phantasmagorical metaphors put in play by Thomas Carlyle, in his French 
Revolution, an obsessive figuring of ‘the bloody spectacle of civil insurrection as a kind of spectral drama – a 
nightmarish magic-lantern show playing on without respite’. I suggest that Brontë enacts a similar visual 
aesthetic, utilising specular tropes weighted with emotion and memory as is Carlyle’s prose, ‘a spectral 
drama’ of the modern mourning subject. Castle, “Phantasmagoria,” 26.   
138 Drawing on Leibniz’s understanding of space as that which must be occupied, rather than a form in itself, 
Lefebvre questions what it is that occupies space. ‘A body – not bodies in general, nor corporeality, but a 
specific body, a body capable … of demarcating and orienting space.’ For, as Lefebvre points out, ‘space is not 
a pre-existing void,’ (contrary to Spinoza’s view that space is an absolute, filled by the presence of God, or 
Nature), not ‘a container waiting to be filled by a content,’ but a producer of space.’ The Production of Space, 
169-70.  
  73 
abundantly ocular focus, as Jane becomes an eye, ‘riveted’ as a succession of objects rises 
before her: 
 
A bed supported on massive pillars of mahogany, hung with curtains 
of deep red damask, stood out like a tabernacle in the centre; the two 
large windows, with their blinds always drawn down, were half 
shrouded in festoons and falls of similar drapery; the carpet was red; 
the table at the foot of the bed was covered with a crimson cloth; the 
walls were a soft fawn colour, with a blush of pink in it; the wardrobe, 
the toilet-table, the chairs were of darkly polished old mahogany. Out 
of these deep surrounding shades rose high, and glared white, the piled-
up mattresses and pillows of the bed, spread with a snowy Marseilles 
counterpane. Scarcely less prominent was an ample, cushioned easy-
chair near the head of the bed, also white, with a footstool before it; 
and looking … like a pale throne (13-14). 
 
The funereal bed that stands out ‘like a tabernacle in the centre’ is an obstinate symbol of 
mourning; it is a dwelling place, constituting a space of its own, like the tabernacle in Lucy 
Snowe’s heart in which she stores her dead love for Dr John in Villette.  Jane’s uncle Reed was 
the only person from whom she received tenderness, and his death marked her complete 
alienation from familial care. The bed demands Jane’s gaze, emphasised by the two large 
windows against which it is set, ‘with their blinds always drawn down [and] half-shrouded in 
festoons and falls of similar drapery’ (13). Like two eyes with heavy lids, these frames which 
deny their function of transparency are also figures of mourning, richly textured and veiled as 
a Victorian mourning habit. This is unmistakably a death shroud. Shroud in fact has a complex 
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and intriguing etymology, being at once an item of clothing associated with mourning habit, as 
well as a token of death, and the sheet, traditionally white, that cloaks the corpse.139 
The room is a surfeit of red which, by force of repetition attains a certain 
contagiousness, as if Jane’s visions paints the colour, spreading as it does from object to object. 
The carpet is red, so too the walls and bed-side table, and ‘[o]ut of these deep surrounding 
shades’ arises the bed, which ‘glare[s] white,’ the language of sight slipping from subjective 
faculty to the object perceived. From where Jane sits she is caught in a series of ‘broken 
reflections,’ which ripple the surface of the wardrobe mirror on one side of her, and are blocked 
out by the voided windows on her other side; between them is ‘a great looking-glass’ which 
‘repeat[s] the vacant majesty of the bed and room’ (14). Jane is thus caught in a claustrophobic 
series of empty images, images that promise plenitude (‘vacant majesty’) but are translated 
through the medium of glass into a disquieting emptiness. She is trapped in a recursive network 
of reflexive surfaces, a mise-en-abyme that repeats the non-presence of mourning: the absence 
that is the corpse of Mr Reed. Crossing before the mirror, Jane compulsively peers at it against 
her will: 
my fascinated glance involuntarily explored the depth it revealed. All 
looked colder and darker in that visionary hollow than in reality; and 
the strange little figure there gazing at me, with … glittering eyes of 
fear moving where all else was still, had the effect of a real spirit (14)  
 
Bellis describes Jane’s mirror moment as a failed ocular portal (‘Her only visual outlet 
is illusory, the merely apparent “depth” of a “great looking glass”).140  Jane finds not a shallow 
mirage, however, but a depthless-ness, a space with no bottom, and her recognition is fearful 
                                                        
139 See the definition of ‘shroud’ in the Oxford English Dictionary. 
http://www.oed.com.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/view/Entry/178930?rskey=ttcsyN&result=1#eid 
140 Bellis, “In the Window-Seat,” 641. Although I differ from Bellis’s Lacanian reading of Jane Eyre, I share his 
interest in the keenness of visual perception of the narrative eye/I.  
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precisely because she intuits her entanglement in the ‘broken reflections’ of the glass panels. 
A view is ‘a double-sided thing,’ writes Armstrong, ‘intimating the unstable nature of seeing 
and the thing seen.’141 The catatonic stillness of the reflection is placed into relief by Jane’s 
luminescent eye, a disembodied, kinetic eye, her gaze is the object of her vision, repeating itself 
in a manner that does not conceal the alienation of self-perception undergone in this moment: 
this is ‘seeing as perceiving’ in Asa Briggs’s terms.142 For Jane’s image here is ghosted and 
entirely other, her body momentarily a cynosure of the ‘cold,’ ‘dark’ ‘hollow’ of the reflection, 
her figure just another object (a ‘heterogeneous thing’ in her own assessment [15]) in the vacant 
space of the room. There is nothing stable about the picture that Jane sees: she is doubled and 
shorn of concrete individuality. The importance of this spectral moment lies in the fact that 
Jane does not stay to contemplate her body’s dark depth: ‘I returned to my stool,’ immediately 
closing up the image (14). A cleavage in the perspectival field, which culminates in Jane’s loss 
of consciousness at the end of the chapter, renders Jane aloof from her self projected as somatic 
spectacle; or, as Merleau-Ponty would describe it, a disenfranchisement of the actual body from 
its virtual representation in the mirror. In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty 
describes an experiment in which a subject is positioned before a mirror: 
 
At first the mirror image presents him with a room differently canted, 
which means that the subject is not at home with the utensils it contains, 
he does not inhabit it, and does not share it with the man he sees 
walking to and fro. After a few minutes, provided that he does not 
strengthen his initial anchorage by glancing away from the mirror, the 
reflected room miraculously calls up a subject capable of living in it. 
                                                        
141 Armstrong, Glassworlds, 272. ‘It was a crisis for nineteenth-century modernism,’ she writes, ‘as different 
accounts of the meaning of viewing … were violently fought out’. 
142 Briggs, Victorian Things, 10. 
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This virtual body ousts the real one to such an extent that the subject 
no longer has the feeling of being in the world where he actually is, and 
that instead of his real legs and arms, he feels that he has the legs and 
arms he would need to walk and act in the reflected room: he inhabits 
the spectacle.143 
 
 Jane breaks the illusion of merging with the mirrored image by looking away, resisting the 
lure of the spectacle, only half-inhabiting it. 
In this primarily visual reconstruction of experience, the medium of sight overwhelms 
subjectivity as the objects of the room, the spectral light, the coalescence of dominating red, 
all collude in a sensory overload of phenomena that renders subjectivity in peril. Sandra Gilbert 
and Susan Gubar rightly point out that this mirror is ‘a sort of chamber, a mysterious enclosure 
in which images of the self are trapped,’ yet I disagree with their assessment of Jane’s 
recognition that her mirrored self is an image of her double imprisonment in a patriarchal 
order.144 Brontë is self-reflexively questioning the veracity of perception, questioning too the 
source of that sensory disorder, issuing from mind, from body, from the world outside Jane’s 
red-covered room? – that makes the narrative possible. Jane’s phantom appearance, her 
disorientating glimpse of self as other (an image repeated in Lucy Snowe’s failure to recognise 
her mirror image), inaugurates a brokenness that her subsequent narrative works to de-couple 
from her augmenting subjectivity, in the way of bildungsroman; yet the story, indeed Jane’s 
written self, is constituted around this very moment. As she admits later, the shock of her 
imprisonment in the room never leaves her (JE, 20). To again invoke Merleau-Ponty,  Jane 
glimpses her self in the mirror as incarnate subject ‘through which an object perceived 
                                                        
143 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 250.  
144 Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-
Century Literary Imagination, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale UP, 2000), 340-341. 
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concentrate[s] in itself a whole scene or becomes the imago of a whole segment of life’; yet by 
resisting the image in fright, she disavows her body as a subject of perception, denaturalising 
her experience of subjectivity.145 The red-room scene is, as Gilbert and Gubar write, ‘the most 
metaphorically vibrant of all [Jane’s] childhood experiences,’ one that Brontë ‘consciously 
intended … to serve as a paradigm of the larger drama that occupies the entire book’.146 Rather 
than ‘a patriarchal death chamber,’ I understand the space as primarily a psychic representation 
of mourning that is far less concrete in its associations. Its seminal position in the story, in the 
pattern of remembrances of the writing narrator from which all else flows, establishes a 
template of visual paradox, occurring at the level of sensory consciousness. It is a space that 
should be charming, or at least homely, but is unheimlich, exiling Jane into self-
estrangement.147 The contents of the red room and the sadness that it represents are diffused 
throughout the text, uncannily reworked, we shall see, later in the text, when Jane returns to 
Mrs Reed’s deathbed. 
What occurs next is crucial in considering Bronte’s aesthetics of visualised mourning: 
Jane is startled by a light that emanates from no obvious origin, gleaming on the wall. ‘While 
I gazed, [the light] glided up to the ceiling and quivered over my head’ (17). This ‘drama of 
light’148 concentrates in Jane all her preconceived terror, appearing to be the harbinger of Mr 
Reed’s ghost, a figure of longing and repulsion, so that the room at once contracts: ‘My heart 
beat thick, my head grew hot; a sound filled my ears, which I deemed the rushing of wings: 
something seemed near me; I was oppressed, suffocated: endurance broke down –’ 
precipitating her into a loss of consciousness (JE, 17).149 Perspective is formed as a concretised 
                                                        
145 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 52 and 206. 
146 Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman, 341. 
147 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Uncanny’, in The Penguin Freud Library 14, ed. and trans. James Strachey 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), 345. I return to this essay and the theme of the uncanny in detail in chapter 
3.  
148 Armstrong, Glassworlds, 273. 
149 The image of the light returns to Jane’s memory in a later dream: ‘I dreamt I lay in the red-room at 
Gateshead; that the night was dark, and my mind impressed with strange fears. The light that long ago struck 
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totality, as Alan Spiegel describes it, personhood emerging from an exposition of visual 
elements. The colour red, the windows, the peculiar light sliding across the room, the deathly 
bed, the claustrophobic space collate in the reader’s mind as a rubric of how Jane sees. All of 
these ideational visualisations make up the character of the heroine, connoting the complex 
nature of her suffering.150 Brontë’s visual composition is one of material embedded-ness, an 
aesthetic that reinforces an unstable ontology of the image. Jane’s sight is produced out of 
spatio-temporal moments, rather than a static, stable mode of perception, so that affect becomes 
relational and diffuse.  
The horror in the red-room brings together a formative crisis of consciousness that is 
figured phenomenologically, showing us a subjectivity terrorised by the tumult of the senses, 
manifest in the panting syntax and impressions that are rapid as flashing light. The ‘terrible red 
glare crossed with thick black bars’ which cross her sight upon waking recall the red 
afterimages described and catalogued by David Brewster, the Victorian inventor of the 
stereoscope (whom Brontë would enjoy meeting in 1851, receiving from him a personal guided 
tour of the Grand Exhibition).151 ‘I heard voices, too, speaking with a hollow sound, and as if 
muffled by a rush of wind or water’. The hellish dreamscape of Jane’s memory gathers around 
half-remembered images that put into doubt the content of the memory itself. By collapsing 
the tumultuous sensory data with Jane’s psychic struggle, and the true cause of her distress, 
which has the tenor of an austere cinematic footnote (‘unconciousness closed the scene’), this 
seminal experience resists incorporation in the narrator’s rigid scheme of telling. What did 
happen in the Red Room? Jane’s reader never knows for certain, echoing as it does amidst the 
narrator’s ‘confused faculties,’ (18) which from her retrospective temporal moment constitute 
                                                        
me into syncope, recalled in this vision, seemed glidingly to mount the wall, and tremblingly to pause in the 
centre of the obscured ceiling’ (319). 
150 These comments are influenced by Spiegel’s analysis of the Flaubertian novel in Fiction and the Camera 
Eye, 20-21.  
151 On Brontë’s meeting with Brewster, see Armstrong, Glassworlds, 273.  
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the grief itself. What does such distorted remembering imply for the self’s restitution? The 
sharp pang of light destroys the definition of Jane’s subjective experience, the ‘I’ of the 
individual so thoroughly decentred in an aporetic sensory shock.152  Intervening in the 
recollection of subjective occurrence and knowledge, then, is the terrible loss of sensate ‘truth’, 
failing to bridge between the I/eye of remembering and the moment as it was.   
 
 
II 
 
Lowood  
Jane’s deliverance from Gateshead is marked textually by a drama of light, the chief 
properties of which are bewilderment and indistinctness. The scene of entrance into Lowood 
has all the aesthetic qualities of a nineteenth-century lantern show:  
[G]athering my faculties, I looked about me. Rain, wind, and darkness 
filled the air; nevertheless, I dimly discerned a wall before me and a 
door open in it; through this door I passed with my new guide: she shut 
and locked it behind her. There was now visible a house or houses … 
with many windows, and lights burning in some round wall (42-3). 
 
Arriving in darkness, Jane’s first knowledge of her new home is constructed by the brilliancy 
of a swarm of artificial light, an alien luminosity that disbars sight, rather than aiding it. In its 
architecture of imprisonment, Lowood obstructs seeing. Inside, the ‘uncertain light from the 
hearth showed by intervals papered walls, carpet, curtains, shining mahogany furniture,’ a 
                                                        
152 I apply the term aporetic to the dimension of phenomenal perception after the manner of Julian Wolfreys, 
in his study of Dickens’s phenomenology of the city. Wolfreys’s invigorating readings of Dickens’s sense-
drunk narration has had an influence on my own work. See Wolfreys, Dickens’s London: perception, subjectivity, 
and phenomenal urban multiplicity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2012).  
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sequence of flickering imagery. ‘Seen by the dim light of the dips,’ the building is lent a certain 
imperviousness, all aspects of the few spaces that Jane is led through conspiring to overwhelm 
her. Jane’s sense of self is for the first time threatened with a uniformity to which she must 
submit, as now she must enter into the group of indistinct girls, ‘a congregation … [of which] 
their number to me appeared countless’ (43). From this flux of impressions will emerge several 
sharply defined sensations: hunger, terror, shame, and loss. Every sense is sharpened by 
starvation, which shocks Jane by its irrepressibility, and the attenuation of human bonds even 
amidst a sea of other bodies (most of which, aside from Helen Burns and Miss Temple, do not 
acquire explicit form in Jane’s re-telling), is a variation of that hunger. Lowood is about a 
movement into an ugly sensory experience, a phenomenology of terror, but also, a movement 
into a corporeality of indistinctness, an experience of interiority that is shaped (or misshaped) 
by the propinquity of other bodies forced into sameness. The young girls, all ‘uniformly dressed 
in brown stuff frocks of quaint fashion, and long Holland pinafores,’ move as one amorphous 
body to the refrain of the school’s ‘indefatigable bell,’ ‘marshalled and marched’ from one cold 
and inhospitable room to another, a formalistic illustration of affective rigidity.153 This sense 
of psychic enclosure is doubled by Lowood’s circumscribed borders,154 with high, spiked walls 
to deny any sight beyond its confines: ‘The garden was a wide enclosure, surrounded with 
walls so high as to exclude every glimpse of prospect … broad walks bordered a middle space 
divided into scores of little [garden] beds.’ Each bed is assigned an owner, little allotments of 
personhood that are brown with ‘decay’ (48). If we consider this image in formalistic terms, 
the symmetry of the garden beds and those in the bedroom (‘I glanced at the long row of beds, 
each of which was quickly filled with two occupants’ [45]), within the formal unity of the 
                                                        
153 I have in mind here Caroline Levine’s expansion of the formal capacities of a reading of Jane Eyre (just one 
example in her study), whereby the structural and aesthetic dimensions of a text are linked to or inherent 
within larger social aspects of the novel’s content. ‘What are Lowood’s shapes and arrangements – its 
semicircles, timed durations, and ladders of achievement – if not themselves kinds of form?’ she asks. See 
Levine, Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2015), 1-2.  
154 Elaine Freedgood, The Ideas in Things, 38. 
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school grounds, captures something of the enforced perspectival uniformity of Lowood; a 
space scored with equal divisions, like a grid, but abject and un-individuated.155 Subjectivity 
becomes doubled, as each girl moves in a pair, yet perversely neutered of the capacity for 
growth, symbolised by the image of the dying flowers. Once again, a perspective of grief is 
formed visually, the architectural aspects of space merging with the images of the garden beds 
/ dorm-beds, to emphasise a resigned sadness that Brontë articulates as a visual teleology and 
patterning.    
 Disgust delineates Jane’s personhood and her body’s edges, coming upon her like an 
affective assault when breakfast is served; un-ambivalent revulsion is a practice of self-
assertion through the senses.156 Breakfast is ‘a nauseous mess [of] burnt porridge’ that 
overpowers even the most potent hunger, arising in ‘a universal manifestation of discontent,’ 
as the smell of the food ‘met the nostrils of those destined to swallow it’ (45-6). Jane’s 
positioning in the space, her recreation of the image of the breakfast room for instance, is, 
however, conspicuous in her placement as outside the formalistic patterns she reconstructs for 
her reader; she resists the totalisation of the self that Lowood’s rigorously enforced hierarchy 
implements, even as her body is caught up in the power of the ritualistic obedience of the school 
day. This is explicitly represented in the scene in which Jane’s slate smashes on the floor, rent 
in two by her inability to merge fluidly into the group. Another window moment, too, is crucial 
to Jane’s displaced figure:  
when I passed the windows, I now and then lifted a blind and looked 
out; it snowed fast, a drift was already forming against the lower panes; 
putting my ear close to the window, I could distinguish through the 
gleeful tumult within, the disconsolate moan of the wind outside … I 
                                                        
155 Levine, Forms.  
156 In Sianne Ngai’s essay on disgust, she writes that this affect is particular in the way it strengthens and 
polices [the] boundary’ between subject and object. See Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2005), 
335.   
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wished the wind to howl more wildly, the gloom to deepen to darkness, 
and the confusion to rise to clamour (54-5)  
 
Here the experience of interiority is again pushed to a crisis, reified through the exigent 
distinction between inside and outside. Certainty of personhood can only come through a 
willed-for heightening of aural and visual awareness. Indeed, the mind’s vision substitutes the 
body’s wants. Extreme hunger is satiated by the vividness of Jane’s imaginings, as upon going 
to bed, she forgets ‘to prepare in imagination the Barmecide supper of hot roast potatoes, or 
white bread and new milk, with which I was wont to amuse my inward cravings: I feasted 
instead on the spectacle of ideal drawings, which I saw in the dark’ (74-5). These pictures of 
the mind, ‘all the work of my own hands, freely pencilled,’ along with her sketches, are images 
of miniaturised harmony and protection (‘wrens’ nests enclosing pearl-like eggs’) and 
constitute Jane’s attempt to wrestle control over the visual, approximating a means of ordering 
the imagery that most soothes her inner eye, making the darkness her own cocoon of interiority.  
 Jane’s experience at Lowood is the experience of deprivation, and her rebellion is felt 
at the level of her sensory life, pitched at an extreme of want. The loss of bodily warmth is one 
of the most intolerable, indeed deadly, instances of feeling in these chapters. Jane is ‘ready to 
perish with cold’ (52), the water in the pitchers having frozen over with the onset of winter. 
Over time existence is accordingly whittled down to the confines of Lowood and its stubborn 
‘rules and systems’ that constitute a world unto itself. The formalism described above masters 
sensory amplitude, and sensual impoverishment becomes the norm. The violence of un-
individuated space, those lines and shapes of homogenous existence, is contrary to a distinctive 
sensory life, one that could offer hope. The view from the window over the school grounds, for 
example, optically reinforces that incarceration: ‘[t]here were the two wings of the building; 
there was the garden; there were the skirts of Lowood; there was the hilly horizon. My eye 
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passed over all objects to rest on those most remote, the blue peaks … all within their bounds 
seemed prison ground, exile limits.’ Beyond that lies a ‘varied field [of] sensations,’ unseen, 
exceeding vision (85). The horizon line here takes on a specifically phenomenological quality, 
as Jane’s vision is replete with the possibility of perception in a Husserlian sense,157 a futurity 
of feeling, in which the loss she feels (brought into stark relief by the marriage and departure 
of her beloved Miss Temple) is metonymically figured in a yearning for new perceptions, other 
modes of experience. Subject and object merge in the view of the ‘white road winding round 
the base of one mountain and vanishing in a gorge between two’ (85). The white arching line 
is a symbol of Jane’s past (‘I recalled the time when I had travelled that very road in a coach’) 
and a future (as visual field) that feels impossibly distant: a static spatiality and a notion of 
temporality ‘that is inseparable from the visual,’ as John Berger describes it.158 Jane’s desire 
for sensory newness is a quest of self-definition against the impossibility that this white line, 
in its curve away from her vision, represents. We can read a dialectic of desire met with the 
staunch opposition of a flat image that ultimately refuses the eye; the fathomlessness of the line 
implies that her future will be an endless continuation of ‘school-rules, school-duties, school-
habits and notions, and voices, and faces, and phrases, and costumes,’ successive images of 
banality that have denied all temporality of experience. What converges at the point of sight in 
this instance, then, is a feeling of loss, the consciousness of eight years swallowed up in an 
exile of displacement. ‘[D]olore,’ writes Eugenie Brinkema, ‘dampens the optic possibilities 
of a sensual encounter with a present existent world, like an affective cataract.’159 
 
 
                                                        
157 Flint writes that, in accordance with the principles of the horizon as conceived by Husserl, ‘the idea of the 
horizon is infused with the sense of possibility.’ See The Visual Imagination, 307. 
158 John Berger, Ways of Seeing (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1972), 18. 
159 Brinkema, The Form of the Affects,’ 55. 
  84 
A double illumination 
 
Jane’s movement to Thornfield marks a significant shift in the narrative. Not only is it 
the beginning of independence and adulthood, it is an introduction to an interior that is 
suspiciously luxurious, its Gothic splendour beyond anything she has expected to encounter. 
Bachelard describes the truly phenomenological image thus: ‘the real beginnings of images 
will give concrete evidence of the values of inhabited space, to the non-I that protects the I.”160 
When the narrative moves to Thornfield, the psychology of visualised space drives the pattern 
and action of memory, determining the text’s imagery. The house is an analogue for Mr 
Rochester’s mind, and Jane is exposed to its hidden chambers in a way that precludes the 
roundness of perspective: all is thinned out — the light, the passing of time — eclipsed by a 
sensorial erotics that relies upon Jane’s not-knowing, indeed upon her blindness. 
 It is during her time as governess in Mr Rochester’s mansion that Jane is sensually 
reacquainted with an essence of horror reminiscent of her feelings in the Red Room, as the 
spatial character of Thornfield, its deceptiveness, acts upon her with furious energy. From her 
first entrance into the house, the new epoch in the narrative is marked by a sudden blinding, 
recalling her arrival at Lowood: ‘[the room] whose double illumination of fire and candle at 
first dazzled me, contrasting as it did with the darkness to which my eyes had been for two 
hours inured’ (95). ‘When [she] could see,’ the scene before her appears almost too charming, 
‘a beau ideal of domestic comfort’, soon belied by her introduction to the rest of the house, and 
the crepuscular gloom of her new home. We find the same shock of ‘imperfect light’ when 
Jane tours the upper stories, peering out from Thornfield’s roof:  
 
                                                        
160 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 5. 
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‘I surveyed the grounds laid out like a map: the bright and velvet lawn 
closely girdling the grey base of the mansion … the horizon bounded 
by a propitious sky, azure, marbled with pearly white .… When I turned 
from it and repassed the trap-door, I could scarcely see my way down 
the ladder: the attic seemed black as a vault compared with that arch of 
blue air (106) 
 
The pain imminently to close over Jane’s small world is registered at the level of retinal 
confusion, of fleeting visual bewilderment that punctuates her movements through the long 
galleries of the house. The metaphor is striking enough in its suggestion of Jane’s constricted 
view and the myopia of longing and subsequent loss that will afflict her in her love affair with 
Rochester. The horizon that is the focal point of the view over the grounds functions as the 
dividing line of Jane’s splitting perception, the too-sharp contrast of hope-filled blue and 
impenetrable darkness; the horizon, an ‘ideal trope through which to examine Victorian 
attitudes towards the visual, towards the practice of seeing,’161 offers up to Jane an idea of 
vastness, one which accords here with her deep desire to belong. Yet that same azure arc is no 
more than an ever-receding desire, ‘indivisible from [one’s] individual physical and conceptual 
faculties,’ as Flint writes, and this particular moment stages the limits of perception (as Jane 
Eyre consistently repeats), of the futurity of the blue sky denied and re-contained by the dense 
black of the attic room: ‘I, by dint of groping, found the outlet from the attic, and proceeded to 
descend the narrow garret staircase. I lingered in the long passage … narrow, low, and dim, 
with only one little window at the far end’ (106-7). Once in her own room, she is able to gaze 
‘leisurely round, and in some measure efface the eerier impression made by that wide hall, that 
dark and spacious staircase’ (98). The adjustment to sight, the pupil dilating and contracting 
                                                        
161 Flint, The Visual Imagination, 287.  
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according with Jane’s exposure to light, corresponds with a retraction or intensification of 
‘mental anxiety’ (98), and the prose is responsive to such a wave-like motion, opening out with 
the vastness of the blue sky, and receding (‘groping’) with the dimming of the retinal light. The 
acknowledgement of the shocking secret of Bertha Mason’s imprisonment is subtly registered 
at the ocular, syntactical level, while the narrator, writing retrospectively, refuses knowledge 
of the truth at the level of discourse. A splitting is at work, then, between discourse and image.   
When Jane turns from the image of sublimity, the horizon of futurity, her vision is 
immediately sacrificed to the darkness of the house; her sight shifts from the potentiality of 
future desires, to the petrification of wants. There is a deathliness to the ‘vault’ space of the 
attic that corresponds to the shrinking of subjective horizons; the eclipsing of her inner life by 
the claustrophobic space. She feels her interiority more oppressively in this enclosure, trapped 
within the bounds of the shell of Thornfield. History is suspension: Thornfield ‘is a home of 
the past: a shrine of memory’ (106). Jane’s narrative exudes a yearning for a type of freedom 
that Thornfield, as the opposition to that visual drive, makes unavailable to her. Jane 
acknowledges as much in her description of her feeling at re-entering the property: ‘[it is] to 
slip again over my faculties the fetters of an uniform and too still existence (116)’; Thornfield 
resists sight, and by way of Jane’s pattern of associating visuality with a replete sense of 
personhood, the house denies inner plenitude. This is concisely represented in the following 
passage, as Jane stands upon the threshold of Thornfield:  
I lingered at the gates … I paced backwards and forwards on the 
pavement: the shutters of the glass door were closed; I could not see 
into the interior; and both my eyes and spirit seemed drawn from the 
gloomy house – from the grey hollow filled with rayless cells, as it 
appeared to me – to that sky expanded before me, - a blue sea absolved 
from taint of cloud (116)  
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As in the passage quoted earlier, in which Jane stood at the window of the schoolroom at 
Lowood watching the storm, the liminal positioning of the spectator is dramatised as a psychic 
fracture. Jane aligns her ‘eyes and spirit,’ and the juxtaposition between the obdurately obscure 
house with its ‘rayless cells’ and the open vista above her is deliberately stark; inner life is felt 
as a blindness (‘I could not see into the interior’). Her mode of seeing is working prophetically, 
as a proleptic warning of the threat that Thornfield symbolises, yet its complete comprehension 
eludes the heroine here. The glassed room prevents Jane’s seeing, the darkness an apt figuring 
of the secret shut up in the house: that of Bertha, imprisoned in the third story.162 The evocation 
of carceral space in the description also gestures towards the atemporal nature of lived 
experience at Thornfield, a space in which, before she begins to see herself in accordance with 
her longing for Rochester, Jane’s sensuality is eroded, her visual acuity made redundant by the 
darkness. This last image of the sky delimited ‘in its fathomless depth and measureless 
distance,’ is a projection of a desired mode of being. I must disagree with Elaine Freedgood’s 
claim that, in Jane Eyre, ‘subjectivity has no limits or boundaries’;163 the novel stages such 
borders continually. The house, its windows, its architectural shaping of Jane’s being, acts as 
a framework of limitation.  
 The opposition could not be more distinct: the expansion and filling out of subjectivity 
instanced in the presence of unnavigable space, juxtaposed against the visual indigence of the 
interior. ‘A very chill and vault-like air pervade[s]’ the house, ‘suggesting cheerless ideas of 
space and solitude’ (97). In order to ameliorate such spatial vacancy with its attendant 
loneliness, Jane’s eye falls upon things, cataloguing interior objects (‘Jane Eyre,’ quips 
                                                        
162 There are moments when Jane’s view from the interior to the exterior is occluded, too, as when, for 
instance, she peers from a window, ‘but nothing was to be seen thence: twilight and snowflakes together 
thickened the air…’ (118-9). 
163 Freedgood, The Ideas in Things: Fugitive meaning in the Victorian novel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006), 39.  
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Freedgood, ‘is a work about interior decoration’).164 As Susan Stewart writes, elaborate 
descriptions are a textual ‘procedure by which description multiplies in detail … analogous to 
and mimetic of the process whereby space becomes significance’.165  In this ‘multiplication of 
spatial significance,’ the loss inherent in Thornfield is transformed or at least transmuted, the 
observer gaining a temporary respite in a haven of things, to find intimacy in the impersonality 
of the estranging visual space. An accumulation of detail fills up space that would otherwise 
remain menacingly other, a revision of the bourgeois tyranny of things in the Red Room, in 
which Jane lost all control in her function as seeing, grief-stricken eye. Thornfield, in its 
architectural and spatial dimensions, induces in Jane a retrogressive personhood; the movement 
indoors parallels a certain psychic regression, a retreat into a shrunken interiority. Locked 
within this shrine of memory, Jane’s only recourse is to locate the horizon. When this feeling 
builds towards its nadir (as it often does in the early stages of her career as Adele’s governess), 
Jane creates images. She turns to the imaginary to restore subjectivity, allowing her ‘mind’s 
eye to dwell on whatever bright visions rose before it’; this visual restorative is a loosening of 
constricted senses, a perceptual expansion. To illustrate these pictures is ‘a tale … [of] all 
incident, life, fire, feeling,’ (109) gesturing toward both a sense of endlessness and delimitation, 
which is the yearning within Jane Eyre – a vision unimpeded, which, however, coils up in 
response to the inexorability of Thornfield’s secrets. The novel’s consciousness is haunted by 
an unseen space, the chamber from which echoes Bertha’s tragic laugh. Jane abstracts her sense 
of self through her creation of projected interior images, or daydreams, in which she can 
possess a vision that ‘might overpass’ the ‘dim skyline’ (109) that defines her view from the 
building.  
                                                        
164 Freedgood, The Ideas in Things, 31. 
165 Susan Stewart, On Longing, 47. 
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Sharon Marcus’s argument about the paradoxes of abstraction and subjectivity in Jane 
Eyre is useful in considering this point. Like Marcus, I read multiple moments of self-
atomisation in this text, yet these are not (as is Marcus’s focus) centred chiefly on printed 
matter — texts and advertisements, but occur via a mode of visual perception premised upon 
dispersion and the fracturing of personhood. Jane Eyre suggests, argues Marcus, that ‘the split 
subject and the imperialist-capitalist subject may be equivalent’. ‘Jane’s and Brontë’s 
subjectivities emerge most strongly during moments of abstraction and alienation,’ she 
continues, and ‘writing … provides Jane with a medium for the successful transfer of her own 
embodiment.’166 Marcus is interested chiefly in the egregious paradox of the female author of 
the 1840s, who, in order to write was forced to advertise, yet ‘the necessary self-promotion of 
advertising collided with the self-effacement demanded of them’ (213). This chapter has traced 
a different form of invisibility in Brontë’s novel, one not socially codified and enforced, but 
willed, and particularised, rather than gesturing to a general condition. While I share Marcus’s 
wish to read against the dominant narrative of Jane Eyre as a heroine of fulfilment, I do not 
understand Jane’s multiplicity as a means of acquiring agency; on the contrary Jane’s habit of 
self-duplication is revelatory of the patterns of navigating her sense of grief. It is the place of 
abstraction in the novel’s structure of loss that is of most interest for my purposes. Reading the 
visual structures of the novel, in this case the materiality of written texts, and placing Jane 
within an iniquitous economy of embodied desire, in which the only way to achieve a sense of 
personhood is through disembodiment, still leaves unquestioned the assumption that such 
moments of crisis are textually ameliorative. I would argue that the text does not come to terms 
with its series of displacements and transferrals; the sensory substitution from Jane to 
Rochester, for example, that I have begun to sketch out is, in my reading, a narrative haunting 
                                                        
166 Sharon Marcus, “The Profession of the Author: Abstraction, Advertising, and Jane Eyre,” PMLA 110.2 
(March 1995), 209 and 207.  
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that has no easy accommodation in Jane’s writing self. Marcus’s explanation for the heroine’s 
alienation still does not attempt to address her fraught relationship with the sensory body, the 
incarnated gaze as existing outside the limiting framework of political and material 
commodification: in other words, it does not come to terms with Jane’s intimate life. 
Translating the heroine’s entanglement in a specular economy premised on objectification and 
market value does not recuperate Jane’s phenomenal body and its relationship with private 
loss.167     
 Jane has a longing for the bustle of a city (79), for an experience of distracted 
abstraction, in which as Susan Stewart describes it, ‘distance is collapsed into partiality, 
perception becomes fragmentary’.168 This need for distraction, most fully and poignantly 
realised in Brontë’s Villette, points to a larger thematic that I wish to take up: that Brontë’s 
phenomenology of loss is caught in a visual field of obsessive specular symbolism, which 
reveals a desire for dispersion or concealment; it is a loss that does not want to be seen.169 This 
is the paradox of Brontë’s fiction: a yearning, indeed an urgency for visibility, for 
acknowledgement (both within and through the act of writing), for a reciprocal face-to-face 
encounter,170 yet also shame, what is really a terror of grief made irrevocably exposed and 
particular. Jane’s decision, for example, to refuse disclosure in her conversations with the 
blinded Rochester, much later in the novel, a dialogue that for Jane constitutes one endless 
conversation: ‘We talk, I believe, all day long: to talk to each other is but a more animated and 
                                                        
167 Marcus argues that ‘Jane uses the medium of written advertisement to negotiate between absolute self-
effacement, represented by Helen Burns, and spectacular, Bryronic embodiment, personified by Rochester.’ 
The article in its entirety is richly rewarding. “Abstraction”, 209.  
168 Stewart, On Longing, 79. 
169 My phrasing here and the argument I develop in this section are influenced by Stanley Cavell’s essay on 
King Lear, in which he analyses at length the play’s topoi of blindness and insight. ‘Given [the] notion that 
recognising a person depends upon allowing oneself to be recognised by him, the question becomes: Why is 
it Gloucester whose recognition Lear is first able to bear? The obvious answer is: Because Gloucester is blind. 
Therefore one can be, can only be, recognised by him without being seen, without having to bear eyes upon 
oneself.’ Cavell, “The Avoidance of Love,” 279. There are useful and obvious parallels (given Brontë’s 
Shakespearian influence) to Jane’s relation with Rochester.   
170 ‘Is not the face given to vision?’ asks Emmanuel Levinas, in Totality and Infinity, 187. 
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an audible thinking’ (451), could be understood as her denial of the recuperative effects of 
revelation.171 By the end of Jane’s text, she has transferred the particularity of her pain to that 
experienced by her husband, surrendering it to the silence of a mutual bond that must, it seems, 
absolve any need for vocally expressing the loss of her past.  
One query I want to raise at this point is the symbolic nature of Rochester’s blinding. 
Critics who point to its symbolism are not wrong to do so, but if we put aside the Oedipal 
overtures, another compelling meaning emerges: is Brontë’s blinding of Rochester in fact in 
the service of concealing Jane’s psychic wound? Is the troubled sensory perception of the text 
transferred to his maimed and destroyed faculties because grief cannot be seen, cannot be 
decoupled from blindness? For the lovers are now, by Jane’s admission, of one flesh: ‘No 
woman was ever nearer to her mate than I am: ever more absolutely bone of his bone, and flesh 
of his flesh (450)’. Jane’s visuality is sanctified in her new role of seer for her husband, 
endowed with a surety that could only come with seeing for another. Letting go of her singular-
ness at last is a relief for Jane, because with it comes the subsuming of psychic pain in the 
other, the beloved other, who can adopt her loss all the more satisfactorily because it remains 
unknown (unseen). The decoupling of the pricking particularity of that grief from an isolate 
subjectivity is complete. This is, however, a very different process from that described earlier 
by Dames, in which a subject’s interior is stripped of its mnemonic matter, its symptoms, and 
exposed in an ungenerous language of surface. The ruthlessness of making visible, of unveiling 
the self, as I have attempted to show, is far more ambiguous.172 Indeed, it no longer seems 
                                                        
171 Carla Kaplan writes extensively on the complexities and contradictoriness of conversation in Jane Eyre. 
Most pertinent to my point here is her observation that ‘Jane tells her story not [as feminist criticism would 
have have it] because she is a heroine of “fulfilment,” but rather because she is still looking for a “fit listener,” 
still longing for an ideal or at least apt interlocutor. Writing, in this sense, is … a call for a response, a gesture, 
an invitation, one that cannot know what will follow, that cannot be sure of its outcomes.’ Kaplan, “Girl Talk: 
Jane Eyre and the Romance of Women’s Narration,” NOVEL, 30.1 (Autumn, 1996), 23. 
172 Dames writes that ‘[w]hen the self is unveiled as it is in Brontë’s work, we can see that it faces resolutely 
forward.’ Amnesiac Selves, 87. 
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correct to assert that any project of ‘unveiling’ of Brontë’s heroines takes place; it is more a 
change of costume, exchanging one cloak for another, in an unbroken performance of loss.  
The crucial factor in Jane’s reticence and disavowal of grief is shame; she is ‘the heroine 
of shame,’ according to one provocative critique.173 I wish to look at this idea in more detail by 
turning to a scene often disregarded in the criticism, Mrs Reed’s deathbed scene. Aunt Reed’s 
rejection of Jane consistently manifests in a cold, flint-like gaze, while her niece continually, 
even in adulthood, ‘seeks her image’. Returning to her childhood home as her aunt lies dying, 
Jane’s supplicating eyes are once more answered by ungoverned contempt:  
 
Well did I remember Mrs Reed’s face, and I eagerly sought the familiar 
image…. I had left this woman in bitterness and hate, and I came back to her 
now with no other emotion than a sort of ruth for her great sufferings [and] 
to be reconciled…. The well-known face was there: stern, relentless as ever 
– there was that peculiar eye which nothing could melt; … the recollection 
of childhood’s terrors and sorrows revived as I traced its harsh line now!’ 
(230) 
 
The opacity of Mrs Reed’s eye is nonetheless a mirror for Jane, the lines of the face recalling 
her mourning. The impression is of obstructed transparency: Mrs Reed turns her face away 
from Jane’s, regarding her ‘icily,’ ‘her stony eye – opaque to tenderness, indissoluble to tears,’ 
‘unchanged and unchangeable’ (231). Mrs Reed’s face will only ever reflect back the pain of 
the past, unremitting of the present, and the shame of Jane’s alienation. Silvan Tompkins 
describes shame as ‘the most reflexive of affects in that the phenomenological distinction 
                                                        
173 Ashly Bennett argues that Jane’s primary emotion is shame, and it is this affect that drives the diegetic and 
formalistic aspects of the text. Bennett’s argument is in the service of a feminist account, claiming Jane’s 
overwhelming sense of shame as grounds for her feminism. See Bennett, “Shameful Signification: Narrative 
and Feeling in Jane Eyre,” Narrative 18.3 (October, 2010), 300. 
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between the subject and object of shame is lost. Why is shame so close to the experienced self?’ 
he asks. ‘It is because the self lives in the face.’ For Tompkins, the affect of shame is most 
recognisable in the movements of the face, particularly the sufferer’s refusal to gaze, or 
unwillingness to be recognised. The person can in this way ‘call a halt to looking’.174 Jane’s 
image in this scene is doubly denied by her aunt’s stubborn and inexplicable refusal to 
recognise her: ‘“Aunt!” she repeated. “Who calls me Aunt? You are not one of the Gibsons; 
and yet I know you – that face, and the eyes … why, you are like Jane Eyre!’ ‘Yet,’ she 
continues, ‘I am afraid it is a mistake: my thoughts deceive me ... I fancy a likeness where none 
exists”’ (238). Cruelly disabled of her own image, Jane is forced to avow her identity, to prove 
her likeness to the image of her self; to reclaim that image means only to reclaim herself as the 
object of hatred. There is a petrification of loss in these final scenes at Gateshead; despite the 
‘living things alter[ing] past recognition,’ (228) Jane is mired again in a pain impervious to the 
amelioration of time. Seeing is here imbued with an entire history, one woman’s face reflecting 
and then splitting in two Jane’s person-hood; the mourning of love scorned is there still, 
immutably present in the lines of Mrs Reed’s face. Vision is thus implicated – explicitly so – 
in a nexus of temporality that governs Jane’s experience of subjectivity. The present becomes 
past through an endless and unchanging confrontation with Aunt Reed’s unmitigated 
disavowal, ‘temporality and vision become inseparable,’ as Jonathan Crary writes.175 Seeing is 
thus imbricated with Jane’s burden of loss, as the adult Jane is still the child yearning for 
tenderness, yet dispossessed by non-recognition. Charlotte Brontë thereby asserts the 
                                                        
174 For Tompkins, shame is the affect (grouped in a combinatory affect named ‘shame-humiliation’) that is 
uniquely inherent, an ‘inner torment’ that ‘strikes deepest into the heart of man.’ See Shame and its Sisters: A 
Silvan Tompkins Reader, ed. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank (Durham: Duke UP, 1995), 133 and 136.   
175 I have taken Crary’s description out of context, as he is referring not to Charlotte Brontë’s novel, but to a 
general shift in ideas of sight that took place during the early nineteenth century, when the body is 
increasingly anchored to observation, and ‘[t]he shifting processes of one’s own subjectivity experienced in 
time became synonymous with the act of seeing’. Crary, Techniques of the Observer, 98.  
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emotional gravity, indeed the emotive capaciousness, of the specular, the antagonistic field of 
perception.     
 
The largeness of Thornfield is belied by Jane’s description of its series of close 
chambers, or of rooms so heavy with objects that ensure a sense of crowded proximity. In her 
conversations with Rochester, Jane’s body becomes another chamber of secrets, an untarnished 
imaginary space in which he can store his ‘sullied’ memories (135). In Rochester’s gaze, Jane 
is a body without content and, as he believes (yet fails to enquire) her perception is without the 
‘infection’ of troubled images.  Etiolated perspective is soon replaced, however, by Rochester’s 
image, the face that becomes the ‘object’ she best likes to see; for it is he who projects to Jane 
all the variety of scenes and sensations that she longs to see: ‘I had a keen delight in receiving 
the new ideas he offered, in imaging the new pictures he portrayed’ (146). Rochester’s 
remembered images are akin to a virtual after-image (‘the presence of sensation in the absence 
of a stimulus,’)176 that provides Jane with an imagined plenitude, substituting and refracting the 
role of her vivid imagination. Rochester’s past is a filter for Jane’s imagined, longed-for 
potentiality, and the origin of her love is here, in the vicarious visions he delivers to her eye, 
an ocular history that becomes her own in the translation. Rochester’s body is a point round 
which Jane can position her own in a field of desire; as the foundation of metonymy, in Susan’s 
Stewart’s elegant formulation, the other’s body, specifically the lover’s body, becomes a 
contact with a sensory richness otherwise inaccessible. ‘We can see the body as taking the 
place of origin for our understanding of metonymy (the incorporated bodies of self and lover) 
and metaphor,’ Stewart writes. ‘It is this very desire of part for whole which both animates 
narrative and … creates the illusion of the real.177 ‘So happy, so gratified did I become,’ Jane 
                                                        
176 Crary, Techniques of the Observer, 98. 
177 Stewart, On Longing, xii.  
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recalls, [that] my thin crescent-destiny seemed to enlarge; the blanks of existence were filled 
up’ (146). In such descriptions, ‘imaging’ another’s memories has the seductive aura of 
representing a whole. A new dialectic of the eye accompanies the lovers’ growing mutual 
obsession, a heightened sensitivity to the nuances of the eye’s movements. Brontë writes a 
dialogue of visual exchange; all of Jane’s visual energies become directed toward seeing the 
walled-up grief hidden in Rochester’s body. Walking together in the gardens of Thornfield, 
Jane observes that Rochester’s eye glints with a ‘glare such as I never saw before …. Pain, 
shame, ire – impatience, disgust, detestation – seemed momentarily to hold a quivering conflict 
in the large pupil dilating under his ebon eyebrow.’ Rochester is tormented by the sight of 
‘writ[ing] in the air,’ a script of ‘lurid hieroglyphics’ that runs across the battlements (142). 
The gulf between the pair’s respective modes of seeing forms the matter and urgency of their 
desire, as well as its vulnerability: for this is a ‘quivering’ dialogue, tremulous in its patterns, 
wishing to graft one sight upon the other’s in cohesion. Jane’s view is necessarily defined by 
this threat of the unseen, of the impossibility of scopic transcendence. I want to suggest that 
Jane’s narrative becomes one in which vision, problematised from the first, undergoes a 
process of abstraction, quickened by her growing erotic awareness, at last becoming transfixed 
upon the blind eyes of Rochester. Jane Eyre stages a manipulation of images, duplicating, 
fracturing, and at times excising textual pictures, that process of imagistic refraction eventually 
degenerating into a reciprocal blinding. By the end of the narrative Jane’s vision is in the 
service of Rochester’s voided sight, a disturbing literalising of those earlier descriptions of Jane 
re-seeing her ‘master’s’ remembrances.178  
Rochester’s desire is sparked by Jane’s eerie water-colours, scenes of drowned corpses, 
of murky depths, of sea and sky merging at the point of horizon. Fascinated by these pictures, 
                                                        
178 I return to the subject of Rochester’s blinding and Jane’s devoted assistance of him in detail below. Jane 
habitually refers to Rochester as her master. 
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Rochester’s fingers trace the pattern of Jane’s vision,179 the contiguity of tactility and visuality 
charged with the symbolism of the lovers’ sensory porousness, which constitutes erotic 
exchange. Jane’s aesthetic is impressionistic, the figures appearing ‘as through the suffusion 
of vapour.’ The final image Rochester touches is the most illuminating, however, depicting a 
face, as bleached as the veil that covers it, with ‘an eye hollow and fixed, blank of meaning but 
for the glassiness of despair’ (126). The metaphors of reflection (‘On the neck lay a pale 
reflection like moonlight; the same faint lustre touched the train of thin clouds’, and ‘a drowned 
corpse glanced through the green water’ [125]) create the impression of a shadowy pool in 
which Rochester glimpses something of himself, perhaps an intuition of a shared history of 
loss. We can begin to recognise the complexity of the imagistic web that grows up between the 
lovers, the threads of which are borrowed visions, like half-remembered dreams. Notably, 
Rochester at once dismisses the artworks from his presence, handing them to Adele, in a gesture 
that suggests their excision from his preferred fantasy of Jane, that of the ‘little girl,’ whose 
‘memory without blot or contamination [is] an inexhaustible source of pure refreshment’ (135). 
Indeed, these watercolours do not reappear in the narrative; they are instead substituted by 
Jane’s precisely limned portrait of Rochester, which she creates almost mechanically in an 
unconscious, trance-like manner. It manifests from Jane’s habit of sketching any scene that 
appears ‘momentarily to shape itself in the ever-shifting kaleidoscope of the imagination.' Jane 
reproduces her lover’s face, and its features are a mirror for her, an idealised self-
representation. The reciprocal gaze that she yearns for is contained in the eyes, their ‘irids 
lustrous and large.’ Indeed so faithful is the likeness that in this instance, Rochester’s 
troublesome figure is possessed as simulacra with remarkable firmness. ‘I had a friend’s face 
under my gaze … I looked at it; I smiled at the speaking likeness: I was absorbed and content’ 
                                                        
179 ‘Inasmuch as the movement of the hand that touches traverses the “nothing” of space, touch resembles 
vision,’ writes Levinas. Totality and Infinity, 189.  
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(234). Transformed into a miniature (‘If the miniature is a kind of mirror, it is a mirror of 
requited love,’)180 he is utterly, illusively hers: she has authored his image, designing and 
controlling his gaze, so that a convergence of sight occurs (the fidelity of this illusion cannot 
be sundered in such an autoerotic act). The one moment of visual reciprocity, then, is based on 
the absence of the other, more akin to a mirror image than a true encounter with another’s 
accommodating gaze. Susan Stewart describes the face as text: ‘[t]he face reveals a depth and 
profundity which the body itself is not capable of … because the eyes [are] openings into 
fathomlessness. […] The face is a type of “deep” text, whose meaning is complicated by change 
and by a constant series of alterations between a reader and an author who is strangely 
disembodied, neither present nor absent, but in fact, created by this reading.’181 Jane’s portrait 
acts as a veil for her pain in this moment, temporarily blotting out the present — the cold 
rejection of her love from her cousins Eliza and Georgiana Reed.  
 
  
                                                        
180 Stewart, On Longing, 126. 
181 Stewart, On Longing, 127.  
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III 
A rent in the veil 
 
In loving Rochester, Jane’s perspective brims with his image, ‘as an eclipse intervenes 
between man and the broad sun’ (274). The eeriness of this simile is notable: the subject thrown 
into preternatural dark by the shaded sun, one body closing over another, for a moment 
absolutely; another image of totality that is close to self-negation. When that idolised picture 
is muddied by the revelation of his lies and betrayal, Jane’s entire phenomenology of being 
implodes. The fault, Brontë suggests, is one of misapprehension: ‘How blind had been my 
eyes!’ The lucid vision of the heroine, until now assuredly loved and soon to be wed, spirals 
out into a maniacal, kaleidoscopic (a word used throughout the novel) perceptive haze: ‘My 
eyes were covered and closed: eddying darkness seemed to swim round me, and reflection 
came in as black and confused a flow.’ These rings of grief pool round Jane, as she is beset by 
a vision that now ‘sees nothing,’182 eventually dragging her down into a ‘torrent’ of darkened 
water, rendering her in an ontological oblivion: ‘The whole consciousness of my life lorn, my 
love lost, my hope quenched, my faith death-struck, swayed full and mighty above me in one 
sullen mass’ (296). Mourning the death of her past self, her possible selves, is staged as a 
blacking out of her specular capacity, with Jane at the centre of uncontrollable concentric 
circles of selfhood. The reader is left with a discomfiting enigma, one that places in doubt the 
totality of Jane’s scopic power, her narrative eye: is not the whole of what has come before this 
moment now in peril? If Jane’s scopic omniscience is flawed, what is the status of her 
                                                        
182 In her book on the affectivity of vision, Brinkema invokes Milton’s Paradise Lost to draw out the writer’s 
distinctive use of visual figures, describing the way he intuited ‘a vision that sees nothing… “From those flames 
/ No light, but rather darkness visible.”’ Brinkema, The Forms of the Affects (Durham: Duke UP, 2014), 54. 
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narrative? What other failures of recognition lie buried within her text? It is not only Jane, 
therefore, but the narrative entire that faces a nightmare of subjectivity and alienation. The 
critical emphasis on Jane Eyre’s self-actualisation begins to seem unstable if we reconceive 
the novel’s visual authoritarianism as the workings of anxiety.  
This is a crucial nexus that brings to light the affective power of Bronte’s narration: the 
symbiosis of states of loss and a rhetoric of vision, the two twined so extensively that modes 
of seeing become shorthand for grieving. Notably, Jane’s vanquished hopes entail a vision of 
her future and past selves — the virginal young woman soon to embark on a new life as Mrs 
Rochester, the excited young girl in her plain stuff gown — now embodied in an image of 
frozen corpses; in other words, ontologically girded by these stabilising, hope-filled images on 
the one hand, Jane is cruelly undone in an instant by a toxic picture of mortified flesh. Her 
‘hopes are dead,’ which entails the death of several selves, lined up now in her mind’s eye as 
infants whose bodies are beyond revivification. ‘I looked on my cherished wishes, yesterday 
so blooming and glowing; they lay stark, chill, livid corpses … I looked at my love: that feeling 
which he had created; it shivered in my heart’(295-6). The object of her love, too, is unalterably 
tarnished (‘the attribute of stainless truth was gone from his idea’). The narrative can continue 
only under a new visual modality, an adjustment of luminosity; the revivification of Jane’s 
loved and loving self, the brightness of Rochester’s image, must be dimmed. When hope is 
restored at Marsh End, in the form of Rochester’s desperate voice carried on the wind (the 
hollowed-out aurality a symbol of his attenuated force upon her inner eye), it is the shadow of 
a man that she returns to love. As Garrett Stewart writes, Jane ‘must dispossess her 
imagination’ of the force of erotic energy, and ‘Rochester himself must be dimmed [and] 
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purged, burnt away.’183  Charlotte Brontë wrote to ‘quell the otherness of loss.’184 To achieve a 
plot of fulfilment, the text must embrace a shroud, figured as the dark dell that is Ferndean, a 
quasi-crypt in which the ecstatic textures of desire can be safely buried. In the scenes of 
hyperbolic romance at Thornfield, Rochester’s solidity, his very material being had been 
suspiciously pushed against; to his declarative of ‘“I am substantial enough: — touch me,”’ 
Jane responds, only half-ironically, ‘“You, sir, are the most phantom-like of all: you are a mere 
dream.” He held out his hand … placing it close to my eyes … “Yes, though I touch it, it is a 
dream,” said I, as I put it down from before my face’ (279). Rochester’s flesh is still in doubt, 
his body alarmingly spectral, as Jane’s faith in her sensory capacity begins to splinter after a 
series of nightmares. His return to the narrative as a living ghost, his re-enclosure in the loop 
of the speaker’s desire, is simply the logical end of his phantom presence; Jane can only assent 
to this whittled down version of selfhood, her perspective eclipsed now not by the brightness 
of her devotion, but by the deeply-cast shadows of her newly embodied subject-hood.  
Ferndean appears at first to be impenetrable to Jane’s entrance; no aperture is visible, 
only a dense verdancy. ‘Even within a very short distance of the manor-house, you could see 
nothing of it; so thick and dark grew the timber of the gloomy wood about it.’ Inside the gates, 
though, Jane finds herself in ‘the twilight of close-ranked trees,’ and walking ‘between hoar 
and knotty shafts and under branched arches,’ she is led along a seemingly endless path, ‘it 
wound far and farther: no sign of habitation or grounds was visible.’ Jane seeks a portal, a 
break in the enclosing forest walls; ‘[t]here was none: all was interwoven stem, columnar trunk, 
dense, summer foliage – no opening anywhere (430). A dim light at last leads her to a decayed 
house, a desolate grounds, enclosed by a wood that creeps away into a semi-circle. This is the 
                                                        
183 Garrett Stewart, Dear Reader: The Conscripted Audience in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins UP, 1996), 273. Stewart argues, rightly I believe, that in order for the novel to reach its final point of 
contentment, the plot must be arranged so that Rochester’s ‘overweening’ desire meets Jane’s disappointed 
love, a kind of mutual chastening.  
184 Stewart, Dear Reader, 273. 
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chosen ground of Brontë’s romance: a house so damaged, a grounds so unkempt, that no locks 
are necessary, a place ‘where sound falls dull, and dies unreverberating’ (447). So isolated is 
the spot, that the outside world has no longer any concreteness. Jane has entered a ‘portal’ of 
ravaged fecundity, and re-constructs her self  (her story) visually and spatially in the last 
moments of her autobiography. Suitably, the aesthetic becomes one of obsessive visuality, as 
figures and metaphors of sight and blindness, of blackness and light, follow with such rapid 
successiveness that the contours of this new narrative world are defined by a perceptive 
myopia, with all vision contained in the figure of Rochester. Jane’s sensory identity is 
abstracted out into the beloved other, hypersensitive in its awareness of any quiver of his body. 
Invisibility now is a wondrous disguise, indeed a joy, for if Rochester cannot see her with his 
physical eye, then Jane can remain unrecognised to herself. For Gilbert and Gubar, such mutual 
diminishment is a necessary condition of any kind of equality for the lovers; ‘[w]hen both were 
physically whole they could not, in a sense, see each other because of the social disguises – 
master/servant, prince/Cinderella’.185 There is indeed an affecting mutuality in their lovers’ 
dialogue of shared senses: 
  
“Can you tell when there is a good fire?” 
“Yes, with the right eye I see a glow – a ruddy haze.”  
“And you see the candles?” 
“Very dimly – each is a luminous cloud.” 
“Can you see me?” 
“No, my fairy: but I am only too thankful to hear and feel you.” 
“I am hungry: so are you, I dare say, only you forget.” (436) 
                                                        
185 Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman in the Attic, 368. They continue thus: ‘[B]ut now that those disguises have 
been shed, now that they are equals, they can (though one is blind) see and speak even beyond the medium 
of the flesh.’ 
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The correspondence of their banter, in its synchronised clipped phrasing, emphasises a stability 
in their relationship. Sight has become distanced perspective, a ‘luminous cloud’, a hazy 
surface; zooming out from the particularised and granular, this is the kind of visuality Jane’s 
narrative can most easily accept.  
As Marcus observes, Jane’s service to Rochester is yet another form of abstraction: 
‘Jane appears to adopt — rather than triumph over — her husband’s bodily fragmentation by 
transforming herself into a prosthetic part,’ transforming herself into a writing instrument as 
substitute for his crippled right hand.186 Yet it is not simply a tactile service that she offers, but 
instead one that canvases the whole sensorium, and particularly as in the example above, of 
sight; the dimmed sight is not Jane’s own in this instance, transferred instead to Rochester. His 
enfeebled perception is the condition of her own sharpening of the visual instinct, divorced 
from her subjective history of loss. Visuality is merely instrumental, refined to a practical 
function and shared goal, and arising out of a paradoxical logic: seeing for another, one for 
whom she is invisible. Jane’s fractious, obstructed apperceptive abilities are reformulated as 
Rochester’s physical blindness, relegating loss to a shared sensation of overcoming 
impairment, which returns us to Brontë’s nursing of her father.  
Yet I would argue that Brontë’s blinding of Rochester is not simply another working of 
the familiar trope of spiritual insight through physical blindness, as Gilbert and Gubar claim. 
There is a doubleness alive in many of the structural metaphors of this novel, and his disability 
seems a comment on the tyrannous nature of the visible world. His and Jane’s respective 
psychic trauma can remain hidden, as if a bind has been severed in the death of Rochester’s 
vision; a memory cord snapped in blinding him (the past now is unnecessary, yet the present 
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is too banal to narrate, and so the narrative must naturally conclude rather abruptly). There is 
no danger of visible non-recognition (no cold, flinty gazes to reflect Jane’s shame), rather, the 
narrator is known by touch and by the sound of her body’s movements, her material presence 
an elixir for Rochester’s wounded perception.  
St John’s crazed pursuit of her hand in marriage gave rise in Jane to a very different 
feeling, which was, though, no less a demand for acquiescence to his person. His belief of her 
‘invaluable’ assistance in his chosen life of a missionary in India penetrated Jane’s ‘iron 
shroud,’ which ‘contracted round’ her like a noose. ‘Shut my eyes as I would, these last words 
of [St John’s] succeeded in making the way, which had seemed blocked up, comparatively 
clear. My work, which had appeared so vague, so hopelessly diffuse, condensed itself as he 
proceeded, and assumed a definite form under his shaping hand’ (404). These words recall 
Jane’s earlier metaphor of integrity in describing an earlier conversation with St John, when, 
after he reveals that he is in fact her cousin, that she is bonded to him by a tie that places her 
within a structure of belonging, her longings are ‘embodied’ in something solid. 
‘Circumstances knit themselves, fitted themselves, shot into order: the chain that had been 
lying hitherto a formless lump of links, was drawn out straight, — every ring was perfect, the 
connection complete’ (384). Jane Eyre is the search for harmonious form, a form constructed 
centrifugally, from the inside out, and the plot’s vacillations are the movements of subjective 
contraction and expansion. St John offers Jane a perfection of ‘bloodless,’ fleshless form (he 
is himself an embodiment of harmonious beauty and purity of spirit) but his ‘hardness’ of body 
and eye, the implacability of him, at last breaks her resolve to accompany him. The ‘veil f[alls]’ 
from his image, and Jane cannot solder her body to this marble figure, vampiric in his desire-
less wanting of her, for whom her body is no more than a vessel of his needs. Despotic form is 
rejected, then, for uncertain shapelessness in Ferndean, a deathly dell in a hidden forest, where 
Jane’s body is supremely necessary for the happiness of another. ‘The eye itself, pure vision, 
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becomes tired of looking at solids,’ writes Bachelard, ‘it needs to dream of deforming.’187 
Ferndean is a dream of deforming, in which the heroine can live out a fantasy of immateriality 
(in the capacity of a ‘fairy’ or ethereal sprite for Rochester); yet it seems to me that the 
narrative, in all its kineticism, has merely circled in upon itself, its spatiality receding ever more 
narrowly to a contented blindness. ‘Frustration and lack, the haunted sense of lost opportunity, 
and finally the willed sacrifice of achieved desire – these are the propulsive drives of Jane’s 
lifelong internal romance,’ concludes Garrett Stewart.188 ‘The pressure of fantasised desire’ has 
mangled Jane’s intuitive correspondence to her world, vulnerable as it was; for what of the 
longing experienced at the sight of the horizon?189 Is this the conclusion to that wondrous line 
across the earth, that vision of endlessness and possibility? Ferndean is the starkest reversal of 
horizontal space; it is arguably the death of space. And Jane and Rochester are the revenants 
haunting their past selves in a cage of knotted trees, where visuality is at last neutralised of its 
affective rub. ‘The self lives where it exposes itself and where it receives similar exposure from 
others … the mouth talks, the eyes perceive; [these movements] are uniquely related to one’s 
experienced affects and to the affects transmitted to others,’ writes Tompkins.190 Ferndean, a 
symbolic shroud, poses no threat of exposure; it is sealed off contextually and narratively just 
like a photographic still, or a glassy Wardian case.191 The cataract of the eye with which we 
                                                        
187 Bachelard, Water and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Matter, trans. Edith R. Farrell (Dallas: the 
Pegasus Foundation, 1994), 106. 
188 Stewart, Dear Reader, 272. 
189 The quote is taken from Stewart, in Dear Reader, 273. 
190 Tompkins, Shame and its Sisters, 137. 
191 The nineteenth century experienced a craze, indeed a mania, for ferns, which exploded after the 
introduction of Nathaniel Ward’s glass case (the Wardian case). The vogue for ferns contained in glass and 
kept in the home was such that it gave rise to the term ‘Pteridomania’ (‘an extravagant enthusiasm for ferns,’ 
as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary). Gilbert and Gubar understand Brontë’s Ferndean as a 
suggestion of freedom, implying a place ‘without artifice’ (Madwoman in the Attic, 370). Yet I’m persuaded by 
Yoshiaki Shirai’s comprehensive study of Charlotte Brontë’s interest in ferns and awareness of pteridomania. 
For Shirai, Ferndean is a benign Wardian case, an ‘ideal space,’ which ‘encloses Jane and Rochester’ in a 
protective enclosure. To understand Ferndean as a glass case is, I think, utterly compelling, particularly in 
light of the imagery I’ve studied throughout this chapter; yet, as I have argued above, in no way do I see it as 
either free from artifice or benign in its protective qualities. See Shirai, “Ferndean: Charlotte Brontë in the 
Age of Pteridomania,” Brontë Studies, vol. 28 (July 2003), 129. 
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began and its iteration in Rochester’s blindness becomes, in Brontë’s Villette, the novel that I 
now turn to, a more insidious, because invisible, cataract of the mind.  
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‘I sealed my eyes’: Visions of loss in Charlotte Brontë’s Villette 
 
All wondering why I write with my eyes shut – Charlotte Brontë192 
 
 
 ‘Certain junctures of our lives must always be difficult of recall to memory,’ writes 
Lucy Snowe, the narrator of Charlotte Brontë’s final and most desolate novel, Villette (1853). 
‘Certain points, crises … griefs … when reviewed, must strike us as things wildered and 
whirling, dim as a wheel fast spun’.193 Lucy here draws upon a vivid metaphor, a picture of a 
wheel, recalling the estranging effects of nineteenth-century phantasmagorical displays, so as 
to evoke the bewildered reappraisal of a life, figuring lived experience as a kaleidoscopic haze, 
and coupling grief with blurred perception. The blurred image, the indecipherable moment: 
these two aspects are integral to Lucy’s story, alluding metonymically to the confusion of grief 
that the novel contests. The Victorian desire to look back at past forms, a flight from death that 
emerged as a seeking out of patterns of continuity, was a yearning that found expression in the 
nascent technology of photography.194 This turn to the past manifests in Villette in ways that 
push notions of personhood and history into crises of remembering.  
In my introduction I described the veritable tide of images that swept over Victorian 
society, particularly during early to mid-century, and the startling subjective effects this 
provoked. Not only were there the thrill and terrors of photography, but also radically new 
                                                        
192 Charlotte Brontë, undated entry, “Roe Head Journal,” in The Brontës: Tales of Glass Town, Angria, and 
Gondal, 165.  
193 Charlotte Brontë, Villette (London: Penguin, 2012), 576-7. All further references are to this edition and will 
be incorporated into the text as V. 
194 Groth, Victorian Photography, 10-11. Groth describes a general historicist impulse that characterised the 
Victorian sensibility, one that moved indiscriminately throughout cultural life. She attributes it partly to the 
pressures of modernity, and the need to slow down the present moment.  
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means of viewing the world: stereoscopes, mirrors, spectacles, glass shopfronts, electric light. 
A reflective, disconcerting staging of representations that could enfold the spectator became a 
newly persistent feature of the urban environment, an irrepressible phenomenon that 
powerfully altered the ontological and epistemological nature of the seen and unseen world. 
Villette was a direct product of that cultural ocularphilia and explicitly engages with modes of 
perception, linguistically and structurally imbued with a visual dialectic. As Joseph Boone 
notes, ‘eyes are everywhere’ in Villette’s ‘theatre of intercepted gazes’.195 Born from the heady 
visions of the glittering spectacle that was the Great Exhibition, Villette explores the gradations 
of visual experience. As I noted in the introduction, criticism on the specular aesthetic of the 
novel has tended to be characterised by a Foucauldian emphasis on the gaze as surveillance, 
embedded within the workings of institutional power and subjugation, often read against 
feminist strategies of ocular empowerment. In Shuttleworth’s study of Brontë’s impressive 
knowledge of contemporary scientific and medical literature, actively engaging with such 
discourses of vision, we find this claim: ‘Villette, with its obsessional concern with 
surveillance, fits almost too perfectly into the paradigm of nineteenth-century social control as 
outlined by Foucault .… The ideal of Benthams’ Panopticon … might describe the underlying 
nightmare of Villette from which Lucy is forever trying to escape.’196 Shuttleworth reads the 
novel’s visual discourse as an investigation into the neurotic mind, and understands the 
nervous, shivering quality of its pictorial narrative as a rendering of psychological disorder. 
Boone similarly utilises Foucault’s Discipline and Punish to illustrate Villette’s challenge to 
an authoritarian, eroticised masculine gaze, describing the means by which Brontë ‘casts 
Lucy’s narration … so that it dodges the circuit of surveillance and counter-surveillance that 
constructs her world’; and Joseph Litvak finds in Villette ‘the irreversible entanglement of a 
                                                        
195 Boone, “Depolicing Villette,” 26. 
196 Shuttleworth, Charlotte Brontë and Victorian Psychology, 222.  
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disciplinary theatricality with a transgressive or potentially feminist theatricality.’197 Each of 
these interpretations, and the many others in this vein, are valuable, and skilfully argued and I 
have no intention to dismiss them. Yet, defining the complex trauma of the text solely through 
a prism of subjugation and ocular disempowerment/empowerment seems to me unsatisfactory; 
strangely impervious to the mournful weight of a narrative described as ‘perhaps the most 
moving and terrifying account of female deprivation ever written.’198 Villette was written rather 
extraordinarily in the shadow of the consecutive deaths of Brontë’s three remaining siblings, 
and is itself so marked by loss that it is (in Harriet Martineau’s words) “almost intolerably 
painful to read.”199 Villette progresses through a refusal to depict the very events that drive the 
narrative. The novel’s plot is famously elliptical, powered by subterfuge and concealment, as 
Lucy searches in memory for a vista uncomplicated by loss, finding that she can only suspend 
herself ‘in catalepsy and a dead trance’ (V 126). The images of Villette are bound up in the 
anxieties of a Victorian dialectic of reflections and surfaces, tainted by Brontë’s anxieties about 
the alienating consequences of an ocular culture.200 As such, Lucy’s pictures are hauntingly 
opaque and placeless, longing for the coherence that transparency promises.  
In this chapter I read the text’s explicit taking up of visual discourse as a means of 
expressing affective states, specifically the visceral grief suffered by Lucy. I trace patterns of 
light and darkness, and leitmotifs of blindness and sight, to unravel the narrator’s complex 
figuring of loss and death. What might lie outside of Lucy’s line of sight, the aspects of the 
world that she cannot or will not see? Villette is heavy with the darkness of grief and in what 
follows I will argue that its ocular syntax is inflected with trauma.201 By coupling modes of 
                                                        
197 Boone, “Depolicing Villette,” 22; Joseph Litvak, “Charlotte Brontë and the Scene of Instruction: Authority 
and Subversion in Villette,” Nineteenth-Century Literature, 42.4 (March, 1988), 470. 
198 Gilbert and Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic, 400.  
199 Kate E. Brown, “Catastrophe and the City: Charlotte Brontë as Urban Novelist,” Nineteenth-Century 
Literature, 57.3 (Dec., 2002), 351. 
200 Armstrong, Victorian Glassworlds, 249-50. Armstrong points out the ways in which Brontë both participated 
in and maintained fears about a specular culture. 
201 The word grief derives from grever (afflict, burden), which is from the Latin gravare (to make heavy), 
‘hence, the etymological intimacy of grief and gravity, both from gravis (weighty)’, writes Brinkema, who 
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seeing with modes of feeling, we can better appreciate the emotional force of Villette, and its 
querying of the nature of suffering. Brontë’s scopophilia is ineluctably tinged with sadness and 
regret.  
Helen Groth has demonstrated the affective context of photographic discourse in 
Victorian literature, detailing the extent to which writers explored the nexus of word and image, 
challenging the contours of memory and temporality.202 Victorian literature was infused with a 
new aesthetic, manifesting a yearning to hold still the swirl of sensory impulses, and suspend, 
with the indulgence of nostalgia, a given moment.203 Brontë writes a layered, contradictory 
nostalgia in Villette. Lucy’s narrative is riven by contrary impulses, the retrieval of the past 
leading to a recursive nightmare of images that resist coherence, the burnished light of nostalgia 
too often distorted by subsequent loss. In what follows I shall argue that the novel presents the 
specular as a space of dissent, seeking the solidity of memory, whilst cognisant of the fragility 
of a subjectivity entangled in the visible. For in Victorian society, as Asa Briggs points out, 
there was no doubt ‘that seeing or not-seeing and feeling were closely related.’204  
 I depart from Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s seminal work on Charlotte 
Brontë’s novels, and their reading of Villette as essentially a discourse constrained by the 
conditions of patriarchy from which it emerged. In this reading, Lucy has internalised the 
structures of patriarchy, and can survive only by retreating into ‘submission and silence’. 
‘Brontë explores,’ they state, ‘the mundane facts of homelessness, poverty, physical 
unattractiveness, and sexual discrimination … that impose self-burial on women.’205 There is a 
                                                        
argues that this older conception of the particular heaviness of grief has been superseded by its 
contemporary usage. We must remember the weighty affect of grief’s suffocating burden, she states. See 
Forms, 73. Lucy repeatedly draws upon this trope, emphasising the crushing weight of her anguish: ‘I had a 
pressure of affliction on my mind of which it would hardly any longer endure the weight,’ (V, 189). 
202 Groth, Victorian Photography.   
203 Flint, The Visual Imagination, 34. 
204 Briggs, Victorian Things, 106. 
205 Gilbert and Gubar, The Madwoman, 400 and 402. Kate Millett’s influential reading of Villette is also in this 
vein of feminist criticism, seeking the source of Lucy’s bitter pathology in gender constraints. ‘In Lucy,’ she 
writes, ‘one may perceive what effects her life in a male-supremacist society has upon the psyche of a 
woman.’ Millett, Sexual Politics, 140.  
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humanity to Brontë’s project, though, that exceeds the fraught tensions of gender strictures and 
a contracting political sphere. Whilst Villette’s heroine is generally dismissed as altogether 
unsatisfactory, her dispassion symptomatic of erotic repression, few critics have chosen to 
investigate the sensuality of a character who does indeed profess to feel as little as possible, 
priding herself upon her ‘natural cruel insensibility’ (565).206 Kucich writes that the Brontean 
heroine expresses passion as a means of expressive diversion and masking, ‘not some kind of 
privileged relation to interiority made possible by expression, and denied by reticence. 
Passionate expression distances others; it is not a pressure toward union.’ This assumes, 
however, that the character recognises a space in which such passional articulation would be 
welcome, a notion that Lucy Snowe explicitly rejects as impossible in the social contract of her 
world. Villette’s narrative is warped by the distorted perspective of grief and suspended 
mourning; and despite Lucy’s frigidity, her voice resonates with tenderness and feeling. 
Indeed, the novel is an attempt to validate seemingly illusive grief, to expose the inner 
vicissitudes of psychic pain, or to locate a language of loss that might unite the tangible with 
the metaphysical.  ‘Countless times it had been my lot to watch apprehended sorrow close 
darkly in’ (485). The surveillance of Villette, the policing and network of entrapment, is the 
shrewd observation of the grieving consciousness. Lucy labours under a cataract of despair.  
Chris Otter laments that much of the scholarship on nineteenth-century visual culture 
is defined by an ironic myopism, grouped into two hegemonic theoretical trends: discipline, 
embodied in the Foucauldian gaze as a nefarious instrument of control; and capital, the 
emblematic figure of which is the flâneur, whose indifferent gaze renders him aloof from the 
burgeoning spectacle of modern life.207 While acknowledging the impressive value of such 
                                                        
206 Mary Jacobus, for example, reads Villette as a drama of the repressed, haunted by its unsatisfactory burial 
of Romantic and Gothic impulses. Lucy becomes the ‘absent centre [that] exerts a centripetal force on the 
other characters, making them all facets of the [her] consciousness.’ This flattens out Lucy, ignoring her 
substantial selfhood and depth of feeling. See “The Buried Letter: Feminism and Romanticism in Villette,” in 
Women Writing and Writing about Women, ed. Jacobus (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 50. 
207 Otter, The Victorian Eye, 2. 
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scholarship, Otter argues that these broad characterisations of vision and power are 
unsatisfactory and in need of reappraisal. He intriguingly gestures, albeit briefly, at the 
importance of an understanding of vision that might account for its emotional modalities, that 
‘has less to do with power than with emotional and affective experience,’ but makes clear that 
such an account is not within the purview of his own work.208 I want to take up Otter’s reference 
to a subtler and more intuitive, though no less integral experience of perception, and its 
discursive effects in Villette. There is, I will argue, an ocular diction structuring the novel in 
which the discontinuity and fragmentation characteristic of modern vision intersects with the 
kineticism of emotional turbulence.209 I understand the novel as a visual exegesis of grief, of 
the bifurcation and lapses of the grieving subject. I intend to consider Villette as a pictorial 
study of the vicissitudes of loss and aloneness, quite as if Brontë were querying how literature 
might depict entrenched isolation and lovelessness in a world newly crowded by the visual. 
  
                                                        
208 Otter’s The Victorian Eye is a fascinating book on the burgeoning technologies of light in Victorian 
England and the corresponding rise of a specifically liberal political subject. 
209 The literature on vision and modernity as it took shape in the early to mid-nineteenth century is vast, and 
a very small sample would include Crary’s book and those cited earlier by Flint; Smith; and Groth. See also 
Victorian Literature and the Victorian Visual Imagination, ed. Carol T. Christ and John O. Jordan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995). The reference to a modern conception of perception alludes to the 
generally held argument that vision during the Victorian era was profoundly altered, not least due to the 
birth of photographic and cinematic technologies, but also due to the diverse range of optical instruments 
and gadgetry that pervaded popular culture. Vision was in the process changed from a Renaissance and 
unitary perspective to a binocular model, dramatised to great effect in the stereoscope. As Carol Mavor 
writes, it was the revelation of binocular perspective that emphasised the ‘queerness of seeing’, and ‘the 
body’s own doubleness’. Mavor, Becoming: The Photographs of Clementina, Viscountess Hawarden (Durham: 
Duke University Press: 1999), 109. 
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I 
The dimness of mourning 
 
 From the very first moments of Villette, the primacy of visual perception — here, the 
eye: the ‘piercing’ blue eyes of the young Graham Bretton —  is brought into focus, contrasted 
with the black eyes of his mother, Louisa (V, 3). It is not only the eye, but the ‘clear wide 
windows’ of the ‘handsome house in the clean and ancient town of Bretton,’ that is first 
described in Lucy Snowe’s autobiographical reflections; from behind their glass, Lucy, then a 
young woman, can ‘look down on a fine antique street, where Sundays and holidays seem 
always to abide,’ a view ‘so clean,’ so harmonious, that now, decades later, the narrator chooses 
to place it at the foreground of her memoir. An icon of framed perception, there is to be a 
profusion of such ‘window moments’ in the narrative. This is the reader’s entrance into Lucy’s 
painful memoirs, the clean symmetrical lines of the glass apertures and the ‘clearness’ of her 
kinfolks’ eyes forming the symbols of a neatness of life for which Lucy longs. ‘Time always 
flowed smoothly for me at my godmother’s side; not with tumultuous swiftness, but blandly, 
like the gliding of a full river ... I liked peace so well, and sought stimulus so little, that when 
the latter came I almost felt it a disturbance and wished rather it had still held aloof’ (4). Lucy 
emphasises the calmness of linear form temporally and metaphorically, her language 
conveying a sense of suspension, encased in the pleasures of an idealised quiescence. Such 
formal integrity is precarious, however, even as it is imposed. Lucy hints at imminent tragedy; 
an ‘unsettled sadness’ that had forced her removal from her original home, the herald of ‘events 
… whose very shadow I scarce guessed’ (2). The Bretton household is the idyll of exile, with 
Lucy’s mysterious origins relegated to the outside of the narrative frame. What is simply too 
painful, too erosive of psychic composure, is obscured and secreted into the margins of the 
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text, a pattern of suspended enigma that is maintained throughout the careful (un)disclosure of 
her history. 
The crispness of domestic order is punctured by the arrival of the child Paulina Home, 
an uncannily tiny ‘creature,’ ‘a mere doll … delicate as wax’ (6), whose arrival is first signalled 
spatially by the addition of several artefacts of furniture, displacing Lucy’s own. Interrupting 
the privacy of her own space, with its bed in a ‘shady recess’, is the addition of a crib, ‘draped 
with white’; so too does a ‘rosewood’ chest contrast with Lucy’s mahogany set. ‘Of what are 
these things the signs and tokens?’ asks Lucy (4). From now on, Lucy will no longer be ‘made 
much of’ (3), supplanted by a delicate, pretty child, whose colours of white and rosewood 
contrast sharply with the darkness of Lucy’s objects. The contrast of light and dark is 
interpolated throughout Villette, dimness and shadow Lucy’s chosen associations:  
 
In beholding this diaphanous and snowy mass, I well remember feeling 
myself to be a mere shadowy spot on a field of light; the courage was 
not in me to put on a transparent white dress (152) 
 
When I vanished — it was into darkness; … thinking … my own 
thoughts, living my own life in my own still, shadow-world (136) 
 
I was no bright lady’s shadow – not Miss de Bassompierre’s (353)  
 
Overcast enough it was my nature often to be … but the dimness and 
depression must both be voluntary (353) [my emphasis] 
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In the penultimate example, the pairing of grief with darkness is more than just rhetorical, 
hinting at the traditional coupling in Western theological and epistemological thought of 
mourning with obscured vision. Brinkema describes the ways in which psychic suffering has 
over the centuries been figured as darkness and blindness, a persistent trope in the Bible, for 
instance, and in Milton, texts with which Brontë, as the daughter of a clergyman, was 
thoroughly acquainted. ‘It is not a matter of the elimination of seeing,’ she explains, ‘but, 
rather, the muting of light’s approach to the eye in favour of a visibility based in and of 
darkness, a vision that now sees nothing.’210 This homology is crucial for understanding the 
poetics of loss in Villette, in which disoriented perception, grief, and darkness intersect in a 
triadic structure that substitutes for the explicit telling of the mysterious loss at the narrative 
centre, the disaster that the narrator cannot name. 
The confusion of pain inherent in mourning plagues Freud’s account of the 
phenomenon, blurring the dichotomy so that each feeling partakes of the other. Freud was 
baffled by mourning throughout his life, treating of it cautiously in his essay of 1916, ‘On 
Transience,’ and then again, more extensively, in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (although his 
essential focus in that essay is melancholy). He figured mourning as the original mystery, ‘one 
of those phenomena that one does not explain oneself, but to which other obscurities may be 
traced back,’211 evoking the strange, circular vortex of the feeling. While Freud was perplexed 
by the peculiarly intense pain of mourning, he was not in doubt that it always came to its natural 
end, extinguishing itself when the object of mourning is renounced and replaced. One year 
later, in his essay of 1917, mourning becomes the light-casting condition: ‘we shall now 
attempt to cast some light on the nature of melancholia by comparing it to the normal affect of 
mourning’.212 Yet, as Brinkema argues, the slipperiness of the oppositional terms mourning and 
                                                        
210 Brinkema, Forms, 54. 
211 Freud, ‘On Transience,’ in On Murder, Mourning and Melancholia, trans. Shaun Whiteside, ed. Adam 
Phillips (London: Penguin, 2005), 198. 
212 Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia,’ in On Murder, 203. 
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melancholia continued throughout Freud’s writings; mourning remained ‘the blind spot’ of 
psychoanalysis, and its organising principle, ‘increasingly shrouded in peculiar darkness’.213 
Villette stages the vicissitudes of grief as a failure of representation. 
Lucy signals her pain visually, using certain leitmotifs, such as darkness and light, 
veiling, objects, and constricted interior spaces to intimate emotional suffering. Polly’s arrival, 
for instance, recalling that of the smuggled foundling Heathcliff’s unveiling on the hearth of 
Wuthering Heights, and no less cataclysmic, is emphatically a spectacle of threat and 
suspension, the mysterious ‘bundle,’ swathed in a shawl, which methodically discards the 
‘clumsy wrapping,’ becoming tangled in the too heavy and large ‘drapery’. There are two 
things to notice here. The first is the image of Polly’s smuggled arrival, which does not signal, 
as in the case of Catherine Earnshaw, the beginning of self, but rather the estrangement, for 
this child shall come to symbolise the affection and the belonging that Lucy can never attain, 
provoking in Lucy both tenderness and pain. Crucially Polly is veiled, and that veil signifies 
linguistically as well as imagistically: the word mourning has a heterogeneous definition and 
can describe the garments, traditionally black in Western culture, that attend the death of 
another person, garments worn upon the body, or draped across windows, shrouding buildings; 
thus to mourn means to veil, to cover and even to obscure (furthermore, Polly is dressed in a 
mourning frock [15]).214 Cloaked and obscured, Polly is associated with the imagery of veiling 
that will become synonymous with loss as the novel unfolds.  
Second, Polly is the immediate recipient of tenderness, as Mrs Bretton, ‘not generally 
a caressing woman,’ is absorbed in the diminutive, ‘most unchildlike’ girl, stroking and kissing 
her (6-8). Lucy too is transfixed by the spectacle of Polly, who is now the essential focus of 
the narrative eye, usurping Lucy’s place of privilege: ‘I did take notice,’ she admits, ‘I watched 
                                                        
213 Brinkema, Forms of the Affects, 64. 
214 See the entry under ‘Mourning’ in the OED: 
http://www.oed.com.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/view/Entry/122947?rskey=fyaNP8&result=1#eid 
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Polly … I observed her.’ It is Polly’s womanly grief that is the most salient piece of her 
portraiture, her ‘monomaniacal’ yearning for her absent father the point upon which her image 
centres. ‘Other children in grief or pain cry aloud, without shame or restraint; but this being 
wept’ (7). Belatedly, Polly’s attention turns to Lucy, ‘I saw her eye seek me,’ subjecting Lucy 
to ‘some minutes silent scrutiny.’ Lucy is in effect entrapped in the umbra of the child’s 
luminous preciousness, whose image arrests the gaze, in contrast to the ‘inoffensive shadow’ 
of Lucy’s presence (375). The disembodied eye, an object of fetish throughout, is like a 
spotlight upon its object, destabilising Lucy and her fortress against sadness. Polly’s image 
gives life to the narrative, and her presence will become ever more synonymous with light.215 I 
want to pause here to consider the binding of light and the pain of mourning, turning again to 
Brinkema, who argues that grief is fundamentally a problem of luminosity, and can be traced 
through configurations of ‘troubled light’. Sorrow ‘interrupts and confuses illumination and 
enlightenment’.216 There is a phenomenology of illumination and shadow in Villette that is 
shaped by the opacity of Lucy’s grief. Lucy’s eschewal of light masks her yearning: ‘I saw … 
those harvest moons, and I almost wished to be covered in with earth and turf, deep out of their 
influence; for I could not live in their light, nor make them comrades.’ She is bereft of that 
spirit empowered ‘to gladden daylight and embalm darkness’ (186). 
Polly’s representation is marked by disturbance: ‘an object less conducive to comfort 
… than she presented, it was scarcely possible to have before one’s eyes’. It is the 
unboundedness of the girl’s sadness, its ‘angular vagaries,’ which so discomfits, and threatens 
integrity of form, the explosive, expansive potential of her ‘agony’ a spectacle that urges Lucy 
to act, to ‘check’ any such overflow, as is emphasised repeatedly with spatial metaphors of 
‘borders’ and ‘bounds’. The child is transmogrified by her longing, and the narration monitors 
                                                        
215 See for example p. 537, in the chapter entitled ‘Cloud’.  
216 Brinkema, Forms, 56. 
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the patterns of her ‘intolerable’ sadness (23): ‘no furrowed face of adult exile … ever bore 
more legibly the signs of homesickness than did her infant visage. She seemed growing old 
and unearthly,’ and ‘worn and quiet’ (11, 23). To Lucy’s febrile mind the mourning figure of 
the child becomes a ghostly presence: ‘whenever, opening a room-door, I found her seated in 
a corner alone … that room seemed to me not inhabited, but haunted’. Polly, who is left to 
‘contend with an intolerable feeling,’ (23) is a study in the isolation of grief.  The potency and 
propinquity of the child’s suffering that haunts Lucy, and she retrospectively recreates a 
disjointed set of images that are tinged by the sadness of her own life. In memory, Polly is a 
receptacle of Lucy’s own suffering, the picture of her ‘womanly’ grief a tormenting omen of 
the imminent catastrophe awaiting the narrator.    
While Lucy professes the necessity of guarding herself against such ‘sudden, dangerous 
natures,’ she is nevertheless utterly absorbed by the image of Polly, and indeed ceases to find 
her of interest when she is quiet (24). She cannot resist watching the heady moment of reunion 
between Mr Home and his daughter: 
 My eye being fixed on hers – I witnessed in its irid and pupil a startling 
transfiguration. The fixed and heavy gaze swum, trembled, then 
glittered in fire …. It was not a noisy, not a wordy scene: for that I was 
thankful; but it was a scene too brimful, and which, because the cup 
did not foam up high or furiously overflow, only oppressed one the 
more. 
Polly’s eye is given in precise, fetishistic detail, yet the narrative eye ‘sees’ opaquely, in 
fragments which refuse synthesis, a paradox that reflexively points to the irony of the visual in 
Villette, where the ostensible work of Lucy’s inscription — to show, to tell — is undone by her 
own damaged visual instincts. As Terry Eagleton points out, even Polly remains throughout 
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essentially opaque to the narrator.217 Polly’s scene of ‘vehement, unrestrained expansion’ is 
‘burdensome’ to Lucy: ‘I wished she would utter some hysterical cry, so that I might get relief’ 
(12-13). The disconcerting, eroticised image pulls at Lucy’s prose, stretching her syntax in 
concord with the dilating pupil, as the spectre of Polly’s overripe feelings undermines the 
stability of representation. Such emotional vicissitudes pervert the even, if constricted, shapes 
in which Lucy cloisters her emotions. Moreover, the elision of sight and feeling occurs as the 
intense visualisation of Polly’s eye slips to her ‘nature,’ establishing a metonymic affiliation: 
the liquidity of the eye (‘gaze swum’) matches that of an emotion ‘too brimful’. John Hughes 
reads this passage as staging the estrangement of reflection: Lucy’s sedulous and clinical 
looking chiefly an introspective examination; Polly a surrogate in whom she seeks ‘the 
vibration of her own affective habits’. Lucy’s ‘attention appears less as an act of solicitude than 
as a fascination with the involuntary betrayal of obsession on the part of another.’218 While I 
resist the claim that Polly functions primarily as an abstraction of Lucy’s ego, the notion of 
reflection is helpful in considering the visual dynamic at work in this instance. Polly’s visible 
torments are at once repulsive and exotic for Lucy, threatening to pull her into the greediness 
of feeling. Yet the irrevocable need to watch enlivens plot, propels it even, in contrast to the 
equilibrium that the narrator insistently works to maintain. Polly runs ‘mad’ into the street to 
greet her father, while Lucy ‘watches calmly from the window’ (12), the image mediated by 
the glass. Lucy’s affective engagement is split in this moment, for she is both safely within yet 
also apart, the window frame a barrier that might ward off the perils of attachment and loss.219 
                                                        
217 Polly’s eyes are a spectacle, and Lucy frequently describes them with wonderment, exulting in ‘the tender 
depth of her eyes … her eye-lashes, her full irids, and large mobile pupils.’ V, 369. Terry Eagleton, Myths of 
Power: A Marxist Study of the Brontës, 2nd ed. (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1988), 63. 
218 John Hughes, “The Affective World of Charlotte Brontë’s Villette,” Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 
40.4 (Autumn, 2000), 713. Eagleton similarly regards Lucy’s interest in Polly, yet with a decidedly more 
sinister tone: ‘a sort of malice is rationalised as a briskly commonsensical taking in hand…. Lucy projects 
herself into Polly and then coolly disassociates herself from that self-image’. See Myths of Power, 62-3. 
Eagleton does not consider Lucy’s ambivalence towards Polly as arising from her anguish at such 
propinquity of grief. 
219 I am indebted to Isobel Armstrong’s poetics of window moments, by which this analysis and indeed my 
reading of Villette is influenced. See Victorian Glassworlds, 126-132.  
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The seemingly uniform surface of glass masks Lucy’s losses, and the next chapter opens with 
this rhetorical play: she asks the reader to picture her, ‘for the next eight years, as a bark 
slumbering through halcyon weather, in a harbour still as glass’ (38). The language of glass 
facilitates Lucy’s efforts to preserve her vulnerable self in a cocoon-like shell, while 
paradoxically increasing her aloneness, as is evident in her later confession that her relationship 
with Graham Bretton is mediated by an ‘invisible, but a cold something, very slight, very 
transparent, but very chill: a sort of screen of ice had hitherto, all through our two lives, glazed 
the medium through which we exchanged intercourse’. Indeed, as Isobel Armstrong writes, 
Lucy’s name (luce, or light) recalls the contemporary usage of ‘lights’ for windows, just as 
Frost (the name Brontë temporarily assigned her heroine)220 ‘signals the nature of glass as 
frozen liquid. She becomes a window on glass culture.’221 A ‘frail frost-work of reserve’ divides 
the pair and, despite Lucy’s assurance that ‘it gave note of dissolution,’ she never achieves 
with Graham the intimacy for which she longs (227-8). The sheen of glass here allows Lucy to 
intimate a notion of subjectivity curtailed by a persistent divisibility, a sense of her cruel 
distance from other bodies. 
 A dialectic of glass suffuses Brontë’s juvenilia, too, and her fictional world of 
‘Glasstown’ plays with glassy textures of longing. The juvenilia stories dream, in the young 
Charlotte’s words, of a ‘perfect transparency’ and ‘crystalline clearness.’222 Her characters gaze 
out of windows, and Lucy, like Jane Eyre, is tempted too by that transparent portal. It is a view 
                                                        
220 In a letter to her publisher in 1852, Brontë made the following request: ‘As to the name of the heroine – I 
can hardly express what subtlety of thought made me decide upon giving her a cold name’; but – at first – I 
called her “Lucy Snowe” which I afterward changed to “Frost”. Subsequently – I rather regretted the change 
and wished it “Snowe” again: if not too late – I should like the alteration to be made now throughout the 
manuscript. A cold name she must have’ [author’s emphasis]. Brontë, Selected Letters, ed. Smith, 210. 
221 Armstrong, Glassworlds, 240. 
222 Brontë, “The Adventures of Ernest Alembert,” in The Tales of the Islanders, in An Edition of the Early 
Writings of Charlotte Brontë, vol.1, ed. Christine Alexander (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 158. 
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that ‘is ambiguously liberating and emptying out,’ suggesting that in fact these characters gaze 
only into a limitless emptiness.223  
  Importantly Polly’s grief is easily succoured, as her father’s presence restores her 
happiness: she seemed ‘to be in a trance of content,’ wonders Lucy, her deprivation 
immediately forgotten. There is no such relief for Lucy, perhaps explaining her ‘system of 
feeling,’ a determination to preserve the veneer of the unrifled surface. In order for life to be 
‘better regulated,’ advises Lucy, one must quell ‘Feeling’: all will thus be ‘quieter on the 
surface; and it is on the surface only the common gaze will fall. As to what lies below, leave 
that with God’ (212). With the arrival home of Graham, the ‘circle’ of which Lucy is a part, is 
sundered: ‘Graham … broke it up,’ (15). Lucy does not so much omit herself, as she is 
displaced from the narrative focus by two familial pairs, the Bretton mother and son, and Polly 
and her adoring ‘papa,’ Mr Home. As the asymmetrical figure on this ‘stage,’ Lucy is pushed 
out from the frame, cast instead as observer, a position that she will formally adopt as ‘the 
watcher of sorrow’ in her care of Miss Marchmont. From these examples, then, we can see that 
visual representation in Villette is at once far more textured than any one ideological position 
can allow. It is a composite of conflicting, intersecting acts of observation. Villette is ‘an 
autobiography of seeing,’ a record of the visible and invisible traces of loss, and its pattern of 
specular displacement.224 As Carol Mavor reminds us, ‘invisible pain is often the most 
impossible to reconcile.’225 
  
                                                        
223 Armstrong, Glassworlds, 127-8. I return to this idea below, studying a number of such ‘window moments’ in 
Villette, most notably those that occur at the Pensionnat. 
224 Briggs, Victorian Things, 107. Briggs does not mention Brontë or her novels in this description, but refers to 
the broader genre of visual memoir, such as Ruskin’s work.  
225 Mavor, Black and Blue, 15. 
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II 
The blindness of grief 
 
The blind figure of grief is explicitly offered in an extraordinary scene that occurs 
between Lucy and Polly/Paulina, much later in the novel, which distils the sense of imagistic 
mourning that I have described.226 Lucy is implored by Paulina to comment on the beauty of 
her now-lover, Dr John Graham Bretton, provoking the following exchange: 
 
‘Do other people see him with my eyes? Do you admire him?’ 
‘I’ll tell you what I do, Paulina,’ was once my answer to her many 
questions. ‘I never see him. I looked at him twice or thrice about a year 
ago, before he recognised me, and then I shut my eyes; and if he were 
to cross their balls twelve times between each day’s sunset and sunrise, 
except from memory, I should hardly know what shape had gone by 
[emphasis original].’ 
‘Lucy, what do you mean?’ said she, under her breath. 
‘I mean that I value vision, and dread being struck stone blind’ (505) 
Utilising the trope of blindness that had such currency for Victorian writers,227 Lucy explicitly 
aligns her profound sense of loss at her unrequited love for Graham Bretton, with a strategy of 
                                                        
226 The naming of characters is one of Villette’s most eccentric features, and each character (excepting the 
narrator) holds a set of names, indicating perhaps the fluctuation of physical presence and identity as it 
appears to Lucy. Nothing in the world of Villette holds still, and Graham’s name is the most mutable (see V, 
319 for example). I will follow Lucy’s choice in this scene to use Paulina. 
227 Flint, The Visual Imagination, 64. 
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visual mastery that she implies works to nullify pain. Her statement could be read merely as 
perversity: Francesca Kazan describes her words as ‘sinister’ and ‘chilling’, stating that Lucy 
‘sees clearly provided she remains “unseen.” ‘Graham has the power to blind her through his 
brilliance,’ she writes, ‘perhaps even to petrify her should he, Medusa-like, catch her eye. … 
Her closed eyes in no way represent an impotency – quite the opposite.’228 There is a far greater 
threat than Graham’s beauty, however, (which Lucy admires with a relishing pleasure). Kazan 
neglects to consider Lucy’s ‘unalterable passion of silent desolation’ (V 533). Nor is Lucy’s 
strategy the exposure of the visible in order to master it, but rather a deliberate attempt to 
remain impervious to the volition of the present, of that which would force itself upon her 
consciousness. Despite her continued friendship with Graham (his presence dominates the 
novel’s first half, and much of Lucy’s narration tends towards him; he is her ‘refuge’, she 
admits: ‘His eye shot no morose shafts that went cold and rusty and venomed through’ one’s 
heart; ‘beside him was rest and refuge – around him, fostering sunshine’ [264]), she nonetheless 
claims that ‘I never see him’. She pursues a way of seeing that obscures the burden of bereft 
subjectivity. This is the blind spot of grief. If there is power in the denial of seeing, however, 
it is inefficacious. As I noted in chapter 1, Brinkema has described blindness as ‘the affect of 
a stricken disorientation.’ The confusion of imagery in Lucy’s language would seem to support 
this; the image is not only frayed, but seemingly erased by the elisions of a grief-stricken 
perspective. In Villette Lucy transcribes experiences of a drastically confused and darkened 
perception, an ontological disorientation poisoned by abiding grief.229 Lucy’s ‘dread’ of ‘being 
struck stone blind’ is the terror of debilitating psychic pain, which, if she succumbs, leaves her 
flailing for control. For her, inner vision is preferable, an image of past encounters that can 
remain in stasis. 
                                                        
228 Francesca Kazan, “Heresy, the Image, and Description; or, Picturing the Invisible: Charlotte Brontë’s 
Villette,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 32.4 (Winter, 1990), 552.  
229 Brinkema, Forms, 54-55. 
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Lucy’s statement also displays a peculiar relation of memory to sight as an 
epistemology. As Flint notes, the trope of blindness called upon ‘the powerful forces of 
imagination and memory. Such an idea was one of the most powerful legacies of the early 
Romantic writers on Victorian sensibilities,’ along with a consideration of ‘the importance not 
so much of perception, but of the memory of perception’.230 In Lucy’s qualifying clause, 
‘except from memory,’ she suggests that remembrance is both preferable to the reality of 
Graham’s body, and also tyrannous, like an after-image lodged in her visual consciousness. 
There is a relentlessness to memory: Graham, and Lucy’s futile desire for him, is stamped upon 
her gaze, her retinal perception impressed irrevocably, no matter how strenuously she shuts her 
eyes. It is an image of loss that is fixed upon the surface of the eye, in a process that suggests 
the photographic imprinting of an image in light, or as Sally B. Palmer suggests, the dissolving 
pictures of a stereopticon.231 The exigency of the image meets the exigency of pain: Lucy’s 
insistent denial of seeing is a denial of feeling; grief and vision are tautological in Lucy’s 
perspective, and once again mourning is predicated upon visual stimuli, fluctuating with the 
confusion of her psychic state. Brontë’s typographical stressing of Lucy’s claim (‘I never see 
him’) invites the reader to pause. As Lindsay Smith notes, visual metaphors are embedded in 
our language, in our very notion of reflection, enabling the imaginative capacity to embody 
disjunct temporal and spatial states. Lucy’s metaphor is both figurative and literal, weighted 
                                                        
230 Flint, Visual Imagination, 23. Flint recounts the story of George Eliot’s similar response to a photograph of 
her dead lover, George Lewes. ‘Memory,’ Flint writes, ‘may certainly prove preferable to an image which, 
through its function as simulacrum, signifies loss more powerfully than presence’. Contemplating the 
portrait of Lewes, Eliot wrote that ‘‘Himself as he was is what I see inwardly, and I am afraid of outward 
images lest they should corrupt the inward’’(23). 
231 Sally B. Palmer, “Projecting the Gaze: The Magic Lantern, Cultural Discipline, and Villette”, Victorian 
Review 32.1 (2006), 34. Palmer argues a comparison of the Victorian slideshow, or stereopticon, and the 
narrative techniques of Villette, an idea that I take up in this essay. Palmer’s argument, however, is heavily 
influenced by Foucault’s ‘prison’ metaphor, whereas I align the magic lantern show with Brontë’s 
representation of loss and attitudes towards sight. 
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with an understanding of the physiological grounding of personhood. Lucy implies that optical 
agency governs psychic wellbeing.232  
 
 
III 
Sequestered suffering 
 
Lucy’s position as ‘the watcher of suffering’ almost brings the narrative to a premature 
end at various junctures, for instance in her care for the invalid Miss Marchmont.233 The details 
of Lucy’s great loss — the deaths of her family members —  are deliberately omitted, opaquely 
hinted at in the image of her reflection ‘in the glass, in my mourning dress,’ (40) but secreted 
in conversations or asides that occur outside of narrative time, a strategy that shapes narrative 
tension in Villette. The absence of light substitutes the details of her trauma; her suffering in a 
place with ‘neither sun nor stars’, wracked and torn by tempests. Exiled from the idyll of 
Bretton (‘[o]f Mrs Bretton, I had long lost sight’ [38]), Lucy, now ‘a worn-out creature’ in her 
mourning dress, ‘a faded, hollow-eyed vision,’ (40) resigns herself to a small and smothered 
existence with her new mistress, removed entirely from the outside world: 
Two hot, close rooms thus became my world; and a crippled old 
woman … my all. Her service was my duty – her pain, my suffering – 
her relief, my hope – her anger, my punishment – her regard, my 
reward. I forgot that there were fields, woods, rivers … [and] an ever-
                                                        
232 Smith, Victorian Photography, 4-5. I take the concept of ‘optical agency’ from Smith’s account of Ruskin’s 
theories of vision, which were ‘characterised by a new desire to manipulate the object in the visual field and 
to recognise the positioning of the body of the subject in acts of visual perception.’ Lucy suggests that she can 
create or suppress her emotional state by virtue of her position as spectator, re-framing the images that form 
her world. 
233 John Hughes has written that Villette is destabilised by moments of radical ‘contingency … so extreme at 
times that it seems as if the text might cease to find the means to continue’. While his argument is dedicated 
to such scenes of a hallucinatory or otherwise bizarre nature, I also find his description germane to Lucy’s 
more mundane, domestic encounters. See “The Affective World of Villette,” 716.  
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changing sky outside the steam-dimmed lattice of this sick-chamber; I 
was almost content to forget it. All within me became narrowed to my 
lot (41)  
Mourning has extinguished her own illumination of being, reflecting the coldness of her 
patient’s imminent death. She shackles herself to the aggressive regime of her patient’s needs, 
embodying Marchmont’s historical agonies (the loss of her lover as a young woman) and her 
fury at her fate. At stake in Lucy’s quiet masochism is an implicit acknowledgement of shame, 
and a reactive impulsion toward self-punishment, even self-loathing. The room, with its 
geometry of sadness and repression, is sepulchral and Lucy’s personhood is accordingly 
‘narrowed’, whittled down to mirror the wasted patient who shares her life. Her language, too, 
has been lulled into the echoes of conformity, individuality sliding into the rhythms of mimicry 
in the repetitive couplets (‘her pain, my suffering’), the characteristic dash that attends Lucy’s 
voice in moments of despair flattening out her voice. This is how Lucy must encounter 
tenderness, through a terrible ossification of existence, purely to secure a ‘little morsel of 
human affection, which I prized as if it were a solid pearl’ (41).  
The upheavals of a sudden confession of trauma kill Miss Marchmont, who asphyxiated 
by the utterance. As Gretchen Braun notes, Lucy is witness to the paradoxical nature of 
unburdening personal pain, ‘acknowledging both its urgency and its potential damage.’ In re-
living one’s trauma, there is a dramatic confrontation with the self, an encounter that can 
produce a ‘damaging self-knowledge’ and ‘can end in total self-negation,’ and death.234 It is 
the potency of Marchmont’s mnemonic images, those ‘scenes’ that she is able to convoke with 
‘singular vividness,’ which engulf her (43). With the severing of ‘the thread of an existence so 
long fretted by affliction,’ (46) Lucy’s mistress is swiftly despatched, as it were, with the abrupt 
                                                        
234 Gretchen Braun, ‘“A Great Break in the Common Course of Confession”: Narrating Loss in Charlotte 
Brontë’s Villette,’ ELH, 78.1 (Spring, 2011), 201. 
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close of the chapter, as though she has exhausted her function as a grieving agent for Lucy’s 
buried pain. The most important feature of Marchmont’s existence is that she has suffered, an 
agony that is abstracted and which, growing cancerously, extinguishes her. If Lucy grieves for 
this fresh loss, it is denied expression in the text.   
That erasure of imagery, or the blank of pain, occurs at other, seminal moments of 
urgent grief. Lucy, her body and mind abraded by the torments of extreme isolation, collapses 
in a Villette street, as her surrounds ‘turned black and vanished from my eyes … I seemed to 
pitch headlong down an abyss. I remember no more (192)’. This moment abruptly closes the 
first volume. Later, as Lucy watches the forced departure of Monsieur Paul, whom she has 
grown to love, several minutes of suffering are unrepresentable: ‘There seems, to my memory, 
an entire darkness and distraction,’ she writes, ‘a grief inexpressible over a loss unendurable 
(528)’. The fade to black, the obscured perception: both narrative techniques enact the 
obliqueness of grief, a further indication of psychic pain that simply defies representation, yet 
which, paradoxically, must be communicated, if only through a neutered image. The psychic 
pain so particular to grief inverts the image, unmakes it.  
There are moments when Lucy is offered the chance to confess her anguish; for 
instance, on the occasion when Paul implores her to confide in him, ‘attempts necessarily 
unavailing,’ laments Lucy, ‘because I could not talk’ (276). As Braun notes, ‘[n]ot only does 
the intensity of her grief render her inarticulate, but her losses have diminished her’ such, that 
she exists ‘at the bare edge of … social intelligibility and empathetic range’.235 Kate E. Brown 
concurs with the dearth of social restitution in Villette, arguing that Brontë ‘insists on both the 
necessity to mourn and the impossibility of doing so in the absence of a responsive social 
world.’236 Indeed, Lucy repeatedly emphasises the unique isolation of her state, precluding the 
                                                        
235 Braun, ‘Narrating Loss,’ 189. 
236 Brown, ‘Catastrophe and the City,’ 352. 
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comprehension of any listener: ‘Mine was a state of mind out of their experience,’ she explains 
(269), therefore ‘[t]he half-drowned life-boat man keeps his own counsel, and spins no yarns’ 
(214).  
 It is the tyranny of ‘Reason’ that more immediately presses upon Lucy, haunting her 
with a violent inner dialogue of abstracted symbols of self-alienation.237 The ruthless voice that 
whispers to Lucy, issuing masochistic demands, is an interior song of madness, strangling her 
ability to tell. Anne A. Cheng argues that Lucy’s refusal to divulge her great sorrow is strategic: 
Lucy ‘self-present[s] as … a pathological figure,’ she claims.238 Yet the harrowing tenor of 
Reason’s dictums and Lucy’s helpless resistance points to a consciousness wholly gripped by 
grief, incapable of the self-possession that strategy requires. Instead, Lucy resists, with a 
wrenching futility, the nefarious whims of a cruel psychic chant: 
 Hope no delight of heart – no indulgence of intellect: grant no 
expression to feeling – give holiday to no single faculty: dally with no 
friendly exchange: foster no genial intercommunion…’ […] ‘But if I 
feel, may I never express?’ ‘Never!’ declared Reason. I groaned under 
her bitter sternness. Never – never – oh, hard word! This hag, this 
Reason, would not let me look up, or smile, or hope: she could not rest 
unless I were altogether crushed, cowed, broken-in, and broken-down 
(272) 
Reason draws from her ‘insufferable tears which weep away life itself,’ a ‘deadly weariness,’ 
and ‘paralysed despair’ (273). This extraordinary evocation of pain akin to madness is just one 
moment of textual vulnerability, or ‘ventriloquism’ as Cheng describes it, in which the dialogue 
                                                        
237 For an alternative reading of the character of ‘Reason’ in Villette, see Jacobus, The Buried Letter; she 
understands Reason’s strangling hold as the the realist imperatives. ‘The narrative and representational 
conventions of Victorian realism are constantly threatened by an incompletely repressed Romanticism.’ 42. 
238 Anne A. Cheng, “Reading Lucy Snowe’s Cryptology: Charlotte Brontë’s Villette and Suspended 
Mourning,” Qui Parle, 4.2 (Spring, 1991), 76. 
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wanders into a space of strangeness, signalled by the use of dashes. At such moments the 
encroachment of despair seems to collapse temporal distance, so that the particularities of the 
pain Lucy describes now, decades later, reorientate perspective, seamlessly overcoming the 
present. Grief becomes the single point of narrative view, accounting for the aleatory style; 
Lucy is not able ‘to look up,’ her perspective etiolated by a pain that she implies is extrinsic to 
the self. The volition of mourning and its insurgency into the temporal and structural dynamic 
of the text indicate the rhythms of what I can only describe as grief-time, coalescing in the 
undialectical image of loss, the enigma of the heroine’s past.239 Even now, from such a distance 
in narrative time, Lucy’s mourning, as Freud conceived of it, has not been overcome, its work 
completed and put aside.240 Mourning suspended, its image undisclosed, is mourning that is 
stubbornly enduring. 
The novel anxiously enacts the communication of psychic pain. Lucy shuns the well-
lit hall where Graham Bretton awaits her, not wishing him ‘to see that ‘the water stood in my 
eyes,’ for his was too kind a nature ever to be needlessly shown such signs of sorrow’ [emphasis 
added] (270). Here Lucy reveals two crucial anxieties: the shame of visible sadness, the 
impossibility of communicating distress (her tears speak a language, but it is an inadequate 
language). Graham, she notes, cannot heal her pain, he cannot comprehend her inner wounds 
and bruised mind. Lucy’s infrequent speech, which is often abrasive and non-revelatory, is, 
according to the pernicious voice of Reason, a disguise for her psychic torment. ‘Talk for you 
                                                        
239 I take the concept of the undialectical image from Brinkema. Roland Barthes describes the same 
conundrum in the diaries written in the months following his mother’s death, shocked by the non-
narratability of ‘pure mourning’. ‘There is a time when death is an event … and as such mobilizes, interests, 
activates … And then one day it is no longer an event, it is another duration, compressed, insignificant, not 
narrated, grim, without recourse: true mourning not susceptible to any narrative dialectic.’ See Barthes, 
Mourning Diary, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012), 50. 
240 Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in On Murder, Mourning and Melancholia. In mourning, theorises 
Freud, it is generally the case that ‘respect for reality carries the day. But its task cannot be accomplished 
immediately. It is now carried out at great expenditure of time and investment of energy,’ but ‘the mourning-
work is completed,’ 204-205. Freud’s dichotomy would situate Lucy as pathological, her failed mourning 
degenerating into melancholia. Lucy, however, “fits” into neither category as neatly as such a formula might 
suggest, and a number of critics have pointed out the unsatisfactory application of the schema to Brontë’s 
heroine. See for example Brown; Braun; and Cheng. 
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is good discipline. You converse imperfectly. While you speak [to Graham], there can be no 
oblivion of inferiority – no encouragement to delusion: pain, privation, penury stamp your 
language …’ (271). Lucy counters that ‘where the bodily presence is weak and the speech 
contemptible, surely there cannot be error in making written language the medium of better 
utterance than faltering lips can achieve?’ But Reason only warns that she must never attempt 
to put emotion into her writing. This is a crucial exchange between the warring factions of 
Lucy’s psyche, and works metonymically to expand the novel’s major concern: the 
communication of mournfulness. For Lucy discourse dies within her: ‘speech, brittle and 
unmalleable, and cold as ice, dissolved or shivered in the effort’ to communicate (577). Speech 
shares its qualities of deathliness with glass, ‘dead matter reflecting dead matter,’ refusing the 
shape of Lucy’s affect, just as her optical perspective resists solid impressions.241 Thus we see 
Lucy’s so-called manipulative telling (or refusal to tell) anew: the novel is an attempt to express 
what is forbidden her. While the novel proceeds under Lucy’s scrupulous policing of her 
language, moments of textual looseness and vulnerability, where the strangled words fray, 
serve as counterpoint. And ironically, her very obduracy and obstinate silence do indeed 
communicate, even illuminate, the magnitude of her suffering.  
 We can also detect in Lucy’s hoarding of pain, and her desperate need to preserve it 
from spying eyes, a fear that her grief will be violated, thereby losing its sacredness. But to 
protect is also to preserve, even, curiously, to nurture. The enigma of the narrator’s sorrow is 
intensified in her secret confession to the Catholic priest, Père Silas, in whom she seeks relief 
from what she describes as ‘a pressure of affliction on my mind of which it would hardly any 
longer endure the weight.’ She clothes her confession in habitual obscurity, ‘show[ing] him the 
mere outline of [my] experience’ (189). The details of her losses are limned in scanty outline, 
entirely content-less for the reader. The portal of the confession booth remains closed for all 
                                                        
241 Armstrong, Glassworlds, 242. 
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but her priestly listener. She determines the visual and emotional borders, always shying away 
from satisfactory revelation, so that her readers are permitted to see only so much, no more. 
Despite her precise depiction of ‘optics’ (243), her fixation on the eye and its mutations, Lucy 
rejects for herself the wholeness of circular forms. For her, the roundness of the pupil is a shape 
most elusive, for ‘the orb of [my] life is not to be so rounded … the crescent-phase must suffice 
(431)’.  
 
The body as reflected image 
Lucy searches for the succour of any other image but her own; those moments of 
contemplation of her physical reflection are invariably ones of displeasure, if not shame. As 
Kate Millett writes, ‘Lucy is subject to a compulsive mirror obsession, whereby each time she 
looks in the glass she denies her existence – she does not appear in the mirror’.242 Those few 
occasions when her own body is given back to her, usually when prompted by the shock of an 
unexpected refraction, are moments of alienation, which settle instantly into bitter apathy. Lucy 
is estranged from the projected image of self, experiencing her physicality as degradation. The 
woman who meets her under the chandelier in the luxury of the concert hall is a stranger, until 
Lucy realises it is her own corporeal presence that haunts the scene:  
 
I noted them all – the third person as well as the other two – and for a 
fraction of a moment, believed them all strangers, thus receiving an 
impartial impression of their appearance. But the impression was 
hardly felt and not fixed, before the consciousness that I faced a great 
mirror, filling a compartment between two pillars, dispelled it: the 
party was our own party. Thus for the first, and perhaps the only time 
                                                        
242 Kate Millett, Sexual Politics, 146. 
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in my life, I [saw] … myself as others see me … It brought a jar of 
discord, a pang of regret (248). 
For a brief moment, an alternative perspective is given us, caught in the mirror image, existing 
(almost) outside of the narrative control. We meet three figures, including a woman ‘in a pink 
dress and black lace mantle,’ standing under the dazzling splendour of a ‘rock-crystal … 
sparkling … ablaze with stars, and gorgeously tinged with dews of gems dissolved,’ and 
glimpse the germ of another Lucy, one whose story might have unfolded as Paulina’s does, 
illumined with the fullness of being. Reflections, by nature, are always a ‘missed encounter,’ 
images of matter emptied out and depthless.243 We share in the speaker’s shock when, suddenly, 
the two disparate self-images fold together, collapsed. Lucy enacts the otherness of the mirror-
gaze, but what it delivers her is not an entrance into narcissism; rather an intimate staging of 
the inherent strangeness of the image as stereoscopic. That fleeting ‘impartial impression,’ 
‘hardly felt and not fixed’ is how she might perceive herself from a perspective plane were she 
to shift outside of the penumbra of subjectivity; that aperture into a second visual frame makes 
strange her habitual mode of seeing. Her visual experiments force the reader continually to 
readjust; just when we think Lucy is in our vision, she steps to the side.  
Lucy’s perspective is so collared by sadness that the spectre of grief in another is inevitably a 
mirroring of her own state. In one sense this is the detection of shared suffering, a sign of the 
piquancy of her affect, which seems to inflame her senses. In another, though, it is a marker of 
the self-reflexive nature of Lucy’s manner of seeing. While I am mindful of collapsing those 
others into mere dispersions of the narrator’s multitudinous selves, there is an obsessional 
quality to Lucy’s fixation on paragons of suffering that begins with her scrutiny of Polly’s 
grief. Upon the Labassecourean king’s visage, for instance, Lucy reads the ‘strong hieroglyphs 
graven as with iron stylet on his brow,’ interpreting these characters as the marks of a fellow 
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‘silent sufferer – a nervous, melancholy man. Those eyes had looked on the visits of a certain 
ghost …. The Queen, his wife, knew this: it seemed to me, the reflection of her husband’s grief 
lay, a subduing shadow’ on her own face. ‘Full mournful and significant was that spectacle! 
[Yet] … its peculiarity seemed to be wholly invisible: I could not discover that one soul present 
was either struck or touched’ (253). Whose grief does Lucy witness in this scene? In a circuit 
of observation, she mediates an indistinct grief that ‘beclouds the light in [the king’s] eyes’. He 
seems to reflect the expression of her silenced story, an image that draws to itself only deeper 
obscurity, suggesting the porosity and transferability of her affective state. The sublation of 
Lucy’s own affect emerges as curiosity for another’s, both reflecting and intensifying her 
feeling, whilst creating a certain distance as observer, as if watching one’s self as another. 
Lucy’s grief is held in the mercurial patterns of transitive sight, seemingly unbounded, 
mingling with the malleability of reflections. 
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V 
The mirror of memory 
Following Lucy’s return to consciousness after her psychic and bodily breakdown in 
the streets of Villette, she describes the renewal of life surging through her in visual terms: 
Where my soul went during that swoon I cannot tell. Whatever she saw 
… she kept her own secret; never whispering word to Memory, and 
baffling Imagination by an indissoluble silence… The returning sense 
of sight came upon me, red, as if it swam in blood…[and] 
consciousness revived in fear (195) 
There is a distinctly sinister ambience to Lucy’s re-emergence into subjectivity. The text that 
follows unfolds in shifting simulacra, where sight shudders and will not seem to hold still. This 
dialectic of stillness and kineticism is analogous to movements of literary discourse itself, as 
Palmer reminds us.244 The suturing of images inevitably involves elisions of what is seen, what 
is remembered, so that the resulting palimpsest ostensibly forgets what is extraneous; but the 
refuse of discarded images linger as loss, which exert disruptive force. 
The world into which Lucy awakes is foreign to her, and her estrangement is augmented 
by exhaustive looking at the objects placed round her, all of which plunge her deeper into 
memory; seeing has the tinge of a narcotic. It is as if Lucy is waking from the dead, and her 
‘sense of sight’ is the first to besiege her, ‘red’ and bloody. ‘At first I knew nothing I looked 
on … all my eyes rested on struck it as spectral,’ and one notes the peculiar volition she 
attributes to that faculty: the slippage of eye/ ‘I’ rhetorically signalling the disembodiment of 
her state. The text has strayed into a curious vulnerability, as if it were staging yet another 
beginning, where all must be visually reconstructed. Yet almost simultaneously Lucy 
recognises the appearance of familiar surroundings: ‘I gazed at the blue arm-chair, it appeared 
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to grow familiar …. Strange to say, old acquaintance were all about me, and “auld lang syne” 
smiled out of every nook’ (196). Not only is this scene an elaborate visualisation of the past, it 
is framed and mediated by symbols of sight: ‘a gilded mirror filled up the space between two 
windows, curtained amply with blue damask. In this mirror I saw myself’ (196); ‘ten years ago 
shone reflected in that mirror’ (200). Lucy is ‘obliged to know’ and ‘compelled to recognise’ 
the drawing room of Bretton, the one place that has resembled home for her in the narrative. 
Yet one can clearly see the unanchored topography of this room, divorced as it is from England, 
floating phantasmagorically in a maze of reflections, a field of vision defined by mirroring 
surfaces. The mirror reflects only an alien face (‘I looked spectral; my eyes larger and more 
hollow’ [196]), relaying a recursive image of loss and displacement, recalling that other, 
equally surreal moment of alienation that Jane Eyre experiences in the red-room, in which Jane, 
caught between ‘broken reflections,’ is shocked by her image: ‘all looked colder and darker in 
that visionary hollow’ (14).245 Both mirror-moments are precipitated by a trauma – Jane is 
imprisoned in the red room after fighting with John Reed, while Lucy is recovering after her 
nervous collapse – and both present a space that could be one of belonging, but is rather a 
surreal place of disenfranchisement. Lucy’s blood-red vision evokes the superabundant red of 
that earlier room, too, although in this instance the colour is an illusion of Lucy’s grief, as 
though the horrifying hue of the red-room’s interior is, in Villette, internalised: the visible has 
been assimilated into the protagonist’s psyche to such a degree that it taints the retina.  
Intense scrutiny is coupled with a return of subjectivity, of a past that will not 
correspond with Lucy’s present, the lonely existence and exile of a foreigner. ‘[W]hy did 
Bretton and my fourteenth year haunt me thus? Why … did they not return complete?’ (200). 
                                                        
245 Armstrong makes a strong case for the origin of Brontë’s seminal mirror – the so-called Sutherland mirror, 
created by one William Potts for the Duchess of Sutherland, whom Brontë met in her time in London in 1851. 
Charlotte viewed the mirror, which was included in the Grand Exhibition, on at least five occasions. The 
similarities between the real mirror, as pictured in the Catalogue, and that in the Bretton house, are indeed 
striking. See Glassworlds, 234-240. 
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While most critics read this scene as a brief interlude of comfort and safety, I want to suggest 
that this richly detailed interior, replete with objects that only partially satiate Lucy’s yearning 
to possess and inhabit a sense of belonging, is one defined by loss.246 Eva Badowska argues 
that the bedroom’s objects are ‘an axis around which Lucy’s subjectivity gets reconstituted,’ 
that despite their fluctuating status, it is ‘material object[s] that enable her … to recall 
herself’.247 Yet, it is precisely the fact that Lucy’s ‘relation to [the objects] fluctuates’ that 
renders this moment as one of specular displacement, rather than assertion. The return of a 
provisional self, it seems to me, emerges from the act of seeing, rather than predominantly from 
the objects of Lucy’s gaze. Moreover, the promise of these objects cannot be met and, as Lucy 
fears, there is indeed a falsity to what she perceives, not least the fact that these very things 
have been transplanted from their original interior setting of Bretton to Villette. In fact, she 
implicitly recognises this threat of lack in her wish that ‘the room had not been so well lighted, 
that I might not so clearly have seen the little pictures, the ornaments, the screens’. Whilst I 
concur with Badowska’s emphasis on the fetishistic items of display Brontë unveils, I would 
place the emphasis on the novel’s lament at the contingency of an interiority garnered from 
bourgeois ‘things’; there is apparent a yearning for such a self, one attached to the referents of 
belonging and home, but a distinctly painful recognition that, for Lucy, any such self must be 
an illusion. Lucy’s nostalgia is compromised by an origin that cannot be named. As Badowska 
notes, the representation of commodities in Villette is paradoxical, yet I must disagree with her 
statement that the novel ‘fears and scorns the thingness of things’;248 instead, Brontë writes a 
fantasy of things— ribbons, dresses, silks, and furniture. These function as images of 
                                                        
246 This scene has been the subject of considerable attention, and there is space only to point to a few notable 
examples. Eva Badowska’s “Choseville: Brontë’s Villette and the Art of Bourgeois Interiority,” PMLA 120.5 
(2005), see 1514-17; Palmer, “Projecting the Gaze,” who interprets it as staging a stereoscopic show; and 
Francesca Kazan, “Heresy, the Image, and Description; or Picturing the Invisible: Charlotte Brontë’s Villette,” 
Texas Studies in Literature and Language 32.4 (Winter, 1990), who argues that the passage functions as a mode 
of description that relishes in display and ‘textual filigree’ (548-9). My interest in loss shapes my reading of 
this scene in contrast to these examples, in which mourning does not enter into the exegesis.  
247 Badowska, “Choseville,” 1516. 
248 Badowska, “Choseville,” 1513. 
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ornamental seductiveness, sparkling with luxury. Icons of a lost past, they are also tokens of 
mourning: the cigar case that Lucy refuses to relinquish recalls Graham, and the letters Paul 
sends her from Guadoloupe, which she has kept long after his disappearance. All the items in 
the subaqueous room are remnants of a past occluded from the narrative view, a childhood 
almost completely obscured; the objects are ‘phantoms’ and ‘wraiths’ (210). It is another 
example of a textual blind spot, out of which emerges an incomplete, elusive self, extracted 
from the crucible of buried memory, mnemonic fragments that fall outside Lucy’s chosen 
perspective. The vision of the past fails to cohere. In his essay, ‘The Rhetoric of Blindness,’ 
Paul de Man sets out a model of interpretative blindness, in which the reader-as-critic fails to 
see the generative irony of his critical insight, unintentionally producing a contrary meaning 
out of an analytical blind spot. As de Man argues, ‘the blindness of the subject to its own 
duplicity has psychological roots since the unwillingness to see the mechanism of self-
deception is protective’.249 The paradoxical dialect that de Man points to is, I think, suggestive 
for the type of affective blindness found in Villette. Lucy’s habit of discriminatory seeing is 
comparable to the critic’s self-reflexive gesture of immunisation against recognising those 
things that one does not wish to see; while at the same time, significant for the insight such a 
mechanism produces. Lucy is, after all, an interpreter, her retrospective narrative a hermeneutic 
project, parsing the mechanics of loss that still elude her textual strategies.   
Everything in the intriguing parlour, Lucy writes, is ‘precisely the same, in every 
minutest detail, with those I so well remembered, and with which I had been so thoroughly 
intimate’ (200). Yet this is qualified by the observation that the apartment is ‘of different 
proportions and dimensions,’: the interior is wildly disjunct from its spatial context, displaced 
temporally and geographically, suggestive of the condition that has haunted Lucy’s retelling. 
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The Past is no home, just another exile, a fractured frame. This scene cannot be read otherwise 
than as unfolding in the shadow of loss: it is a place of beauty mourned, as a possible self free 
from pain resides in that abundance of luxurious things, a cushioned embrace. The past is 
grafted onto these displaced, anachronistic objects. Lucy notices a ‘pair of hand screens, with 
elaborate pencil drawings finished like line-engravings; these, my very eyes ached at beholding 
again, recalling hours when they had followed, stroke by stroke and touch by touch, a tedious 
… finical, school-girl pencil held in these fingers, now so skeleton-like’ (197). As Badowska 
writes, it is ‘as though touching could heal’ Lucy’s disoriented vision.250 The solidity that 
Villette longs for, nostalgically figured in this scene, inheres in the sanctity of touch, because 
tactility reaffirms a sense of home and shields the self, however briefly, from isolation. The 
ache of her eyes is a symptom of the visual assimilation of psychic agony, figuratively 
normalised in her uncanny expression, responding to her historical (child’s) body with her now 
emaciated frame. It is a poignantly sensual and sensory reproduction of past images, of distinct 
impressions embossed upon a surface that even Lucy’s body recalls. This last tangible remnant 
of childhood, the handscreens – the tactility of pencil-mark, or engraving –strikes her most. 
Lucy is in effect recalled to herself; her adult, grieving self, partnered suddenly with another, 
younger, nurtured subjectivity. It is inevitable, though, that Lucy cannot remain here long, and 
indeed, soon the room and its nostalgic collection come to seem oppressively ‘confining’ and 
she ‘long[s] for a change’ of atmosphere (203). ‘How it was that what charmed so much, could 
at the same time so keenly pain?’ (202). The topography of the charming interior is 
burdensome, impregnated with undisclosed sorrow. The charming objects taunt Lucy with an 
impossible dream of possession.  
Lucy’s grief-tinged vision has two elements that must be distinguished in order to 
appreciate the whole: on one level, there is the past time that is the subject of narration, the 
                                                        
250 Badowska, “Choseville,” 1516. 
  138 
‘present’ of Lucy’s experiences as they occurred; on the other is the aged Lucy remembering 
those events, from a perspective that has, as she laments, lost some of its precision and depth, 
yet still reels from the shock of mourning. It is from this temporal anachronism that the 
volatility of imagery that characterises Villette is derived. We cannot apprehend Lucy’s 
mourning other than as a temporal disquietude, the shifting palimpsest of past, present and 
future push the pictures Lucy shows into a chaos of conflicting time. Lucy’s much later re-
encounter with Polly, for example, is an uncanny confrontation with images of the past. The 
scene is remarkably spectral, a play of shimmering appearances at once delusional and 
accurate. Lucy is startled when seeing a dream-like figure in the mirror of her ‘own little sea-
green room’: ‘before the glass, appeared something dressing itself – an airy, fairy thing – small, 
slight, white … [w]ith distrustful eye I noted the details of this new vision’ (324). There is a 
semantic hesitation in the build-up of descriptors as the image comes into a partial focus. The 
first feature that strikes Lucy when the vision turns upon her is ‘a large eye, under long lashes, 
[which] flashed over me … the lashes were as dark as long, and they softened with their 
pencilling the orb they guarded’ (324). The gaze here is a mnemonic embrace, an ocular 
intimacy that envelops Lucy in a brief dream of belonging, and of recognition; for in Polly, 
Lucy believes that she encounters a shared store of memories, an affinity of vision. She demurs 
that ‘I could not quite admit the conviction that all the pictures which now crowded upon me 
were vivid and visible to her (327),’ yet gradually accedes to this comforting illusion: ‘I 
wondered to find my thoughts hers: there are certain things in which we so rarely meet with 
our double that it seems a miracle when that chance befalls’ (328). Lucy is the surface through 
which her ‘double,’ Polly, sees clearly her past, memories that have an origin and a duration 
of wholeness, something denied the narrator. Polly’s ‘eyes were the eyes of one who can 
remember’, exults Lucy: ‘she stood opposite, and gazed into me; and as she gazed, her face 
became more and more expressive … till at last a dimness quenched her clear vision.’ Not 
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dimmed by grief, Polly’s eyes are instead glinting with the pleasures of remembrance. This 
undermines the unity that Lucy has until now imagined. Polly’s memories are her own, 
segregated from Lucy’s and undistorted by her traumatic history. Polly is one for whom 
existence admits of a full perspective, a temporal integrity, one who does ‘not take life, loosely 
and incoherently, in parts,’ but rather whose life ‘grow[s] in harmony and consistency’ (326). 
Lucy, however, has established for herself ‘some imperious rules, prohibiting under deadly 
penalties all weak retrospect of happiness past; commanding a patient journeying through the 
wilderness of the present … [and] hushing’ the ‘longing’ ‘for a far-off promised land’ (274). 
Lucy’s historical perspective is wounded by the cataclysm of her past, and dismally futureless, 
whilst Polly’s has the luminosity of anticipation. Their encounter is an example of what John 
Hughes describes as Villette’s ‘peculiar kind of intimacy,’ whereby the sharing of experiences 
operates by a desperate need to locate in the other ‘the signs of one’s own emotionally reduced 
predicament.’251 In this instance between the two women, that emotional mimicry fails, as Lucy 
realises her pained consciousness is incontrovertibly isolated. The singularity of Lucy’s 
impressibility, the unique way in which her ‘grief’ and ‘bereavement’ have ‘stamped [her] 
mind’ (326), is a symbol of her aloneness; no one can share in the pictures that form her 
phenomenology of suffering.  
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VI 
To bury a grief 
 
In Villette Brontë seeks a mode of discourse in which to both express and submerge 
private pain, to expose and contain, if we understand containment as a means of keeping sacred 
her losses. As Brown argues, this can be attributed to Lucy’s ‘refusal to relinquish her sense of 
loss,’ her denial of any substitution, or ‘the resistance to mourning within mourning’; this 
refusal is, she continues, ‘both grotesque and necessary’ in a social network devoid of 
sympathy.252 This is poignantly illustrated in chapter twenty-six, ‘A Burial’, in which Lucy 
stores away her five precious letters from Graham Bretton. It is not so much the content of the 
letters, as Lucy admits that the words are devoid of desire, but the materiality, the object-ness 
of them, which gives them the gleam of value.253 It is in fact the sender’s script that attributes 
the greatest phenomenological value: for Graham’s handwriting is synonymous with his touch, 
his hand upon the surface of Lucy’s mind/skin. Significantly, the catalyst for the ritualised 
burial is a visual violation: Madame Beck’s stealthy pilfering of Lucy’s letters. The very notion 
of Madame Beck, this ‘passionless’ woman, reading ‘over documents, in my eyes most sacred,’ 
impels Lucy to sequester them ‘out of sight’: ‘[P]eople who have undergone bereavement 
always jealously gather together and lock away mementos,’ she explains, ‘it is not supportable 
to be stabbed to the heart each moment by sharp revival of regret’ (348-9).  
The letters have, from the first, registered only as betrayal, their gorgeousness 
undermined by their banality. Their materiality has always been precious, but precarious. Lucy 
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assiduously tests their reality by repeated reading, and indeed, as a result of her obsessive 
perusal, the missives degenerate into spectrality before her very eyes: the letters, ‘from 
incessant perusal were losing all sap and significance: my gold was withering to leaves before 
my eyes, and I was sorrowing over the disillusion’ (317). Lucy must keep the image of the 
precious objects alive to her, must return again and again so as to retain the image upon her 
mind’s eye; yet, the very act of doing so destroys their worth. The letters cannot be buried in 
the grenier, as ‘the writing would soon become obliterated by damp’ (349) and the ink, the 
visual imprint of failed and misapprehended desire, must be preserved. Why? Because, in this 
ritual of mourning (‘I stood like any other mourner’ [351]) Lucy buries the corpse of her pain 
not to forget it, but to suspend it. The buried letters are the blindness embedded at the heart of 
the novel.  
It is important to note that whilst Lucy does not reveal the letters’ contents (she 
repeatedly refuses to transcribe them), she does describe in meticulous detail every stage of 
their embalmment, enclosing, sealing and burying the prize. There is a double function to this 
deliberate evasion: the tomb in Lucy’s cherished alleé défendue is that single, sacred space so 
desperately sought, enclosed within the walls of memory, within the casement of the text in its 
materiality; yet it is also a wound, no less dangerous for being hidden, ‘thrust … deep in’ the 
hole of ‘the nun’s pear-tree … a dryad skeleton, gray, gaunt, and stripped’ (350). The 
description of the location of the sealed bottle provides a clue to the complexity of this 
performance of mourning. Firstly, Lucy aligns herself with the nun, reputedly buried alive 
beneath the tree, itself an image of ossification (a ‘gaunt’ ‘skeleton’). If we allow that the 
ghostly woman is a projected image of Lucy’s stifled sadness and the reification of her 
submerged past, we can understand the burial as not only the secreting of an object of pain, but 
a live burial of Lucy’s grieving self.  What I am suggesting is that, whilst Lucy is indeed 
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ensuring the survival of a ‘beloved object’,254 she is also attempting to sever from herself an 
asphyxiating grief. Lucy subsists upon an ambivalent mourning, one that seeks to nurture pain, 
as Brown argues, but also to destroy it, for it is felt as a debilitating weakness: ‘I meant … to 
bury a grief,’ Lucy confides (351). Brown remarks that Lucy’s admission reveals that ‘the grief 
is the treasure’ (3), but I would add that the grief also has a toxicity that its bearer feels acutely. 
‘I closed the eyes of my dead [and] covered its face’ (348), Lucy reveals. The ‘dead’ is her 
‘long pain,’ a figure here embodied as a corpse, replete with eyes; it is a veritable act of self-
blinding: ‘I sealed my eyes,’ she later affirms (555). This is mourning through a refusal to 
mourn. The letters remain, assimilated into the folds of remembrance; the mourning continues 
as the force of the story that the now much older Lucy recalls. Moreover, while this scene 
imagines a diminution of a grief, locked up in a series of small containers, the narrator carries 
within her ‘a tabernacle’:  
I kept a place for him [Graham] … a place of which I never took the 
measure … All my life long I carried it folded in the hollow of my hand 
– yet, released from that hold and constriction, I know not that its innate 
capacity for expanse might have magnified it into a tabernacle for a 
host (543).  
 
It is a poignant image of her conception of self, bounded by a loss, kept hidden in the ‘hollow’ 
of her hand, ‘folded’ like the buried letters. 
The sealing of sight is again evoked in another scene of letter reading that cruelly 
reiterates and then rewrites Lucy’s experience of being the recipient of Graham Bretton’s 
correspondence. As Lucy recounts Paulina’s description of a love letter from Graham, the ‘I’ 
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of the speaking voice slips uncertainly between the two women, a slippage of desire that enacts 
Lucy’s yearning to occupy the position of the loved and loving other: 
‘[The letter] lay in my lap during breakfast, looking up at me with an 
inexplicable meaning, making me feel myself a thing double-
existent… I began to study the outside of the treasure … The seal was 
too beautiful to be broken, so I cut round it with my scissors’ (446) 
[emphasis added]. 
It is a moment of restrained trauma for Lucy, as Paulina details her own tender ritual staged 
around the document, which sharply contrasts with Lucy’s burial ceremony. Paulina 
generously describes the particulars of Graham’s hand, the ‘full, solid, steady drop – a distinct 
impress: no pointed turns harshly pricking the optic nerve, but a clean, mellow, pleasant 
manuscript, that soothes you as you read’ (446). Brontë’s voice is identifiable in this 
observation, commenting on the novel she could have written — the conventional Victorian 
marriage plot, with Paulina as heroine — had she chosen to give us a visually palatable text, 
rather than Lucy’s ‘harshly pricking’ narrative. That erotic visuality of the letter is textually 
juxtaposed with Lucy’s earlier bitter disappointment upon receiving another letter, seemingly 
from Graham, but inscribed with the ‘pale female scrawl’ of her godmother, ‘instead of a firm 
masculine character’ (320). Lucy’s experiences end in a failure of desire, and she must 
substitute her erotic longing with vicarious acts of facilitation, assisting her doppelgänger with 
romantic counsel. Paulina’s ‘real’ missive writes over and erases the merely amicable 
correspondence in Lucy’s possession.  Lucy may indeed imbibe the pleasure of the other 
woman’s gift, but only as a translator of the image.  
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VII 
An image without content 
 
Lucy is tortured by her position outside the loving gaze and excluded from the sociality 
and community that it forges. Her unrelenting aloneness is often figured as empty time; what 
awaits one who falls through the protective fabric of social networks is a ‘blank’ void, a ‘snow-
sepulchre’: ‘[u]nbroken always is this blank’, Lucy laments (314). Her cordial interactions with 
the Brettons and the de Bassompierres do not offer a robust relationship, and she is accorded 
only enough interest to satisfy their good natures. Lucy’s greatest fear is to be forgotten, her 
image displaced in the minds of others. As Shuttleworth points out, ‘[p]erception, in Lucy’s 
spectral world, is integrally related to the social construction of identity’.255 In the absence of 
any correspondence from her friends, time atrophies, the duration is ‘as bare as seven sheets of 
blank paper: no word was written on one of them’ (315). Mourning delimits space and also 
creates a temporal indistinctness, and the blank void is analogous to a sightless gaze. It is as if 
vision only has currency in requited acts of gazing, so that, for Lucy, to see is to be seen, and 
recognised in her uniqueness.  
Yet she also takes a perverse pleasure in remaining hidden, disguised from view. Whilst 
this might be seen as a strategy of manipulation (Litvak argues that Lucy ‘sustains a veiled yet 
watchful subjectivity … that functions primarily by gathering information about (and 
withholding it from) other selves,’),256 there is, I suggest, a different emotion at work: grief. 
Lucy’s infamous withholding of her early recognition of the true identity of Dr John as Graham 
Bretton is not an example of her jealous assumption of specular power, as it is often conceived, 
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but rather another instance of removing the burden of subjectivity (however illusory that might 
be), so as to indulge in watching the object of her desire through eyes that do not belong to 
“Lucy Snowe.” As she admits, ‘Well I knew that to him it could make little difference, were I 
to come forward and announce, ‘This is Lucy Snowe!’ (207) There is also the shame implicit 
in the fact that neither Graham, nor, later, Mrs Bretton, recognises Lucy, whilst she clearly 
recollects them both, a circumstance overlooked in criticism of this scene; they are as close to 
familial relations as Lucy comes in the course of her narrated history. ‘To say anything on the 
subject [of recognition], to hint at my discovery, had not suited my habits of thought,’ she 
explains. ‘I had preferred to keep the matter to myself’ (207). What is painful to recognise, 
then, is simply blotted from subjective as well as narrative perspective, and Lucy’s 
concealment of Graham’s identity is as much from herself as it is from her reader. There is 
potent hurt in his failure to see her, when her ‘unguardedly fixed attention [on Graham] had 
drawn … the mortification of an implied rebuke’ (207). For Lucy to reveal his failure to see 
her, would be to show an irreparable loss. Graham is a figure of her childhood in the transient 
paradise of Bretton, a past that predates her inexplicable loss of family, home, economic 
stability, and marriageability. To acknowledge him openly would indeed be a compromise of 
her ‘system of feeling’ (207), as it would necessarily invoke her hidden grief.   
 Catastrophe is relayed through the eyes of others in Villette, given back to the reader 
belatedly and obliquely, and often by virtue of another’s perception, as we saw in the complex 
circuit of watching the Labassecourean king and his wife. But it is Lucy’s relationship with the 
Pensionnat’s English teacher, Monsieur Paul (growing out of a crucible of antagonistic ocular 
exchanges), which, for the first time, provides her a self-image not marked by alienation: ‘I 
looked up,’ Lucy records in a description of one of their visual encounters, and ‘two eyes filled 
the pane of that window; the fixed gaze of those two eyes hit right against my own glance: they 
were watching me. I had not till that moment known that tears were on my cheek, but I felt 
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them now’ (274). In the violent mirror of Paul’s gaze Lucy at once realises her own visibility 
and the truth of her grief. While the glass disrupts her intimacy with Paul — the gaze becomes 
a thing apart (‘they were watching me’) — it gives her a somatic awareness, a (mediated) 
proximity to her physicality. Paul’s eyes interpret Lucy’s emotions, revealing to the reader (and 
to Lucy) what she would conceal.  
A peculiar pattern of refracted reflections is at work in Villette, Lucy often placing her 
visual perspicacity in doubt. That dubiousness frequently centres upon her own physical 
presence, as her image seems insufficient to prove her own sensate ontology. The pattern 
begins early in the novel, with her deferment to Graham’s vaunted judgement. On the night of 
the concert, mortified in her conspicuous pink dress, it is only Graham’s approving gaze that 
‘calmed at once [her] sense of shame … since Graham found in it nothing absurd, my own eye 
consented soon to become reconciled’ (246). As her visual entanglement with M. Paul deepens 
in complexity and sophistication, Paul is able to interpret the marks of suffering that Lucy 
bears, like stigmata, upon her eyes:  
‘Well,’ said he, after some seconds scrutiny, ‘there is no denying that 
signature: Constancy wrote it; her pen is of iron. Was the record 
painful?’ 
‘Severely painful,’ I said …Withdraw her hand, monsieur; I can bear 
its inscribing force no more’ (572). 
 
She finds an interlocutor through a relationship forged in the eloquence of visual strategies 
based not on concealment, but on intimate revelation; on a mutuality of looking that recognises 
and comprehends what it is to live with psychic pain.   
  
 
  147 
VIII 
Performing grief 
 
The aberrant capacity of visual perception is borne out in Vashti’s performance. The 
actor’s spectacle of wild grief is like no other in the novel, and it transforms Lucy’s visual 
perspective. She is brought to life, seemingly from nothingness, before Lucy’s eyes, her image 
suddenly ‘spread out’, as Eve Sedgwick writes, ‘to capture Lucy, the suddenly fixed viewer.’257  
It is an experience of witnessing ‘embodied’ ‘grief’, a sight at which Lucy is both intoxicated 
and repelled, transfixed by self-recognition. Lucy takes obvious pleasure, mingled with pain, 
at recalling this scene; what begins as the recollection of a past event in narrative time, quickly 
slips into the textual present, as the working of grief elides temporal distinctions. Lucy’s 
description evokes a gruesome battle in the conjuring of Vashti, borne by ‘evil forces’ through 
the performance of a tragedy. Vashti is ‘draped in pale antique folds,’ with a ‘backround … 
and flooring of deepest crimson,’ womb-like, from which she pours forth. Yet the impression 
is one of ‘Death’ (305). At the same time, she is only ever a hollow figure, neither woman nor 
flesh; her becoming never reaches fruition, for she is always already ‘hollow, half-consumed’ 
and then, just as suddenly as her inception, she dissolves, ‘wasted like wax in flame’ (304). In 
Vashti, Lucy sees her own vacancy, another creature tormented by decaying forms, of an ‘orb 
perished or perishing,’ shapes that lack completeness. Most transfixing, however, is the 
reification of psychic pain: finally, it seems, a vessel in which to store the immured losses of 
the past and present, one that Lucy can merely observe, safe in the comfort of the theatre’s 
darkness, a mere spectator. Yet Lucy’s place as observer is compromised by her thirst for 
performance; the lyricism and pulse of the prose hint at Lucy’s psychic and somatic investment 
in Vashti’s death-throes: she feels every blow. The boundary between watcher and watched 
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falls away as Lucy’s subjectivity is engulfed in the spectacle and she is possessed by precisely 
the same force that impels the actress:  
[E]vil forces bore her through the tragedy, kept up her feeble strength 
– for she was but a frail creature; and as the action rose and the stir 
deepened, how wildly they shook her with their passions of the pit! 
They wrote HELL on her straight, haughty brow….They writhed her 
regal face to a demoniac mask (304).  
 
And: 
I have said she does not resent her grief. No; the weakness of that word 
would make it a lie. To her, what hurts becomes immediately 
embodied: she looks on it as a thing that can be attacked, worried down, 
torn in shreds …. Before calamity she is a tigress; she rends her woes, 
shivers them in convulsed abhorrence. Pain, for her, has no result in 
good (305).  
Fragments of images of Lucy’s own life appear, as though grief were visually contagious. The 
colour red, for instance, ‘the fierce light … a rushing, red, cometary light’ that is ‘hot on vision 
and to sensation,’ which strikes Lucy’s sight so forcefully, recalls her own bloodied perception 
in the early moments of her return to consciousness in the Bretton household. The image most 
strongly evoked, proleptically at this point in the text, is Lucy’s attack upon the nun’s lifeless 
garments:  
[A]ll the movement was mine, so was all the life, the reality, the 
substance, the force … I tore her up – the incubus! I held her on high – 
the goblin! I shook her loose – the mystery! And down she fell – down 
all round me – down in shreds and fragments – and trod upon her (558).  
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What Lucy undergoes in the presence of Vashti is akin to a second awakening, ‘a mighty 
revelation’. As Vashti’s performance hurtles towards its irrevocable combustion, however, 
Lucy’s volition as a spectator begins to unravel; she is powerless to look away. Vashti’s 
writhing pervades the rhythm of Lucy’s prose, ‘her throes, her gaspings … [and] panting … 
convulsing a perishing mortal frame,’ she ‘resisted to the latest the rape of every faculty, would 
see, would hear, would breathe, would live, up to, within, well nigh beyond the moment’ (308). 
The rapid build of short clauses is like shallow breaths. As the force of ‘the vision of all eyes 
centred in one point,’ on Vashti, the collective watching of her agonies shatters representation: 
a flame is seen, a conflagration erupts, and Vashti, with her dangerous grief, is swallowed up, 
the image dissolving just as its delineation is sharpest. The spectacle of Vashti, ‘hot on vision,’ 
is so forceful that the intensity of her grief, and of Lucy’s own, burns through perspective, 
threatening the continuity of the narrative itself. Vashti is sacrificed to the greedy affective 
needs of the audience, to the community of watchers. As spectator, Lucy’s singular perspective 
merges with that of the crowd, and the private nature of her pain is overwhelmed by the shared 
quality of fascinated horror at witnessing a body out of control. Vashti is excess, like grief, and 
as such she, like Mrs Marchmont, is abruptly re-contained, never to appear again. 
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IX 
‘Through a glass darkly’ 
 
The spatial analogue of forbidden mourning is ‘l’allée défendue’ in the Rue Fossette, a 
liminal corridor of privacy that defines Lucy’s spatial map of the Pensionnat. This space is 
striking in a number of ways: it is womb-like, a place of unconscious yearning for origins, 
where time and specificity of place are rendered immaterial. The forbidden alley is situated 
between two worlds, Madame Beck’s school, and the boys’ college next door, and between 
Lucy’s reality and her ‘fancies’. It is a dark, overgrown area, in which ‘neglected shrubs [are] 
grown very thick and close on each side, weaving overhead a roof of branch and leaf which 
the sun’s rays penetrated but in rare chequers’ (124), recalling the dank dell that figures Lucy’s 
sadness. This could be considered as a model for Lucy’s mode of perception: a prescribed 
space, fallen into abeyance (just as Lucy has laid to waste aspects of her self), thicketed and a 
little wild; perforated, though, by small tears, fissures in the texture of Lucy’s psychic space. 
Through the cracks in the ceiling of trees, Lucy spies light, a light that holds the memory of a 
younger, happier self: ‘Oh, my childhood! I had feelings: passive as I lived, little as I spoke … 
when I thought of past days, I could feel.’ Covered in as if prematurely buried, Lucy is wrapped 
in the dimness of the narrow passage, located at the heart of the city.  
Lucy exudes a distrust of her visual capacity, eager to find validation of what she sees. 
Villette is shaped by a distinct pattern of revelation and subsequent retraction, providing an 
image and then destabilising it, so that all of the images are indeterminate. In this way the text 
establishes itself as an imprint that is simultaneously in danger of disappearing, just as the nun 
is simply a collection of limp garments, a shell of reality. Tony Tanner points out that Lucy 
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eschews direct contact with human faces, instead depicting shadowy outlines, or robustly 
drawn figures.258 It is remarkable that in a novel so rich with perception, we find that the 
impression of physical attributes is a masterful illusion. There are no bodies in Villette, only 
outlines, such as Madame Walravens, the orchestrator of her suffering, who is ‘a strange mass 
… bearing no shape,’ no more than ‘the outline of a face and features,’ the ‘cadaverous’ 
embodiment of death (546). The ghostly nun haunting the Rue Fossette is the exemplary figure 
of this tendency, the reification of spectrality. Lucy, too, leaves barely a visual trace, being 
merely ‘a colourless shadow’ (181). Paulina is equated throughout with light, (she is ‘a lamp 
chastely lucent, guarding … a flame vital and vestal’ [326]), casting an entrancing glow. Paul 
is figured as a diminutive, ‘fierce,’ and ‘testy’ man, identifiable by such markers as a ‘blackness 
and closeness of cranium,’ and a ‘blueness and fire of glance’ (366). Lucy is able to detect Paul 
from his physical outline alone: ‘I had already noticed by glimpses, a severe, dark professorial 
outline, hovering … in an inner saloon, seen only in vista’ (372). Paul’s body is lost to Lucy in 
the present narrative time in her position of retrospective writer. As if to emphasise this, Paul’s 
eyes are often hidden behind his ‘lunettes,’ articles that inspire in Lucy a deep distrust and even 
terror, which climaxes in her shattering them. Particularity is sacrificed for synecdoche, a 
marker of the opacity of others in Lucy’s specular world. Christina Crosby argues that Brontë 
deliberately wrote two-dimensionality into the text, as a counterpoint to the uncharted depths 
of their opposite, Paul and Lucy. Graham and Paulina are ‘superficial characters, implicitly 
criticised for their lack of depth … and complexity, she observes.’259 Palmer paints Lucy as 
manipulator of her own lantern show, a ‘projectionist [who] assumes the power to “see 
through” appearances, to capture and “fix” characters in focus for her patron’s gaze.’260 Along 
with Cheng, I think Lucy’s acts of defacement can be read as a necessary trait of mourning, an 
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elegiac imperative of ‘re-membering [and] re-figuring’ the lost one(s).261 Lucy is ‘ghost-seer,’ 
(319) and the figures she parades before us are murky with regret, escaping into a place of 
possibility, of a world and self that could have been, but exists now only in the wavering shapes 
of memory. Lucy is, furthermore, still an isolate, tracing images that have no witness, the 
necessity of which is persistently emphasised in Villette. The text is projected upon a screen of 
memory, unfolding pictorially within the chamber of Lucy’s aged mind, and, as Brontë wrote 
to a correspondent, ‘memory is both sad and relentless.’262 Memory ‘needs confirmation,’ 
Graham notes, it ‘partakes so much of the dim character of a dream … that the testimony of a 
witness becomes necessary for corroboration’ (374). Lucy is called upon to provide such a 
function for Graham, and for Paulina, but is without her own such ally of verification. From 
the position of narrator, her memories appear to her ‘wildered,’ an inheritance that cannot be 
trusted. Lucy exists ‘in expectation of mystery breaking up,’ perceiving the world ‘through a 
glass darkly’ (550). 
 The figure of the nun that haunts the Rue Fossette is the embodiment of the urgency 
of silenced grief and specular betrayal that drive Villette. An insistent mnemonic shadow that 
begs the question of whether or not Lucy’s pain is as real as physical suffering (as definite as 
the ‘crétin’s,’ for example), the nun is ‘an irresolvable mystery’ that persists despite the 
banality of the answer to the riddle: it is apparently Ginevra’s lover, Colonel de Hamal, dressed 
in a nun’s habit, stalking Lucy for his own amusement. The phantom is grief reified: the 
undisclosed image of past trauma that the text has consistently worked towards yet repeatedly 
denied, a voiceless, faceless figure that seems to burgeon and attach as a growth to Lucy’s very 
sight: ‘a ray gleamed even white before me, and a shadow became distinct and marked. I looked 
more narrowly, to make out the cause of this well-defined contrast appearing … in the obscure 
                                                        
261 Cheng, “Cryptology,” 86.  
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alley: whiter and blacker it grew upon my eye: it took shape with instantaneous transformation’ 
(352). ‘[S]able-robed and snowy-veiled’ the nun is semantically linked to Lucy Snowe. The 
image of Lucy as spectre in the milky Sutherland mirror of Bretton is repeated, yet now the 
ghost is the reflective surface, a picture wrought from both light and darkness impressed upon 
the retinal surface, both in front of and within the viewer.  Despite the apparition’s defacement, 
Lucy says that ‘she had eyes, and they viewed me.’ The lost image of her displaced past is here 
materialised, gazing back at her, just as in the encounter with Monsieur Paul above, the 
importunate eyes of grief’s peculiar blindness. Interestingly, out of her ‘desperation’ comes the 
instinct to touch, as if to ascertain whether the ghost is a part of herself. In the spectre’s third 
visitation, Paul and Lucy share in the spectacle, ‘dispelling any notion,’ as Jolene Zigarovich 
states, ‘that she suffers from nervous delusions.’263 I would suggest, however, that the text is 
careful to retain the ambivalence of the haunting. Brontë gives us only Lucy’s violent vision 
of the nun rushing upon her (‘Never had I seen her so clearly.’) What is certain is that M. Paul 
is similarly haunted by disembodied ‘impressions,’ and that, like Lucy, he is weighed down by 
unresolved mourning. In this scene, however, Lucy attains her longed-for witness, an other 
who can briefly share in the figure of her pain, to whom she entrusts the sacredness of her loss. 
‘[W]e are alike,’ Paul claims, ‘there is affinity. Do you see it, mademoiselle, when you look in 
the glass?’ (438) Their affinity is built upon a shared vision, though grief-tinted and baffled by 
obscurity, a bond knitted by threads ‘difficult to disentangle’; yet, as Paul warns, ‘sudden 
breaks leave damage in the web’. The unitary scene is broken at once, with the ‘rending’ of the 
feathery foliage from which the nun appears. ‘Villette reads like one long meditation of a prison 
break,’ argues Kate Millett. ‘Lucy will not marry Paul even after the tyrant has softened. He 
has been her jailer all through the novel, but the sly and crafty captive in Lucy is bent on 
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evading him anyway.’ Lucy is immured, but it is not in the stranglehold of a psycho-sexual 
tyranny.264 The lovers’ web of intimacy is an image too fragile, and in the nun’s visitation, the 
moment is sundered by the violent images of death and storm (‘the wind rose sobbing; the rain 
poured wild and cold’). Typically the moment of coherence is founded on a picture that won’t 
resolve. The image is suspended, just as Paul’s intention to seek the nun (‘I mean to follow up 
the mystery. I mean –’ [438]) is unfinished, broken from its object of intention. 
The world of the Rue Fossette is a web of reflections that serve only to confound and 
entangle Lucy, immuring her in a transparent prison of suffering.  For Isobel Armstrong the 
Pensionnat reproduces the Crystal Palace conservatory, the site where Lucy encounters ‘the 
painful modern alienations of glass’: ‘[g]lass is frequently non-transitive. It is constantly 
exclusionary in its refusal to enable seeing … blocking vision.’ The shifting terms of this glassy 
space, variously referred to in Villette as casement, window, or croisees, heighten the surface’s 
ambiguity.265 The glass doors that lead out into the berceau are repeatedly referred to, and 
Lucy’s phantasmal visions seem to correspond with her stepping through and beyond the glassy 
threshold (V, 430). As Lucy watches Paul’s signs of distress from the glass room, we can read 
her body as encapsulated behind the deceptive porosity of her glass cage, enclosed in the 
invisible walls of her own grief and fear. When Paul moves towards the glass door, Lucy’s 
spirit ‘pales’ and she flees. The tragic missed encounter between the two incipient lovers that 
follows, brings for Lucy ‘a dead blank [and] dark doubt’ (458-9); instead of the luminosity of 
clarity with Paul, she is left to contend only with the emptiness of suspension. As their intimacy 
deepens, the glass door becomes central to almost all their encounters, the barrier that gestures 
towards inevitable separation, as if they stand on opposite sides of a mirror.  
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Lucy escapes through this door in her drugged, fantastical quest to escape the despair of Paul’s 
departure: ‘I wonder at the strange ease with which this prison has been forced. It seems as if 
I had been pioneered invisibly, as if some dissolving force had gone before me’ [536].266 Light 
builds to a frenzied climax in Lucy’s narcotic-fuelled expedition during the carnival night of 
Villette, the city aglow with a fantasy of light, a whirling spectacle of flambeaux, the artificial 
brightness of which at last becomes oppressive. Articulated through the opacity of dreamscape, 
Lucy’s midnight wanderings occur in an unprecedented space of strangeness, delimited by the 
narrative norms of the realist novel. There is an oneiric quality to the novel’s apprehension of 
things, a shroud of ‘disillusion,’ (317) where objects hover like mere ideas of things, unsure of 
their materiality. Only in this fantasy can the text enter into a light-filled interstice of carnival 
absurdity and shadow play. We draw intensely close to each image — the newly engaged 
Brettons, for example, haloed by happiness (‘the light repeated in her [Paulina’s] eyes beamed 
first out of his,’) — only for the picture to blur, here the ‘floating’ ‘drapery’ of Paulina’s 
garments confused amidst a ‘flaming arch of massed stars’ (537). Lucy’s ‘torch-lit perspective’ 
descends into an apparitional filminess: ‘On this whole scene,’ she says, ‘was impressed a 
dream-like character; every shape was wavering, every movement floating, every voice echo-
like – half-mocking, half-uncertain’ (538). Indistinctness now explicitly inflects the specular 
aesthetic, the speciousness of vision imbricated with the distortions of sadness, rendering every 
object sinisterly nebulous.267  
Forced from her prison in the Rue Fossette by Madame Beck’s violations of her inner 
life (‘In this house, what grief could be sacred?’ [530]), Lucy’s night-walk has one purpose: to 
reach the city’s park, at the centre of which is a fountain, holding ‘a huge stone-basin … deep-
                                                        
266 Emphasis added. 
267 I would argue that there are parallels with John Ruskin’s theory of the grotesque, which, as Lindsay Smith 
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set in the tree-shadows, brimming with cool water [and] clear’ (534). As she makes her way to 
this watery recess, she invokes the image several times, imagining the basin’s ‘clear depth and 
green lining … [It was] of that coolness and verdure I thought, with the passionate thirst of 
unconscious fever. Amidst the glare … [I] secretly and chiefly longed to come on that circular 
mirror of crystal, and surprise the moon glassing therein her pearly front’ (539). She never does 
reach the basin; instead she flees the garish ‘illuminations’ of the park, grieving anew for what 
she has misconceived as a love affair between Paul and his young ward, Justine-Marie. Villette 
strays into a dangerous territory of ‘elastic’ perception, ‘of dubious light, now flashing, now 
fading’ (539), which promises at first to palliate Lucy’s aching loss, but collapses into shame 
at her impossible desire for Paul. Suddenly sickened by light, Lucy seeks again the dimness of 
the Rue Fossette. 
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X 
The undialectical image 
 
Throughout Villette I have traced a specular aesthetic founded on betrayals of 
perception, in an attempt to better understand Charlotte Brontë’s refusal to depict Paul’s 
drowning in the closing moments of the novel. The final, most inscrutable vanishing act is 
Paul’s disappearance from the narrative gaze, his death rewritten in the banal rhetoric of the 
romantic marriage plot, an ending more congenial to that smooth visual aesthetic Brontë 
punned on earlier: ‘There is enough said. Trouble no quiet, kind heart; leave sunny 
imaginations hope …. Let them picture union and a happy succeeding life,’ a scene that 
conjures Jane Eyre’s ‘Reader, I married him’. In that earlier novel, Brontë’s depiction of the 
lovers’ in conjugal harmony, which, like the marriage of Paulina and Graham, necessitates the 
swift end to their place in narrative (‘My tale draws to its close’ [JE, 450]), envisions the ending 
that Lucy dismisses with one generic sweep: ‘I have now been married ten years. I know what 
it is to live entirely for and with what I love best on earth… No woman was ever nearer to her 
mate than I am … we are precisely suited in character; perfect concord is the result (JE, 451). 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Jane’s union with Rochester instantiates a physical co-
opting of her visual faculties: she becomes his eye. In Villette, visibility has no such 
intermediary; Paul is the symbol of the absent image, the face that will not be seen. Jane’s 
anxious watching of her husband becomes a source of tragic irony in Lucy’s desperation to see 
proof of Paul’s safe return: ‘[B]ut he is coming,’ she maintains, ‘he is coming’ (585).  
 In place of the buried image of Paul’s obscured fate is a hastily configured set of 
pictures: ‘Madame Beck prospered all the days of her life; so did Père Silas; Madame 
Walravens fulfilled her ninetieth year before she died. Farewell’ (586). And with that 
unsatisfying conclusion, the agonies of the narrating voice subside into inscrutability. The 
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picture of happy union is undermined by the spectre of Paul’s absent corpse. I cannot concur 
with Tanner’s claim that the conclusion of the narrative act repairs the derangement of Lucy’s 
rebellious perspective; that in the ‘completion of her ‘project’, [there] is the fulfilment of that 
“lack” and “need” which marked her original condition’.268 Hughes’s description of Villette’s 
aberrant temporality, whereby the ‘present is interrupted from within by a habit of unhappiness, 
by the repeated insistence of grief … that signals to other times and places,’ best captures the 
ambivalence of Brontë’s infamous conclusion.269 The future is experienced as impossible, for 
it is fractured by the tug of the past, which, as we have seen throughout this chapter, is founded 
upon undialectical images of trauma. The ‘work of mourning’ seems to proceed in only one 
regressive direction. Another tempest ‘roared frenzied for seven days,’ and ‘did not cease till 
the Atlantic was strewn with wrecks: it did not lull till the deeps had gorged their full of 
sustenance’; ‘when the sun returned, his light was night to some.’ (586) The rush toward 
revelation precipitates a sudden retreat into non-figuration: ‘Here pause, pause at once. There 
is enough said.’ The sinuosity of the narrative closes in over the final image, veiling it in 
someone else’s history, a recursive gesture that confronts the reader with no more than another 
empty reflection. Perhaps this is best understood as ‘a different type of whole’, one which 
stands in a reconfigured relationship to the part, or fragment, made possible by Victorian visual 
alterations.270 Terry Eagleton categorises the ambiguity of the ending as typical of Villette’s 
confusion as to its status, as romantic valorisation of rebellion, or a conservative upholding of 
rationalism: ‘in the end, Villette has neither the courage to be tragic nor to be comic … it is a 
kind of middle-ground’.271 Brontë’s refusal to contain anguish, and delimit mourning is, I 
suggest, better understood as a mark of the novel’s temerity, a bold impulse to deny 
consolation. In deference to the reader, Brontë offers a choice of contrasting images, or the 
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illusion of such, for the opposing conclusions in fact converge and abide in sinister proximity. 
There is, moreover, an elegant gesture towards loss as lived experience. ‘Mourning,’ as Kate 
Brown reminds us, ‘is never done.’272 Lucy inhabits an eternal present of loss and Brontë 
suggests narrative cannot yet accommodate that dialectic. Lucy’s is a loss that ultimately 
refuses visualisation.  
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‘A painful want of light’: The uncanniness of darkness 
in George Eliot’s The Lifted Veil 
 
 
 
When I look I am seen, so I exist. 
D. W Winnicott273 
 
 
While Lucy Snowe’s story is predicated on a wilful blindness, George Eliot’s 
protagonists are often haunted by the vividness of their visual power, aware of the ineluctable 
arrangement of things, but helpless to alter the picture. Nowhere is this better expressed than 
in Eliot’s gothic novella, The Lifted Veil (1859), a surreal portrait of a protagonist who sees in 
horrifying detail the content of his imminent suffering and failures. If Lucy Snowe’s loss 
refuses visualisation, then Latimer’s tragedy reverses this dynamic: he compulsively witnesses 
his grief, mourning proleptically via the medium of projected images from the future. George 
Henry Lewes’s description of the ‘spectral illusions’ produced by the suffering brain, which I 
discussed in the introduction, is here given narrative form in Eliot’s protagonist’s spectral 
visions, which, as Lewes describes such illusions, have ‘a vividness equal to that of actual 
vision,’ while ‘no assurance of the bystanders … will persuade the patient that what he sees so 
vividly is not actually present.’274  
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The Lifted Veil begins where narrative ends: imminent death. Latimer sits alone in his 
house, the luxurious interior no bulwark against his harrowing psychic struggle. ‘The time of 
my end approaches,’ he writes, ‘[and] I foresee when I shall die and everything that will happen 
in my last moments.’ He tells his projected, phantasmal reader that he has precisely one month 
to live. His encroaching death from angina pectoris is plotted with all the care of a novelist, 
detailing even the sensation of suffocation that will kill him:  
 
On the 20th September 1850, I shall be sitting in this chair, in this study, at 
ten o’clock at night, longing to die, weary of incessant insight and foresight, 
without delusions and without hope. Just as I am watching a tongue of blue 
flame rising in the fire, and my lamp is burning low, the horrible contraction 
will begin at my chest.275   
 
 
Latimer is the victim of unbidden mental powers: unrestricted access to the movements 
of other minds. He hears the thoughts of his father, brother, wife and servants, in all their 
pusillanimity and pettiness; he has uncanny visions of the future which are realised with exact 
similitude. His senses are not ‘well wadded with stupidity,’ deaf to the roar of the world;276 
instead, Latimer is overwhelmed by the horrifying volubility of simply existing, the 
‘insincerities and platitudes’ that assault his senses without relent (30). The veil of the world is 
lifted and he finds …. nothing. So much of the horror, however, occurs in its imagining. He 
foresees his death as an enfolding in blackness: 
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‘Darkness – darkness – no pain – nothing but darkness: but I am 
passing on and on through the darkness: my thought stays in the 
darkness, but always with a sense of moving onward… 
Before that time comes I want to use my last hours of ease and strength 
in telling the strange story of my existence (3) [original ellipses] 
 
Darkness here is a type of veil, doubling as a shroud of grief. The deterioration of subjectivity 
is figured as gradients of blackness, which could also be the very process of leave-taking from 
life, adding to the confusing overlap of space and time (‘moving onward’ connoting both 
aspects). Latimer’s syntax is arresting, too, with two colons punctuating a sentence that has no 
definite end, only the void of the ellipsis. The sentence is structured by the endlessness of his 
passage through darkness, ‘on and on’ through and beyond language, to something inarticulate. 
Eliot writes a distinctive ‘grammar of being’ for her only first-person narrator,277 one that 
conveys consciousness from the inside out. In The Lifted Veil language is a mode of seeing, 
immanent and embodied. The protean power of Latimer’s metaphors renders flexible the figure 
of darkness, so that, in a doubling that structures the narrative and its voice, both existing and 
dying are of the same essence, the same substance – there is ‘nothing but darkness’.  Death is 
a sensual experience – autoerotic, even -  in Latimer’s imagining – olfactory, visual, and 
auditory; and it is the death of the phenomenological body that he anticipates with the sharpest 
nostalgia: ‘the fresh scent after the rain, the light of the morning through my chamber-window, 
the warmth of the hearth … will darkness close over them for ever?’ (3)  
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The phenomenal body constituted in an embryonic space that symbolises both the 
‘ongoingness’ of life and death, tells us something about Eliot’s conditions for consciousness 
in The Lifted Veil.278 In this moment, imagination, emotion and a concept of mind or 
consciousness are combined, in a speaking voice - a subject - which seems to emerge from the 
spatial quality of darkness. Like her anti-hero, Eliot brings together in this story various 
binaries – subjectivity and objectivity, consciousness and unconsciousness, reality and illusion 
– interrogating the polarity of the terms. The author poses a series of questions about aspects 
of being in the opening scenes: what is it to imagine, or, more specifically, to experience one’s 
own future death? What is it in Latimer’s pre-experience of death that distinguishes from his 
‘real’ death?  
Jill L. Matus has shown the extent to which contemporary models of consciousness 
influenced Eliot’s depiction of cognition and emotion. Drawing on modern trauma theory, 
Matus frames her analysis through the response of shock, writing that Latimer’s narrative ‘is 
about excessive exposure and the vulnerable subject’s inability to regulate stimuli and 
response.’279 While similarly interested in the unregulated flow of qualia, my own interest in 
Eliot’s exploration of consciousness shifts the emphasis to visuality and the role of the 
imagination in conceptualising ontology. Contravening the established critical view of The 
Lifted Veil, I shall contend that this is a story not of a man who unwittingly sees too much, but 
rather one who fails to read the world; whose isolate personhood desiccates under the 
exigencies and transparencies of Victorian lens culture, undone both by his failure to look back 
at the world, and to create an alternative language with which to author his self.    
Since its anonymous publication in Blackwood’s, The Lifted Veil has been regarded as 
a particularly thorny problem in George Eliot’s oeuvre. Critical appraisal of the story has 
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hummed with the same general tenor: a strange, if not regrettable, anomaly in Eliot’s corpus. 
Henry James described it as ‘woefully sombre,’ the incidents of plot quite wonderful in 
themselves, but being ‘in conjunction…rather violent.’280 It has often been understood as a 
morbid work from the pen of a troubled author. Eliot’s usually supportive publisher, John 
Blackwood, wrote a response to her manuscript that resembled more a letter of condolence – 
‘There is a painful want of light to the story … I wish the theme had been a happier one, and I 
think you must have been worrying and disturbing yourself about something when you 
wrote.’281 Readers have recoiled, too, at the gruesome horror depicted in the blood transfusion 
scene of the novella’s ending, in which all the overtly Gothic elements combine in what Terry 
Eagleton describes as ‘tawdry melodrama’.282  
Biographer Rosemarie Bodenheimer embeds the novella in the context of Eliot’s 
painful estrangement from her family and, most immediately, the death of her sister, Chrissey, 
who died in March, shortly after Eliot had begun work on The Lifted Veil. The story might be 
understood, she concludes, as ‘a sort of dumping ground for feelings…which had to be 
exorcised before The Mill on the Floss could be written.’283 Most startling, though, was the 
drastic cynicism of vision in The Lifted Veil, when held up for comparison with the later novels, 
or more specifically, the perceptive incongruities: the story seems to oppose that notion of sight 
– from the narcissism of myopic self-awareness through the growth of a wider perceptive 
faculty, symbolic of a social and civic maturation – that was the very foundation of Eliot’s 
realist aesthetic. Latimer’s ‘diseased vision’ – his unwanted prophetic powers of virtually 
untrammelled access to other minds -  has no hope of acquiring the gracious plenitude of 
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perspective allowed to Middlemarch’s Dorothea, for example, whose difficulties are similarly 
framed as ‘a disease of the retina’.284 On the contrary, the singular perspective of Latimer’s 
story is so attenuated as to be confined to the narrow sphere of one man’s egotism, where 
‘vision and insight become mere functions of a disordered brain.’285  
Eliot’s famous magnification of visual detail, her accrual of everyday relationships as 
filaments in a wider web of social contiguity, becomes, in The Lifted Veil, a horror-filled 
imagining of ‘a superadded consciousness of the actual’ (LV, 18). Yet what precisely is the 
source of horror? In Middlemarch Dorothea Brooke’s moment of inward desolation in St 
Peter’s in Rome, comes upon her as an ‘electric shock’ of the imagination, a swirl of images 
that render affect as imagery. Rome is one open-air museum and its sensuous, ancient ideals 
 urged themselves on her with that ache belonging to a glut of confused 
ideas … Forms both pale and glowing took possession of her young 
sense, and fixed themselves in her memory even when she was not 
thinking of them, preparing strange associations which remained 
through her after-years. Our moods are apt to bring with them images 
which succeed each other like the magic-lantern pictures of a doze[…] 
Dorothea all her life continued to see the vastness of St Peter’s … and 
the red drapery which was being hung for Christmas spreading itself 
everywhere like a disease of the retina.286 
 
This passage suggests, as do many of the passages in The Lifted Veil, that subjectivity is a 
matter of spectral forms, impressed upon the retina, preparing a sequence of imagery that 
constitutes memory. The threat to stability is inherent in seeing, at work in the very activity of 
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the eye, just as we saw in Brontë’s novels. In an age that was ‘obsessed with epistemology,’ 
Eliot offers an intuitive, specular, embodied consciousness, that is radically ungrounded and 
contingent. As U. C. Knoepflmacher points out, to read The Lifted Veil, we must appreciate its 
author as a philosophical novelist.287 In this chapter, I will attend to the palimpsestic succession 
of images, or the magic lantern modernism of Eliot’s mode of seeing as a structural and 
thematic antagonism, a tension – between embodied ontology, and epistemological objectivity 
-  that has no easy resolution.  
 
 
I 
TRANSFIGURED LIGHT 
  
The Lifted Veil produces hermeneutic discomfort. The abiding tendency is to situate the 
story in contemporary scientific discourse, most notably as an argument against materialist 
positivism and the dissolution of the human body’s corporeal and psychological boundaries in 
a quest for categorisation. Victorian science was abjuring the integrity of the body in its 
forensic probing of body and psyche alike. The Lifted Veil has thus come to represent a 
theoretical counter-argument in mid-nineteenth-century scientific and novelistic discourse, an 
intervention in the debate concerning the duality of body and mind, ‘whether,’ as Flint 
formulates, ‘identical hypotheses and modes of investigation are indeed suitable when it comes 
to understanding the workings of the mind and of the body.’288 Eliot’s tale grapples with those 
fundamental questions, scouring character interiority – Latimer’s damaged and fragmented 
mind -  for the particles of individuated consciousness: what is the source of one’s personhood? 
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The Lifted Veil, however, pursues the implications of humanness through narrative, adding 
another layer of complexity to the equation: of linguistic and intersubjective fashioning of 
consciousness.   
While I too read Eliot’s work alongside contemporary science, I want to take up an 
alternative strand of this imagining of materialism pushed to its furthest unsympathetic 
conclusion. The Lifted Veil queries where grief resides, and yet, there is a risk of neglecting the 
embodied and specular loss Latimer experiences, not least because its anti-hero construes his 
narrative along materialist lines. Eliot asks: what is the fate of the subject in darkness? Not 
simply in a Manichean sense – Eliot’s intelligence was too restless for reductionist oppositions 
of good and evil – but of a symbolism pertinent to her own moment, the peculiar light of 
consciousness. I will argue that private loss - troped in the Lifted Veil as a darkening of the 
world, or, more broadly, as a question of fraught optics – is in Eliot’s fiction a crucible of 
identity. How is the subject made and unmade by Eliot’s heterogeneous figures of darkness 
and the rhetorical displacements of tropes of disfigured light? What is the process and the 
implications of internalising darkness? The themes which Eliot addresses, her uses of light and 
shade, sight and blindness, are the very same that thread through her later novels, such as The 
Mill on the Floss, the writing of which was put on hold so as to work on The Lifted Veil, and 
considered by Adela Pinch as its partner text.289 I propose a reappraisal of this Gothic novella, 
bringing to attention its critical import as a document of mid-century anxiety about the nature 
of vision and its role in the textures of individualised remembering. The Lifted Veil is a text in 
dialogue with Charlotte Brontë’s traumatised visuality, whose work, along with George Sand, 
she considered as her favourite.290 Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar position The Lifted Veil 
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290 Gillian Beer, George Eliot (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1986), 43.  
  168 
firmly in relation to Jane Eyre and Villette,291 an intertextuality that is evident in both authors’ 
respective use of veil imagery, for example, and their divergent representations of the femme 
fatale figure (not incidentally sharing the name Bertha). Reva Stump rightly argues that Eliot’s 
rhythmic weaving of figures and metaphors ‘for the most part derives its tension from the 
contradictory urges to see and to avoid seeing.’292 I would suggest, though, that Eliot’s visuality 
implicates more than Stump’s equation allows, and that Eliot pushes further the very 
problematics of sight unique to mid-century, situating identity within a fragile specular 
paradigm that tightly binds consciousness and subjectivity with the phenomenal body. Eliot 
does so with a resolute focus on the loss inherent not only in the new science of seeing, but 
through an embeddedness of perceptiveness in textuality. Latimer’s conscious crafting of text 
arises from his singular physicality. In re-reading Eliot’s anti-hero as a character grappling with 
grief, rather than an ‘autobiography of a perverted mind that interprets all visions and events 
through the narrow lens of timid egotism,’293 while also questioning the veracity of his insight, 
we find an aesthetic charged with a mid-century phenomenology of dimness as analogue for 
emotional blindness.294  
There were autobiographical factors that also have bearing upon our reading. The 
writing of the story was a hurried affair, jolted mid-composition by the sudden death of Eliot’s 
estranged sister, Chrissey, and Eliot’s own illness.295 In the early stages of writing The Mill on 
the Floss, she mysteriously put it aside (uncharacteristically neglecting to mention this in her 
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journal), and, in early 1859 began to write something which, on the surface, appeared utterly 
distinct from that other, nascent pastoral novel of childhood innocence. By April, the novella 
was finished, and as Adela Pinch points out, it was the next day that she resumed work on The 
Mill, now intent on re-writing the opening chapters.296 Despite several times dismissing the 
Lifted Veil as a slim ‘nothing’, a work undertaken ‘as a resource when my head was too stupid 
for more important work,’ (which Knoepflmacher notes was an unusual deprecation of her 
work)297 the ideas in the novella were obviously insistent and had to find expression.298 The 
genesis of the tale coincided with an unexpected letter of forgiveness from Chrissy (belatedly 
recorded in Eliot’s journal three weeks later). Her entry for March 15 is a single italicised line, 
poignant as a simple capsule of death’s date and time : ‘Chrissey died this morning, at a quarter 
to 5.’299 The urgency that characterised the emergence of this ‘slight tale of an outré kind,’ 
belying Eliot’s light assessment of it as a 'jeu de mélancolie,’300 is a clue to its unmitigated 
blackness, brimming with ‘dark emotions’.301 Certainly, the author’s personal traumas were 
many: familial estrangement, recurring anxieties about her authorial identity, and her 
controversial relationship with Lewes, all of which pressed upon her with such force that, in 
the words of Bodenheimer, the novella was a means of ‘exorcising’ grief. For Gilbert and 
Gubar, too, the story is grounded in personal tragedy, but here it is Eliot’s ‘dis-ease with 
authority,’ and her conflicted investment in Romanticism.302 Any pathological reading of Eliot, 
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though, needs to account for the sophistication of her aestheticizing of loss, particularly as, in 
The Lifted Veil, the allegory of grief takes on a dimension stretching to encompass nineteenth-
century epistemology, implicating the very nature of being.  
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II 
FANTASYING 
 
 
Turning back to the opening scene of The Lifted Veil and its darkened field of vision in 
Latimer’s previewing of death, I want to look more closely at the network of perceptions that 
render both consciousness and story. ‘My thought stays in the darkness, but always with a sense 
of moving onward…’ Latimer writes, moving swiftly to a recollection of his boyhood, and the 
beginning of the story proper. Blackness acts as caesura, linguistically marking a shift from 
being to non-being, and crucially, a quasi-severance of sight from subjectivity - ‘my thought 
stays in the darkness’ – the residual pronoun a marker of incomplete separation.  The forward 
movement in space and time paradoxically results in narrative retrieval, for in the next 
paragraph Latimer takes us back to his infancy. The ellipsis –a proto-cinematic fade-out - thus 
denotes a passage in memory and spools story, symbolising both death and the return to 
childhood. The voided sight then materialises as a primal darkness of infant blindness (the 
description of which, crucially, neglects any reference to darkness): ‘I had a complaint of the 
eyes,’ he recalls, ‘that made me blind for a little while, and [my mother] kept me on her knee 
from morning till night’ (5). His blindness is synonymous with the tenderness of his dead 
mother’s love, a logic that will have disastrous ramifications.  
 Barbara Hardy, and Stump respectively argue that Eliot’s protagonists move from the 
darkness of self-deception to the clarity of brightly lit space, a movement towards self-
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awareness that, in the case of Maggie Tulliver for instance, comes at great cost.303 In The Lifted 
Veil, however, the binal drama of illumination is changeable, sometimes reversed, or, at times 
non-existent, light and shadow having no stable oppositional relation: Latimer’s involuntary 
visions, for instance, are cast as ‘flash[es] of strange light’ between which his ‘world remain[s] 
as dim as ever’ (11). The Lifted Veil thereby reverses that steady Enlightenment ontology of 
the subject in an illumined field of vision. The specular, haunting play of shadows and 
luminescence structures ocularity, a pattern that recurs throughout the story, engendering an 
experience of vertiginosity that doubles as the disorientating articulation of personhood.  
Eliot wrote at a time when the stability of the dichotomy of light and dark was being 
undermined. As Martin Jay notes, under the influence of philosophers such as Goethe and his 
theory of colour, a writer with whose work Eliot was intimately familiar– a ‘new valorisation 
of darkness’ appeared, ‘as a necessary complement [to], even the source of light’.304 Light and 
dark acquired an essential polarity, as the Enlightenment’s privileging of illumination and faith 
in sight shattered. As I discussed in the introduction, Goethe set out the affective shifts marked 
by changes in illumination that amounted to a psychological theory, the psychic implications 
of which were borne out in both Jane Eyre and Villette’s figuring of optical trauma.  Goethe 
had no doubt as to the contrariness of the coupling of the dark and the luminous: ‘The retina, 
after being acted upon by light or darkness, is found to be in two different states, which are 
entirely opposed to each other.’305 In The Lifted Veil Yixhi Xaio reads a dialectic of Victorian 
microscopy and ocularcentrism – ‘the daunting challenges and the tragic failure of becoming 
an empirical observer and sympathetic narrator’306 – problems, then, of things coming to light, 
                                                        
303 Barbara Hardy, The Novels of George Eliot: a Study in Form (London: the Athlone Press, 1959), 196; Reva 
Stump, Movement and Vision in George Eliot’s Novels (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959.  
304 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes, 106-7.  
305 Goethe, Theory of Colours, 2. 
306 Yizhi Xiao, ‘Lost in Magnification: Nineteenth-Century Microscopy and The Lifted Veil,’ George Eliot -George 
Henry Lewes Studies 69.1 (Spring, 2017), 77. While similarly interested in Victorian lens-culture, Yizhi Xiao 
reads The Lifted Veil as an allegory of microscopy and the production of knowledge, embedding the novella in 
the immediate context of Lewes’ scientific experiments. “Elliot translates nineteenth-century microscopy’s 
epistemological struggle with the imperfect observer into a narrative one and experiments with a narrator 
  173 
illuminated by science. Yet the novella is interested chiefly in the uncanniness of darkness, that 
was, as Nicholas Royle argues, the real subject of Freud’s great essay on the uncanny. The 
experience of the uncanny, while its meaning is in flux throughout that essay, involves the fear 
of losing one’s eyes, which Freud links to the horror of castration: ‘We know from 
psychoanalytic experience that the fear of damaging or losing one’s eyes is a terrible one in 
children,’ he writes. ‘Many adults retain their apprehensiveness in this respect, and no physical 
injury is so much dreaded by them as an injury to the eye.’307 Latimer’s condition appears to 
be the opposite – uncanniness arises out of the horror of a vision too clearly resolved – but I 
think there are interesting parallels between Freud’s account of Nathaniel in the story of the 
Sand-man (whose visions may or may not be delusional), and Eliot’s narrator. Latimer exudes 
a longing to be robbed of his tormenting insights, but in fact his despair resides in his particular 
form of blindness: blindness as delusional sight. He has been robbed of the mode of seeing that 
ensured continuity with the certainty of his mother’s love, the infant ‘complaint of the eyes’ 
that was felt as a gift, rather than a lack. To return to Brinkema’s pairing of sighted blindness 
and despair, in which the non-existence of the other (here, Latimer’s mother) is felt at the retinal 
level as an affective condition: ‘the visual field, in mourning, is reduced entirely to its blind 
spot.’308 
Freud’s enigmatic grouping of darkness, sight, and an experience of isolation, argues 
Royle, suggests that it is the synaesthetic spectrality of this thing called darkness ‘which finally 
haunts his project’. In any case, the terror of the unheimlich ‘involve[s] a special emphasis on 
the visual,’ on what comes to the eye out of the darkness. What emerged out of the dark for 
Latimer was the ‘vanishing’ of his mother, a point to which I return below, and the beginning 
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of a new form of diseased vision. As Royle concludes, ‘[b]lindness can be an especially 
powerful kind of seeing,’309 and Latimer’s blind spots are, like Jane’s Eyre’s or Lucy Snowe’s, 
the agitations in the text that tell us something about the nature of phantasmic mourning.  What 
is perception in Latimer’s imagining? What is objectively material, knowable? He exists in a 
Winnicottian state of fantasying, a dissociated condition unlike the dream-world, which has a 
relation to worldly objects; fantasying remains ‘an isolated phenomenon, absorbing energy, 
but not contributing,’ to dream or reality. One can exist almost permanently in such a place.310 
It seems unwise, at the very least, then, to give our trust to this narrator’s ability to tell us – his 
imagined reader – the truth.  
 Latimer’s question – ‘Will darkness close over them for ever?’ –  in an important sense, 
is disingenuous. For he has no stable notion of the constitution of shadows, arbitrarily 
redefining his terms throughout; and furthermore, he wills the closing-up of his world, as it is 
the too-insistent light (of visions) that has compressed his senses into the narrow room of 
myopic narcissism. The chronology of his memory, though, suggests that the enfeebled space 
of blindness is the integument of nurture, one symptom of his eagerness to recreate infantile 
pleasures. The opening scene conveys the plasticity of Eliot’s metaphors: light and dark are 
features of Latimer’s very subjectivity, drawing the curtains around the reader so that there is 
no way out of the narrator’s frantic perception – making Latimer the man behind the screen 
and in control of the phantasmagorical display, denying any other perspective from which to 
view the scene.  
 Eliot’s dialectic of light and darkness, the central tropes that re-emerge, metamorphose 
as they are further abstracted from the source of illumination. Eliot’s ‘scenic method’ (in 
Hardy’s term), sharply depicts lens culture and its impermanence, the phantasmagorical, 
                                                        
309 Nicholas Royle, The Uncanny (Manchester, NY: Manchester UP, 2003), 107-111.   
310 Winnicott, Playing and Reality,31-32. 
  175 
magic-lantern effect of modernity.311 For Hardy, ‘the scene [of Eliot’s fiction] is [in The Lifted 
Veil] compressed into an image. The lighted room is the metaphor which stamps the crisis’. ‘It 
is rather a melodramatic [image],’ she continues, ‘one not very closely in keeping with the 
actual pressure of the seen world within the story.’312 Yet if we read the illuminated scene and 
its multiple recreations as pointing to something very real about the quality of mid-century 
experience, we find an image (the eye/I in the darkened room) that is both contracting and 
expanding, an image under threat: the seen world, the objective world - each of those frames 
collapse into the other, so that form is ordered through a tragedy of light.  
Eliot’s aesthetic in The Lifted Veil approximates the volatility of Victorian culture’s 
specular imaginary, shifting kaleidoscopically, (recalling Lucy Snowe’s nightmare after-
images, glowing on her mind’s eye), as if in mimicry of the magic lantern’s resolution and 
dissolve. Latimer’s previsions – his precipitate, telescopically accurate conjuring of Prague, 
for example – ‘I could not believe that I had been asleep, for I remembered distinctly the 
gradual breaking-in of the vision upon me, like the new images in a dissolving view’ (LV, 10, 
emphasis added) - share the volatile qualities of optical technologies. In his study of the cultural 
psychology of light in this period, Wolfgang Schivelbusch argues that there was a general flight 
from stark luminescence, driven in part by the increasingly lit space of the nineteenth-century 
domestic interior. For the bourgeois subject, blunting the aggressiveness of daylight with 
curtains on all windows, and diffusing the ‘harsh core of light’ effected by gas lighting, 
‘unstructured’ in its glow, became a drawing room necessity. The hypnotic aura of candlelight, 
clustered and pale, was lost, and the dazzling quality of new technologies of lighting robbed 
the eye of pleasure: ‘To look at [the light] directly was not merely unpleasant, it was 
impossible.’313 What followed was endless innovation in shading and cloaking the glare of the 
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newly-lit world. This pathology of the lit space gives added resonance to the veil or as I have 
called it, the screen, that dissolves Latimer’s membrane of self-protection, leaving him 
besieged by the ‘naked, skinless complication[s]’ of every person he encounters, ‘all the 
struggling chaos of puerilities, meanness, vague capricious memories, and indolent make-shift 
thoughts, from which human words and deeds emerge like leaflets covering a fermented heap’ 
(LV, 14).  
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III 
Magic lantern optics 
 
 I began my introduction with Tyndall’s poetics of the eye/I, placing his experiments with the 
camera obscura model within a context of a cultural beguilement at the space between the 
visible and the invisible.  What follows is an excerpt from one of Tyndall’s public lectures:  
 
Looking at the dazzling light, you see a globe of light, but entirely fail to see the 
shape of the coke-points whence the light issues. The cause may be thus made 
clear: On the screen before you is projected an image of the carbon-points, the 
whole of the lens in front of the camera being employed to form the image. It is not 
sharp, but surrounded by a halo which nearly obliterates it. This arises from an 
imperfection of the lens, called its spherical aberration … The human eye labours 
under a similar defect, and, when you look at the naked light from fifty cells, the 
blur of light upon the retina [is] sufficient to destroy the definition of the retinal 
image.314 
 
As I have aruged, The Lifted Veil tropes on a contemporary fascination with light and grafts its 
complications onto Latimer’s subjective visual aberrations. Tyndall’s blaze of destructive light 
meets Latimer’s dysmorphic blurred previsions, denaturing the ‘definition of the retinal 
image,’ to evoke Tyndall. It is also evocative of the phenomenology of loss at the heart of 
visual perception, and the two dynamics read together strengthen each other. The inherent 
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defect of the eye that Tyndall refers to is its blind spot, which for Schwenger is the point of 
loss that is generated by the act of perception itself. Schwenger  reminds us of the persistent 
mournfulness embedded in vision: ‘always falling short of true possession,’ the image seen is 
inseparable from our own condition, telling us only about the subject.315 Latimer’s mode of 
seeing explicates his loss, revealing little of how the world might actually be – for Eliot leaves 
ambiguous the status of his visions, which could be delusions – but conveying to the reader, 
via visual plotting, the trajectory of what Freud might categorise as his failed mourning.  
Latimer is characteristically sceptical about the nature of his visionary capacities – 
‘Might it not rather be a disease – a sort of intermittent delirium?’ Doubt as to what precisely 
is occurring within his mind haunts the narrative: ‘I felt a dizzy sense of unreality in what my 
eye rested on (12)’.  It is as though Latimer’s perception endures under the influence of a potent 
narcotic, recalling Lucy Snowe’s drugged night-walking on the night of the carnival in Villette, 
and anticipating the bewildering haze of the scene of the Italian festa, in Romola. Formally, 
too, Eliot’s prose mirrors the swift substitution of image for image, as Latimer’s focus bleeds 
into an overlapping perspective. As he stands transfixed before Giorgione’s painting of 
Lucrezia Borgia, he feels haunted by ‘its cunning, relentless face, till I felt a strange, poisoned 
sensation, as if I had long been inhaling a fatal odour, and was just beginning to be conscious 
of its effects (18-19)’. Later, in the garden, he is aware of the presence, then touch of a woman 
(both Bertha and Lucrezia), and:  
 
[i]n the same instant a strange intoxicating numbness passed over me, like 
the continuance or climax of the sensation I was still feeling from the gaze 
of Lucrezia Borgia. The gardens, the summer sky, the consciousness of 
Bertha’s arm being within mine, all vanished, and I seemed to be suddenly 
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in darkness, out of which there gradually broke a dim firelight and I felt 
myself sitting in my father’s leather chair in the library at home. 
 
‘[I]n darkness’ is a metonym for the spatial feel of swiftly passing from one psychic state 
to another, along the chain of memories; it is the nucleus of sensation, a point of return 
that is Latimer’s default, primal space. But his vision of home is one with an oppressive 
despair and ‘hopeless misery’: 
  
‘[t]he light became stronger, for Bertha was entering with a candle in her 
hand – Bertha, my wife, with cruel eyes, with green jewels and green leaves 
on her white ball-dress; every hateful thought within her present to me... 
‘Madman, idiot! Why don’t you kill yourself, then?’ It was a moment of hell 
[…] She was my wife, and we hated each other. Gradually the hearth, the 
dim library, the candle-light disappeared – seemed to melt away into a 
background of light, the green serpent with the diamond eyes remaining a 
dark image on the retina. Then I had a sense of my eyelids quivering, and the 
living daylight broke in upon me; I saw gardens and heard voices (19-20) 
 
I have quoted at length to better appreciate the syntax of Latimer’s thought pattern. The 
permeation of one sensation-image into another occurs in the grammatical continuity, the first 
and fourth sentences broken up into shorter clauses with the briefest pause of an apostrophe. 
The dashes (of which there are eight in these two paragraphs, condensed here), semi-colons 
and the ellipsis all convey a mind stumbling from form to form: Bertha’s body, and then her 
eye, to the colour green, to the jewels, to the sensation of being the object of hate, to the lucidity 
of her thoughts, and finally to the melting away of the image. As Melissa Raines demonstrates, 
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Eliot’s punctuation was deliberate and she was highly resistant to editorial change; grammar 
was assuredly another mode of character development.316 Latimer’s syntactical character 
communicates the desperation of a mind trying to feel its way to a dim object, the obliqueness 
of his perception matched in the indirection of his style. Consciousness is a peripatetic, 
inconsistent visuality, a ‘quivering’ mass of sensations, felt at the level of the narrative eye, 
voice and syntactical structure.  
The very structure of Latimer’s autobiography is a simultaneous flow of parallel images 
and sensations, occurring both at the level of discourse, and spatio-temporally (his sense of the 
‘future is brought into the compass of feeling by’ his visions [20]). As the scene of Prague 
breaks in upon his mind’s eye, he reveals that, ‘while I was conscious of this incipient vision, 
I was also conscious that Pierre [a servant]’ entered the room (10), speaking to him. Spatial 
and temporal flow moves not with narrative – in which diachronic progression was distorted 
from the ‘beginning-as-end,’ nullifying suspense by temporal prolepsis (in Genette’s terms),317 
but rather works in a pattern of inchoate resistance, disorientating the subject. The architecture 
of Latimer’s narration depends in fact on a recursive (re)-creation of imagery. As Hao Li notes, 
‘[j]ust as memory can provide imagery and structure for a new vision … so vision depends on 
future recollection to be reinstated as reality of the present,’ thus ‘merging the conscious with 
the subconscious,’ and collapsing temporal frames. 318 It resonates with Crary’s claim in his 
discussion of afterimages, that ‘the presence of sensation in the absence of a stimulus … posed 
a theoretical and empirical demonstration of autonomous vision, of an optical experience that 
was produced by and within the subject’. An implication of this was the realisation of the 
inseparability of seeing and temporality: ‘The shifting processes of one’s own subjectivity 
                                                        
316 Raines, “George Eliot’s Grammar of Being,” Essays in Criticism vol. 8.1 (2008), 45. 
317 Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1980), 67-
79. Genette describes such narration as ‘anticipat[ing] the most disconcerting proceedings of the modern 
novel,’ 67.  
318 Hao Li, Memory and History in George Eliot: Transfiguring the Past (Hampshire: Macmillan, 2000), 47. 
  181 
experienced in time became synonymous with the act of seeing’.319 Latimer’s involuntary 
visions – often sparked by a single word (‘Prague’) or an impressible image that causes objects 
to oscillate, creates a splicing of time, and with that, of space and being. The consequence of a 
dangerously autonomous perspective is an inability to distinguish the real from the virtual and 
caught in this nightmare of simulacra is the substance of personhood.  
 
 
IV 
Spinoza and the affective imagination 
 
 
The dominion of the visual and its emotional geography in The Lifted Veil references 
Spinoza’s philosophy of the destructive and nutritive power of the imagination. As I established 
in my introduction, Spinoza’s theories on affect and its grounding in the imagination are 
powerfully articulated in the novella. It can arguably be read as Eliot’s response to Spinoza’s 
theory of the imagination, with its nursery of illusions and fears, if not dangers: a thinking-
through of the problem of an ontology founded in pure awareness and the vital contribution of 
other bodies. Spinoza’s thought is evident throughout Eliot’s novels, and as Moira Gaten’s 
argues, Eliot ‘helps us to see that the fundamentals of his philosophy of the body, imagination, 
affect, place, and time are highly amenable to narrative treatment.’320 The relationship was a 
complex one, however, plastic enough for Eliot to offer her own critique of Spinoza’s ontology. 
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Eliot devoted ten years to scholarship on Spinoza, beginning her first translation of his work in 
1843, and then, in 1849, turning to his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670). Her translation 
of his Ethics (1677), completed in 1856, suffered by a dispute with her publisher and remained 
unpublished until 1981. Nevertheless, both she and Lewes were steeped in Spinoza’s writings 
for decades. Eliot’s translation work became a daily ritual, designated in her diary in the same 
manner as one might note waking or breakfasting: ‘Translated Spinoza’ or ‘Worked at Spinoza’ 
a shorthand for her habitual engrossment in his philosophy.321  
Spinoza’s concept of the imagination involves a sequencing of the body’s space-object 
relations and its emotional states: ‘the images of things are the very affections of the human 
body, or modes by which the human body is affected,’ he writes in the Ethics (E, III, Prop. 32): 
a veritable image-affect. 322  As Isobel Armstrong observes, for Spinoza ‘[i]maging and the 
imagination are at the core of all affective experience’ (and, she adds, we might translate this 
as all experience).323 Spinoza substituted Cartesian dualism for what I would describe as a 
phenomenology of the affects, which are ‘generated in and through the body’ (a non-fictional 
counterpart to Eliot’s mode of ‘fleshy’, embodied realism).324 Corporeality is the seat of being 
and knowing: ‘the first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is the idea of an actually 
existing body,’ writes Spinoza, adding that ‘the mind is necessarily conscious of itself through 
ideas of the body’s affections’ (E, III, Props. 9 and 10).  There is thus a symbiosis of body and 
mind, of ‘passion’ and ‘action,’ in the Ethics, for ‘the body and the mind are one and the same 
thing … The result is that the order, or connection, of things is one, whether nature is conceived 
now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of [physical] extension (E, III, Prop. 
2, Schol.).’  
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In these statements of affect seeing, feeling and being are synthesized, in a dialectic 
similar to that which I have emphasised in Latimer’s condition, consciousness arising from 
imagination and bodily perception. Images are the mechanics of consciousness. While the 
imagination constitutes a type of knowledge - it is the first and primary step toward an 
individual ontology - it is a defective and necessarily limited knowing; necessarily because 
imagination is a condition of bodily confusion,325 (and in this we can see a symptom of the 
distrust of the image that characterised the Victorian dialectics of seeing). Ideally, one moves 
beyond instinctive imagining to reason, a process that in Eliot’s novella atrophies under the 
pressures of loss: Latimer’s is a radically delimited imagining untamed by reason, including 
the envisioning of his own destruction. 
There is little space for an individual’s free will in Spinoza’s logic, which emerges from 
the Ethics as a duplicitous illusion under which each person labours. The affects, of which there 
are only three – sadness, joy, and desire (all other emotions subsequently flow from these 
primary affects) – are plotted geometrically along lines and planes, not dissimilar from Eliot’s 
aesthetic web of relations. All emotions flow from the three primary affects as modifications 
of the original. The object of our love, sadness, hate or joy is tainted or augmented by the image 
of that feeling: ‘If we imagine someone to affect with joy a thing we love, we shall be affected 
with love toward him. If, one the other hand, we imagine him to affect the same thing with 
sadness, we shall also be affected with hate towards him’ (E, III, Prop. 22).326 Emotion breeds 
complying emotion – affect engenders and vitalises the corresponding affect – like a mirror, or 
as Spinoza terms it, an ‘imitation’. Latimer voices a similar affective logic when he says that 
we ‘automatically perform the gesture we feel to be wanting in another’ (38).  
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Spinoza figures the emotions mnemonically, operating phantasmatically as one feeling 
is haunted by its pair: ‘If the mind has once been affected by two affects at once, then 
afterwards, when it is affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other (E, III, P14). 
A Spinozistic rhetoric of corporeal emotion turns up in Latimer’s metaphors: ‘I remember – 
how should I not remember? – … when the sadness I had felt in Bertha’s growing estrangement 
became a joy that I looked back upon with longing, as a man might look back on the last pains 
in a paralysed limb’ (LV, 31). Eliot’s phantom consciousness, then, is embedded in Spinoza’s 
tyranny of the imagination, with its proto-Freudian acts of repression, whereby ‘the mind 
avoids imagining those things that diminish or restrain its or the body’s power’ (E, III, Prop. 
13).    
 We can now bring together the vital strands in Eliot’s thinking in The Lifted Veil - the 
visual expression of affect, the phenomenology of doubling, mutating emotions, and 
consciousness. The fragmentation of the eye/I that characterises Latimer’s mode of seeing finds 
a corresponding threat in Spinoza’s palimpsestic imaging: sadness can degrade quickly into 
hate by virtue of the rigid causality of feelings. ‘Hate is increased by being returned,’ Spinoza 
asserts, ‘[i]f someone imagines that someone like himself is affected with hate toward a thing 
like himself which he loves, he will hate that [person]’ (E, III, Prop. 43 and 45).  Grounded in 
the mind’s visualisation, self-compounding affects and passions enslave our freedom. Tangled 
up with each other, Spinoza’s competing images of mind become bound in a confusing overlap 
(rather like the kinetic quality of a stereoscope), becoming indistinguishable in the imagination.  
‘It is not for nothing that Spinoza ground lenses,’ notes Armstrong. ‘The dioptric effects of the 
image and its exponential intensification to infinity, and the capacity of the lens to bend light 
and reverse the image must have entered his reckoning.’327 Eliot’s fascination with the psychic 
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freight of illumination and imagery were most certainly augmented by her reading of Spinoza, 
giving added resonance to Latimer’s psycho-visual trauma.   
 In the Ethics the mind’s image remains stable over time, and thus has a durational 
constancy. But the imagination distorts the subject’s temporal perspective: ‘So long as a man 
is affected by the image of a thing,’ Spinoza postulates, ‘he will regard the thing as present, 
even if it does not exist; and he imagines it as past or future only insofar as its image is joined 
to the image of a past or future time.’328 The free-floating and flexible image affixed to 
indiscriminate temporal moments by the thread of the mind sounds rather like a liberation of 
one’s fantasies, but in The Lifted Veil Eliot shows the dangers latent in our imaginary. For while 
constituting a mode of knowing, imagination is always only inadequate knowledge: ‘The ideas 
of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are not 
clear and distinct, but confused’ (E, II, Prop. 28, 135). However, it is never faulty, for ‘the 
imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves contain no error …. the mind does not err 
from the fact that it imagines.’ The error lies in the breach between perception and acquisition 
of freedom; thus, when freedom (a reasoning intellect) is attained, the ‘mind’s faculty of 
imagining [is] free’ (E, II, Prop. 17). It is this gap that Eliot probes, unsettling Spinoza’s 
certainty in the human mind’s superiority of mastering illusion through intellect.   
Latimer concedes to a hegemony of his senses, never questing or displaying the level 
of curiousity sufficient to make that step towards Spinozistic reason, freedom from the bondage 
of despair and hatred. He becomes trapped in a temporality that is non-present, his perception 
of affect tied exclusively to past or future projections. In re-encountering his childhood friend, 
Meunier, in part two (a symbol of a reasoning intellect), for example, he observes with surprise 
that his friend has reawakened in him an interest in the passing of each moment (37). As 
Spinoza claims, ‘[t]he human body, to be preserved, requires a great many other bodies, by 
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which it is, as it were, continually regenerated’ (E, II, post. VI). Latimer has no resistance 
against the sheer force of the passions, which leaves him with no option but to sever himself 
from the relational web of human contact. Oppressed by the intimacy of other bodies, he refuses 
to acknowledge that propinquity is in fact his only salvation, his only way to understand the 
vicissitudes of the sensory, imagistic world.   
 
 
 
V 
Aqueous haunting 
 
 
Latimer asks his reader to ‘imagine this double consciousness at work within me, 
flowing on like two parallel streams that never mingle their waters and blend into a common 
hue’ (21). The metaphor chosen here is deliberate in its resonance, evoking an early, highly 
significant scene, often neglected in the scholarship. If we are to think of memory in The Lifted 
Veil as generating out of an image distinguished essentially by an absent figure - that of 
Latimer’s unnamed mother – the unfolding of successive images of reflection and water are 
significant in comprehending the retrospective trajectory of his grief. J. Hillis Miller has 
demonstrated the interconnectedness of Eliot’s central metaphors, one of which is the stream, 
as a motif representing the totality of the realist narrator’s vision.329 In The Lifted Veil, though, 
the permeable nature of matter achieves more sinister connotations, perhaps most neatly 
symbolised in Bertha’s opal ring with its mercurial hues, which ‘seems to blush and turn pale 
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… changing with changing light of … woman’s eyes (LV, 17). Latimer’s recollection of his 
early years, cocooned in his temporary blindness, is couched in the charged language of his 
first sensual encounter: ‘I had a tender mother: even now ... a slight trace of sensation 
accompanies the remembrance of her caress as she held me on her knee (4-5).’ His 
sightlessness is synonymous with his mother’s enveloping affection, imperative as it was for 
her to keep him constantly within her touch. ‘That unequalled love soon vanished out of my 
life,’ he laments, ‘and there were no loving eyes looking at me’ (5). Twice he describes his 
mother’s loss as a vanishing (7), rather than a death, rendering it unstable and spectral. Indeed, 
the terms of her death are of a visualised felt presence (the boy is blind), now disappeared, an 
absence felt at the ocular level. Her loss is essentially a loss of witnessing – a mourning of the 
(mother’s) eye -  an uncanny feeling of existing in a semi-darkness: in the world, but unseen, 
unwatched, a sensation of loss that Eliot explores in depth in her portrait of Baldassare’s despair 
at his vanished son, in Romola. Her surveying eye is a fulcrum that balanced the child Latimer’s 
perspectival plane, and without her ocular protection, he internalises a specular anxiety that 
manifests as a hyper-visuality. His sight restored, he now sees only a world devoid of her 
‘loving eye’. 
The isolation in the wake of her death was heightened, he believes, by his sensitivity to 
his sensory environment, which begins as auditory bombardment, ‘the tramping of the horses 
on the pavement in the echoing stables,’ the ‘loud resonance’ of voices, ‘the booming bark’ of 
the dogs (5).330 Latimer’s visual faculty, by virtue of this early severance of his infant body 
from his mother’s gaze (synonymous with her touch), undergoes an inversion, or perversion of 
transmission (recalling Spinoza’s reversal of the light-image, or Tyndall’s blurred retinal 
scene). Blindness becomes the primal state, while seeing (inhering in his mother’s ‘vanishing’) 
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incurs a potent association of anguish. His preternatural auditory sensitivity is translated in 
visual terms – he sees his auditory assault in memory - and the successive sensations he 
describes combine with each other through the act of transcription, much like the 
heterogeneous flow of matter described by Hillis Miller: ‘flowing water, for Eliot is seen as 
made up of currents, filaments flowing side by side, intermingling and dividing.’331   
The intensely happy few years of the narrator’s Genevan life are often overlooked, yet 
it is here that Eliot carefully establishes the progression and arc of the tropes of flow, reflection, 
and light. Afloat on a Genevan lake, Latimer discovers a substitute for his dead mother’s gaze 
– the eye of water. ‘My least solitary moments,’ he recalls, ‘were when I pushed off in my boat, 
at evening, towards the centre of the lake; it seemed to me that the sky … and the wide blue 
water, surrounded me with a cherishing love such as no human face had shed on me since my 
mother’s love had vanished out of my life (7)’. Lying in the boat, ‘as Jean-Jacques did,’ he 
watches as the light departs ‘one mountain-top after the other, as if the prophet’s chariot of fire 
were passing over them on its way to the home of light,’ leaving only ‘when the white summits 
were sad and corpse-like’ (7). The deathly drama of light and shadow in this reminiscence is a 
re-living of his mother’s vanishing. The most insistent reference for this scene is Rousseau’s 
Confessions, a connection that has received fascinating treatment in Neil Hertz’s work.332 I 
want to take up a different link in this relationship of influence, however, pointing out the 
conceptual model of consciousness pictured in Rousseau’s autobiography. The French writer’s 
impression on Eliot was transformative. In a letter to Sara Hennell, dated from the same period, 
she writes that Rousseau’s ‘genius has sent that electric thrill through my intellectual and moral 
frame which has awakened me to new perceptions, which has made man and nature a fresh 
world of thought and feeling to me’; his writings have ‘quickened my faculties’, she continues, 
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so that she has been able ‘to shape more definitely for myself ideas which had previously dwelt 
as dim ‘ahnungen’ in my soul,’ concluding that ‘I have been ready to make new 
combinations.’333 These ‘new combinations’ are a strengthening of her distinctive philosophy 
of consciousness, a merging of ‘thought and feeling’ to better flesh out the material, 
phenomenal nature of being.  
Rousseau’s water is maternal, a return to liqueous origins during the loneliness of exile 
– ‘Oh nature! O my mother! Here at last I am under your guardianship alone’.334 Eliot’s water 
is maternal, too, but with a sinister depth; the ‘corpse-like’ shadows that descend upon the 
mountain-tops are a prescient threat of premature mortality. Where Rousseau floats happily for 
hours, seemingly towards the gentle home of birth and beginnings (‘In this way I would drift 
up to half a league from the shore’),335 Latimer floats ominously towards a death-like scene. 
Water imagery takes on an evocation of grief in another of Eliot’s letters from this period, again 
to Hennell. Long months spent nursing her dying father, coupled with the shock of Chrissey’s 
sudden death, made her feel at sea, she wrote: ‘My thoughts are all aqueous – they will not 
crystalise – they are as fleeting as ripples on the sea. I am suffering as acutely as ever I did in 
my life.’336 The symbolic and destructive associations of water were very much on Eliot’s mind 
– The Mill on the Floss is structured by the power of water and the dynamics of flowing 
energies, where the maternal and annihilating force of the river reaches its fullest realisation in 
the omnipotence of the River Floss. Maggie Tulliver’s final, fatal passage down the Floss is in 
fact a chiasmic refiguring of Latimer’s brief lake journey, itself a re-writing of Rousseau. In 
the flood of the novel’s final section, Maggie is borne along the river in a journey home: 
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 ‘Oh, how welcome, the widening of that dismal watery level – the gradual 
uplifting of the cloudy firmament – the slowly defining blackness of objects 
above the glassy dark! ... the river lay before her. She seized an oar and began 
to paddle the boat forward with the energy of wakening hope: the dawning 
seemed to advance more swiftly.’337  
 
Maggie’s watery crossing moves from darkness to the promise of illumination (albeit one that 
is not maintained), while Latimer’s progress is accompanied by the reverse change in light; 
unlike Maggie in this moment, he moves from hope to despair.338 
 
 The nocturnal water of the lake with its dying shades is an image that, in Bachelard’s 
description, has intimate and morbid force. ‘In many narratives, accursed places have at their 
centre a lake of shadows,’ he writes, ‘water invites death.’339 Latimer’s explicit association of 
the water with the maternal gaze demonstrates the psychology of that element, the way in which 
Latimer has grafted onto its surface the primal image. ‘All water is a kind of [mother’s] milk’, 
writes Bachelard, a notion that ‘has a tap root that descends into the great, simple unconscious 
of primitive child life.’ We can see the sedative effect of the water in the narrator’s retaining 
and re-enactment of the lake imagery in a later scene, in a discussion with Meunier, whose 
excited talk of future experiments and medical discoveries was ‘mingled confusedly in my 
thought with glimpses of blue water (8)’. Latimer’s fusing of word and image have been 
severely damaged, leading to this confused mingling of images – a superimposition that 
structures or, rather, denatures his notion of perspective. All images are shallow substitutes for 
the vanishing point of the maternal gaze. Meunier will re-emerge at the story’s climactic scene, 
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when he performs the blood transfusion upon Bertha’s murdered maid, Mrs Archer, 
grotesquely transmogrifying his youthful imagery of water into an altogether different fluid, 
no less compelled by the maternal and feminine, the two young friends’ bond perversely forged 
by the fluidity of Eliot’s metaphors of changeable liquid.340   
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VI 
Latimer’s mirror 
 
 
Before the sudden onset of prevision and sclerotic subjectivity, Latimer undergoes 
assessment by a phrenologist, Mr Letherall, described simply as ‘a large man in spectacles,’ 
bringing to mind the optician Coppelius / Coppola in the Sand-man. Just as Nathaniel is 
terrified by the optician’s offer of ‘fine eyes,’ which turn out to be ‘harmless’ spectacles,341 
Eliot’s paternal quasi-scientist is most notable for his uncanny spectacles, which are in this 
scene the object most arousing of Latimer’s fascination. Latimer describes the dehumanising 
process of examination as Letherall ‘stared at me with glittering spectacles,’ his terror mingled 
with ‘the agitation of my first hatred – hatred of this big spectacled man, who pulled my head 
about as if he wanted to buy and cheapen it’ (6). There is something disturbing about the 
doubling and mediation of the doctor’s gaze, his seeming ability to penetrate Latimer’s 
youthful skull and pronounce its deficiencies ‘here,’ outlining the boy’s eyebrows, and ‘here – 
here is the excess,’ gesturing to his temples. Latimer admits that it is the ‘sight of the cold 
human eye’ that makes him disavow human relations, despite his hunger for ‘human deeds and 
human emotions,’ and, most of all, sympathy (recalling Maggie Tulliver’s girlish ‘thirst for all 
knowledge,’ her ‘blind unconscious yearning for something that would link together the 
wonderful impressions of this mysterious life’).342 As Hao Li points out, Latimer’s 
impoverished subjectivity is partly a consequence of his self-conception as external, his 
continued separation of consciousness from being,343 that ‘contrast between the outward and 
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inward’ that brings only ‘painful collisions,’ as Eliot’s narrator fatefully intones in The Mill.344 
We find the same language of self-division in The Lifted Veil, of Latimer’s ‘double constraint’ 
of mind, the existence he must ‘live through twice over – through my inner and outward sense’ 
(30). I have suggested that while the veil is lifted from Latimer’s vision of the world, exposing 
it in its harshness, his imposition of a narrative mode of objectivity and disavowal is a shroud 
in its place. At the textual level, this manifests in his quasi-scientific voice (the naming of 
symptoms, for example), revealing an instinctive distrust of his perceptions by imposing the 
order that comes with categorisation and rationalism. His surprising decision in part two of his 
memoir –  to omit recording his private experience (30), (an intention that he nevertheless fails 
to carry out), is a move prompted by anxiety about the nature of his twinned perception and is 
yet another instance of disavowal and distance from his own story. Yet what is the source of 
his dissociation? 
  The moment of externalisation appears to begin under the examination of Letherall 
and his spectacles, consolidating that distrust of the ocular triggered by the ‘vanishing’ of the 
maternal eye. While undergoing examination, Latimer experiences a ‘moment of hatred’, his 
first acquaintance with that sensation, yet it seems to be a feeling that he turns in upon himself, 
infected by the ‘glittering’ precision of Leatherall’s glasses. This is apparent in his cold,  
diffident narrative voice. The doctor’s alienating doubled gaze obliquely comments on lens 
culture, containing that thread of disenchantment that I have traced throughout this thesis. The 
doctor’s grasp and look bear no resemblance to the tenderness of the primal sensations 
associated with his infant blindness – the sensorium in intimacy -  a gaze that Latimer could 
only have imagined, his failed sight translating it into touch, rather like a braille of the 
emotions.  
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In his revision of the Lacanian mirror stage, Winnicot theorises that in emotional 
development, ‘the precursor of the mirror is the mother’s face.’345 In the barest hours of child-
formation, a baby begins to look, directing his or her attention to the mother’s face. ‘What does 
the baby see there?’ Winnicott asks. The answer, he argues, is one that is essentially pre-verbal, 
or even unverbalisable: ‘what the baby sees is himself or herself’. In Latimer’s case, however, 
this is complicated by his infant blindness, although he senses her ‘loving eyes’. Winnicott 
makes exception for cases such as Latimer’s, stating that ‘[b]lind infants may need to get 
themselves reflected through other senses than that of sight.’346 In his recollection of his 
mother’s vanishing (‘there were no loving eyes looking at me as I mounted’), Latimer can 
mean only that he has translated his mother’s gaze into her touch, which is a constant comfort. 
There is a void of unresponsiveness in her disappearance from his life. For Winnicott the 
individual’s ego development is predicated on this maternal looking, which distinguishes the 
subjective and objective self, the me and the not-me. The capacity to progress to normal object-
relations rests on the baby’s achievement of a returned gaze of sameness. When this mirrored 
image is distorted or denied, that is, when the mother’s face is fixed or absent for too long, the 
child’s response pattern can be profoundly damaged: the creative capacity ‘begins to atrophy, 
and in some way or other [infants] look around for other ways of getting something of 
themselves back from the environment.’  
The Lifted Veil’s narrator perceives the maternal absence as a ‘chill’ that has blanketed 
his world and the chronology of his heightened sensory sensitivity dates to this moment (5). If 
this maternal lack or loss persists, Winnicott argues,  the sighted baby begins to recognise the 
mother’s face as an objective reality, setting in motion the substitution of apperception for the 
process of perception: ‘perception takes the place of that which might have been the beginning 
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of a significant exchange with the world, a two-way process in which self-enrichment alternates 
with the discovery of meaning in the world of seen things.’347 Understood thus, Latimer’s 
predicament becomes one of a failure at the most primal, pre-verbal level of visual 
perceptiveness, in which there is no distinguishing between inner and outer forms of reality, 
no clear development from perception to the more sophisticated process of apperception. A 
stalled disillusionment – prevented by his mother’s early death – pushes the young narrator 
into an unending irreality. Latimer has arguably been denied the fullness of the weaning 
process in Winnicottian terms: ‘when we talk about the phenomena that cluster round weaning 
we are assuming the underlying process…by which opportunity for illusion and gradual 
disillusionment is provided’ (PR, 15). Taking this reading a step further, the narrative can be 
read as a transcription of an inexpressible (perhaps for Latimer, unknowable) existence within 
a ‘fantasying’ reality, in which the narrator’s malformed self futilely seeks representation and 
recognition in the objects that surround him, remaining caged, however, within his own 
formlessness. Phenomenological ways of knowing are disfigured, or estranged in Freudian 
terms, becoming what Latimer describes as ‘diseased’. Latimer’s imagination has no 
boundaries, no inbuilt corrections, that might have occurred in the weaning stage, and thus he 
remains dangerously attached to primal images that are in fact illusory. The ‘world of seen 
things’ is imbued not with meaning, but with absurdity.  
Latimer’s sensory overstimulation is a form of anti-knowledge, an epistemological 
dead-end. U. C Knoepflmacher depicts Latimer essentially as a victim of circumstance, as a 
man ‘essentially guiltless,’ and ‘a captive of his vision’.348 It is important, however, to account 
for Latimer’s control over his own story, indeed his urge to master omnipotence of his 
narrative. In his autobiographical essay, ‘A disturbance of memory on the Acropolis,’ Freud 
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recounts a trip to the famous historical ruins in Athens, which leads to what he describes as a 
moment of estrangement, or uncanniness. Standing amongst the Greek site, Freud was 
suddenly struck with the realisation that the Acropolis does indeed exist, certain that he had in 
the past doubted the truth of its realness, until faced at last with its indubitable presence. As he 
reflected further, however, he came to recognise in his uncanny sensation a fleeting feeling 
that, “What I am seeing there is not real”.349 This statement of disbelief, his estrangement from 
the reality of something or from the self, necessitated a defence; in flight from it, he 
manufactured a past memory – a youthful disbelief in the Acropolis. Freud then goes on to 
make a fascinating observation on the nature of depersonalisation (which can take two forms: 
‘the subject feels that a piece of reality or a piece of his own self has become strange’), which 
he leaves unresolved: ‘the path from depersonalisation leads to the extremely curious condition 
of ‘double conscience [double consciousness]’. ‘This is all still so obscure,’ Freud cautions, 
that he feels unable to say more on the subject, once more drawing on the visual, the thing 
unseen or resisting sight.350 It is language that recalls Latimer’s self-description of a ‘double 
consciousness at work within [him]’ (LV, 21). Freud’s gesture towards such a state of 
uninhibited crossing between the subjective and objective conditions of being enables an 
insight into Latimer’s impoverished power, fractured upon the vanishing of his mother. He 
must create and maintain a sense of omnipotence, at least at the level of narrative discourse. 
Latimer thus conflates his body with his text; that is, to wrestle control over his faculties, he 
narrativises his symptoms, just another instance of doubleness in The Lifted Veil.     
During his moments of greatest anguish, he relies on the tropes of the magic lantern. 
When Latimer’s happy stay in Geneva is brought to a sudden end, for example, by ‘a severe 
illness, which is partly a blank to me, partly a time of dimly-remembered suffering,’ punctuated 
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only by rare appearances at his bedside of his partly-estranged father, ‘then came the languid 
monotony of convalescence, the days gradually breaking into variety and distinctness’ (8). The 
languorous diction is weighted by the memory of suffering, becoming only a weak outline; 
grief is mapped onto a lassitude of the eye, evocative of contemporary accounts of the concern 
surrounding ocular fatigue;351 a haunting oneiric quality replaces the crispness of his other 
remembrances, as his mode of recall is steeped in the destabilising surface of the lens-made 
image. With an intriguing symmetry, in a letter to Sara Hennell, Eliot described her experience 
of ‘after-sadness,’ which came upon her after time spent with a friend and designated that 
anxiety that she felt in separation, worrying over her own ‘false image,’ and the ‘veil that comes 
between’ people, distance making ‘some pain ... a permanent memory.’352 Eliot’s private pain 
must have informed her gothic story, and Latimer’s entrenched estrangement and obsession 
with death are evocative of Eliot’s own isolation from both family and society (after her 
relationship with Lewes was made public, Eliot was ostracised in certain circles). The death of 
Chrissey in the wake of their nascent reconciliation haunted her sister. 
The stereoscopic imagination in The Lifted Veil is one with soporific despair, a sadness 
indicated by the fleeting presence of his father, no more than an apparition on the screen, 
withholding love from Latimer in preference for his robust and successful other son, Alfred. 
The implication is of no stable perspectival relations, no centre point from which Latimer can 
perceive the space around him, a ‘diseased consciousness’ (14) that highlights some aspects, 
blurring others. For instance, the characters who people his world are seen in mere outline 
(much like Lucy Snowe’s descriptions of truncated bodies and synecdochic pince nez 
spectacles). Alfred, and his father are portrayed merely by abstractions of their functions: 
Alfred, who has come before him ‘as a perfect stranger’ after decades apart, is ‘a handsome, 
                                                        
351 Crary, Techniques of the Observer, 104.  
352 Eliot, letter to Sara Hennell, in Selections from George Eliot’s Letters, 214.  
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self-confident man’, worldly, ‘good-humoured [and] self-satisfied’, and in possession of a 
‘superficial kindness’ (14); his father is symbolised by his possessions – a musical box and 
‘other purchases rigorously demanded of a rich Englishman’ (11) He is also notoriously 
punctual in his capacity as father and businessman, and his speech is suitably measured and 
calculated, betraying no alarm at his son’s oddities. He extends abstraction to his self-
characterisation, admitting that in contrast to his brother’s, his own ‘half-ghostly’ beauty was 
of the waifish, artistic type (14).  
Latimer has no mirror or window moments, conspicuous when we consider that, 
throughout her novels, Eliot repeatedly places her characters in relation to their reflected image. 
‘I saw in my face now nothing but the stamp of a morbid organisation, framed for passive 
suffering,’ he laments (14). Searching futilely for his mother’s absent face and finding no 
similarity in the bodies of his father or brother, Latimer’s own image is a ‘nothing,’ a blankness 
inscribed now with his oscillating sensations of pain. Winnicott argues that ‘[i]f the mother’s 
face is unresponsive, then a mirror is a thing to be looked at but not to be looked into,’ a concept 
that fits neatly with Latimer’s inability or unwillingness to peer deeply into any reflective 
space.353 There is no mirroring surface for Latimer and thus he is denied self-knowledge, 
trapped instead in a hyper-sensory prison.  
The mirror that Latimer substitutes, however, is the surface of other minds, rendered 
no longer opaque to him, but terrifyingly transparent. The veil that nurtures and protects 
intimacy with others is torn away, but another replaces it, a screen illuminated by a continual 
show of psychic projection; flooded with others’ perceptions of him, Latimer loses his ability 
to regulate external stimuli, a kind of death by imagery – the self has no sovereign ground. ‘My 
self-consciousness was heightened to that pitch of intensity in which our own emotions take 
the form of a drama which urges itself imperatively on our contemplation,’ he says (24). A 
                                                        
353 Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 132. 
  199 
spectator, then, in the darkroom of his own psychic projections. Like the phantasmagorical 
display, Latimer’s psychic receptivity increases then dims in the clarity of its imagery, 
fluctuating arbitrarily, inexorably beyond control. He figures this drama as a dream-like 
muteness, moving ‘dumbly through that stage of the poet’s suffering, in which he feels the 
delicious pang of utterance, and makes an image of his sorrows’ (24). A Spinozistic image-
affect – the picture of his own suffering – amplifies the certainty of his losses.  
 
 
VII 
The transparent veil 
 
The image of the veil is central to Eliot’s fiction, and in this section I will take a closer 
look at the plurality of shapes it acquires in The Lifted Veil. We have seen in the previous 
chapter on Villette the veil’s metonymic significance as a symbol of loss, a productive capacity 
augmented by its textual amorphousness – shifting from garment, to solid structure, to a 
metaphoric gauze between things or bodies, denoting something impermeable in their 
relations.354 Eliot’s veils are rent in filaments (as we shall also appreciate in the following 
chapter on Romola), finding new pattern in webs, and skeins of correspondence. Sedgwick has 
shown the metaphoric ambivalence of the gothic veil and its homology of blood, flesh and 
written word. The gothic veiled woman of The Lifted Veil is Bertha, ‘a pale, fatal-eyed woman,’ 
a ‘Water-Nixie’ in her ‘pale green dress,’ who appears not literally veiled – the whiteness of 
                                                        
354 Gilbert and Gubar point out the significance of the veil as a topos in Eliot’s oeuvre, interpreting it 
primarily as a site of Eliot’s authorial struggle between her nostalgia for the Wordsworthian and male 
tradition of Romanticism and her movement towards female becoming. Madwoman in the Attic, 468.    
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her flesh and sharp, ‘pale grey eyes at once acute’ and mocking, are constantly on display – 
but psychologically veiled, drawing, through her unique psychological opacity, a sexual 
enticement that Latimer cannot resist. ‘The veil itself,’ writes Sedgwick, ‘is suffused with 
sexuality,’ enhanced by an ironic inversion of meaning: ‘the veil that conceals and inhibits 
sexuality comes by the same gesture to represent it, both as a metonym of the thing covered 
and as a metaphor for the system of prohibitions’ that govern sexual desire.355 Bertha’s paleness 
exudes an erotic pull, and Latimer’s excessive use of the descriptor suggests an anxiety to 
portray her shallowness, her lack of spiritual and psychic depth; it also symbolises her paradox 
– she is in his eyes both dim and illuminated, both faint in appearance while eclipsing all others 
round her. He is chiefly piqued by her beauty, with her ‘luxuriant blonde hair, arranged in 
cunning braids’ that belie the sarcastic, violent penetration of her gaze. Every feature is 
designed to provoke his contempt, it would seem, and her splendour lacks the subtlety of girlish 
grace, her ‘grey’ eyes like a knife’s point – ‘I felt a painful sensation as if a sharp wind were 
cutting me’ (11): her very image wounds him. In denuding her of vibrancy (in colour and in 
psychology), Latimer can more comfortably worship her, project upon her his own lurid 
imaginings.  
Eliot’s femme fatale has parallels with Jane Eyre’s Bertha Mason, contrasting paleness 
to the darkness of Rochester’s loathed wife (adding further depth to Eliot’s reversal of any 
conventional dialect of colour).356 Rochester baptises Jane afresh with a ‘delicate, aërial’ beauty 
the yearned-for opposite to his wife’s complexion (JE, 259). Jane is pliant, an ingénue whose 
face he desires to ‘cover … with a priceless veil’. Like Brontë’s Bertha, an ill-used, hidden 
wife, whose desires run to another man, Eliot’s character is sexually unavailable to Latimer; 
                                                        
355 Sedgwick, “The Character in the Veil,” 256. 
356 Gayatri Spivak has looked with far greater penetration at Jane Eyre’s Bertha as a character caught up in 
imperialist ideology. She describes Jane’s voice as ushering the reader into her ‘territorialising individual 
imagination’. See Spivak, “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism,” Critical Inquiry 12.1 
(Autumn, 1985), 259. 
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first, because she is Alfred’s fiancé, and second, because hers is the one mind impervious to 
his insight (13). Both of these women are denied a voice by the first-person narratives in which 
they appear, and both provide an existential threat to the men who tell their story. Rochester 
describes his bewitchment thus:  
  
‘the boast of Spanish Town for her beauty … I found her a fine woman 
… tall, dark and majestic … She flattered me, and lavishly displayed 
for my pleasure her charms and accomplishments. I was dazzled, 
stimulated, my senses were excited; and being ignorant, raw and 
inexperienced, I thought I loved her’ (JE, 305).  
 
Latimer expresses his beguilement with a strikingly similar rhetoric: ‘She made me believe that 
she loved me. Without ever quitting her tone of badinage and playful superiority, she 
intoxicated me with the sense that I was necessary to her … It costs a woman so little effort to 
besot us in this way!’ (29). 
Eliot’s portrait of the seductive female, however, exudes a nuance that is disabled in 
Brontë’s novel by Jane Eyre’s persuasive voice. Bertha Grant’s evil seems to reside chiefly in 
her unattainability – she is an illogical problem of desire (‘a single hypothetic to remain 
problematic till sunset’ [29]), despite Latimer’s insistence that he has no desires (33). When he 
does at last acquire access to her thoughts, it is the ‘narrow room of her soul’ that is the cause 
of his repulsion. His description of her beguiling charm – ‘A graceful, brilliant woman’ who 
smiles her way through social calls and ‘made a figure in ballrooms,’ and who is ‘really pitiable 
to have such a husband, and so all the world thought’; she was ‘secure of carrying off all 
sympathy from a husband who was sickly, abstracted, and, as some suggested, crack-brained’: 
Bertha has ‘the balance … of pity’ (33). His language continually betrays him, bristling as it 
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does with envy, undermining his portrayal of the woman whom he establishes as his nemesis. 
Bertha is cast as double, his antagonist in a competition for sympathy.  
Bertha’s mind is his ‘oasis of mystery in the dreary desert of knowledge (18). Yet her 
element is swamp-like, her potency that of the water-nymphette waiting to ensnare the careless, 
innocent on-looker: Latimer fantasises that he creates this vision of an imperious willowy 
beauty from the German lyrics that are just at this moment swimming in his mind - ‘this woman 
… looked like a birth from some cold, sedgy stream, the daughter of an aged river’ (12). His 
first glimpse of her is a virtual one: she is the content of his second prevision, which comes 
upon him with abrupt force while he stares out of his window at the ‘current of the Rhone, just 
where it leaves the dark-blue lake,’ replaced suddenly by the impossible yet undeniable 
presence of his father beside Bertha, standing before him in front of a ‘folding screen.’ The 
folding screen is another iteration of the veil motif, in this instance a partition between his 
conscious and unconscious selves. As soon as his father speaks, the illusion vanishes, leaving 
empty space. Latimer ‘grasp[s] the bell convulsively, like one trying to free himself from 
nightmare,’ (12) desperate for a ‘real’ human presence, for a few utterances ‘of simple waking 
prose’ from his servant Pierre. To shake off the heaviness of the vision, he is careful to note 
that he passes into the next room, as if the movement from one space to another might break 
the hold of the phantasm. These are the rooms of his tormented psyche, and the passage from 
one to the other is a futile shifting of place. The space beyond the contours of his mind has 
evaporated, thus the neat enclosure of one apartment from that adjoining it does not bring the 
desired effect. Latimer seeks solace in the slow ritual of inhaling eau-de-Cologne, taking ‘the 
cork out very neatly, and then rubbing the reviving spirit over my hands and forehead, drawing 
a new delight from the scent’ because it is not the effect ‘of a strange sudden madness’ (12). 
This haptic restorative, however, is only an illusion. Returning to the adjoining salon, still 
luxuriating in the scent, he is confronted with the vision once more: his father, Bertha … the 
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forms are the same, although the details of the second vision are abbreviated; his collapse into 
unconsciousness ends the experience. Firstly, I would suggest that the mind that remains 
‘veiled,’ – from both his self and others -  is Latimer’s, whose subject-hood is premised on an 
inner blindness, as well as rhetorically displaced in his oddly distant narrative voice – a style 
that soothes him (‘clear waking prose’) and observational poise. The displacement or distance 
from the reality of the image is furthered by his position as narrator, the writing ‘I’ 
reconstructing the sensory traces of these two folded-together images; he is our optical device, 
his observing self a reflecting mirror for us, the reader.357 Removed from the immediacy of the 
scene, Latimer’s vision is the stuff of his imaginary, contingent on re-perception – of sights, of 
smell, of auditory detail – making such renewed perceptiveness the only logical narrative trace. 
It is at this level, the level of the perceptive world, that Latimer is made vulnerable, where his 
taut narrative voice concedes frailty, having no effect on the world as it is happening to him. 
Beyond the flow of sensation, where a view of the Rhone unleashes the sequence of visions, 
there is nothing tangible, or empirically true about this scene.  
Lewes theorised in his Problems of Life and Mind (1873) that the operation of vision 
expands to encompass ‘our stored knowledge of sensations of taste, fragrance, resistance, and 
so on’.358 While Latimer purports to stand somehow outside past visual experience, giving an 
analytical recount of what can only be described as a suspension of intellectual being, his 
memory is torn by competing temporal moments, describing only a phantom view of an already 
illusionary perception. The contradictory kaleidoscope of sensations leads only to a kind of 
sensory recursiveness that promises nothing, except text.  
The Lifted Veil insistently recognises a notion of direct perceptual experience, a quasi-
phenomenology. It is through paradoxical formal means, however, as Latimer’s struggle to 
                                                        
357 These comments are influenced by Julien Wolfreys’s phenomenological study of Dickens’s city writing. 
See Dickens’s London: perception, subjectivity, and phenomenological urban multiplicity, 8.   
358 Quoted in Flint, The Visual Imagination, 255.  
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impose order on his inchoate perception is Eliot’s gesture towards an alternative way of 
totalising experience, similar to that described by Merleau-Ponty, in which ‘meaning is not free 
… but bound, a prisoner of all the signs, or details which reveal it to [the subject]’.359 As 
Summer J. Star points out, George Lewes was formulating phenomenological arguments 
decades prior to its formal instigation as philosophy, proposing ‘a fundamental principle of 
relation-perception through a subject’s constant, unthought sensing of bodily orientation: a 
synthesising principle of how we perceive things going together before poising them for 
contemplation.’ It is, she continues, ‘a consciousness fundamentally of the body.’360 Lewes 
often uses the example of abstraction to best explain the difference between artistic and 
scientific methods. The scientist is to ‘discover and systematise the abstract relations of things,’ 
thus ‘allow[ing] the things themselves to drop out of sight’; the poet, however, ‘wishes to 
kindle the emotions by the suggestions of objects themselves and for this purpose he must 
present images of the objects rather than of any single quality.’ The central distinction being 
that ‘the abstraction of the philosopher is meant to keep the object itself, with its perturbing 
suggestions, out of sight, allowing only one quality to fill the field of vision; whereas the 
abstraction of the poet is meant to bring the object itself into more vivid relief, to make it 
visible’.361 Latimer strikes us as the scientist, despite his assertion of Romantic sensitiveness, 
that he has the misfortune of ‘possessing the poet’s sensibility, without his voice’ (7). As I have 
suggested, his mode of abstraction is borne from pain, perhaps as a means of numbing his 
Rousseau-like ‘lyrical consciousness’.362  
                                                        
359 Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception, 71-2.  
360 Star, “Feeling Real,” 843. 
361 George Henry Lewes, The Principles of Success in Literature (Westmead, England: Gregg International 
Publishers, 1969), 26. 
362 Gillian Beer writes that Latimer is ‘anti-scientific…His is essentially a lyrical consciousness.’ While I agree 
with Beer, there is an obvious and problematic disjunction between the early, primal scenes of childhood, 
and his increasing attempts to analyse with the discourse of science his ‘diseased’ mind. His relationship and 
fascination with Meunier is further proof of his attraction to positivist sciences. See Beer, ‘Myth and the 
Single Consciousness: Middlemarch and The Lifted Veil,’ in This Particular Web: Essays on Middlemarch, ed. Ian 
Adam (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 92-3. Latimer is, however, far from the crudely analytical 
Grandcourt in Daniel Deronda, in which the coldly observing male consciousness is taken to its ultimate 
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It is Latimer’s forced neutrality that lends to his voice that quality of mechanical 
observation, and indeed mechanised language characterises some of his reflective moments. 
When describing the beginning and end of a vision, for example, Latimer feels that ‘a stunning 
clang of metal suddenly thrilled through me,’ recalling him to the objects of the room (9); in 
another instance he experiences a ‘sensation of grating metal’ in his mouth (14). This conveys 
something vital about the tropes of nineteenth-century ocular discourse. Nancy Armstrong’s 
work on the nature of the Victorian photographic image points to what was contemporaneously 
understood as the qualitative difference between the eye and the optical devices flooding the 
market: 
  
In comparison with the eye,’ she writes, ‘the modern optical apparatus 
seemed relatively neutral and impervious to such influences [of 
subjectivity], as only a machine could be. What is more, the modern 
camera substituted an image for the object represented, as if to say that 
an observer could learn more and better from the former than from the 
latter. That image visualised persons, places, and things inaccessible to 
the ordinary observer, thus expanding the observer’s visual universe.363 
 
 
Latimer proceeds towards a paradoxical and deleterious mode of seeing. His longing for the 
collectedness of ‘simple waking prose’, that is, his deployment of a language that approximates 
the optical device’s steadiness or veracity, further entrenches the chasm between image and the 
real (whatever that might be) that we find deepening with the unfolding of the tale. It is as if 
                                                        
logical conclusion. Grandcourt’s gaze is ‘like vision in the abstract.’ Eliot, Daniel Deronda, ed. Terence Cave 
(London: Penguin, 1995), 148. 
363 Nancy Armstrong, Fiction in the Age of Photography: The Legacy of British Realism (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard UP, 1999), 77. 
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he places a film over the immediacy of his distressing previsions, in a desire to erect a 
prophylactic screen, or veil, between his eye and ‘I’. If the content of his autobiography is the 
lifting of the veil between self and other, then the narrative mode is an attempt to restore it. We 
have seen that a complicity with darkness is one materialisation of that drive. Does Latimer 
resemble the mechanics of an optical device? Is he a Frankensteinian monster of the new optics 
of the Victorian age?  
To answer this, I want to look at a further example of Latimer’s uncannily reproducible 
visuality, a source of suffering for him, and that is, the matching of vision with ‘real’ image, 
most notably in Latimer’s imagining of an unseen Prague. This is the crucial hinge upon which 
the ‘truth’ of his visual aberration turns. Latimer’s fragile bulwark against the flow of chatter 
of other minds crumbles when Bertha’s consciousness is suddenly and terribly revealed to him 
in a prevision, set in motion by the electricity of her gentle pressing upon his wrist. He is 
transported instantly to a room in his home, a space that contracts with 
  
the hopeless misery pressing on my soul; the light became stronger, for 
Bertha was entering with a candle in her hand – Bertha, my wife – with 
cruel eyes, with green jewels and green leaves on her white ball-dress; 
every hateful thought within her present to me … (19) 
 
Bertha’s mind is likened to a horror-filled source of illumination. ‘She came with her candle 
and stood over me with a bitter smile of contempt,’ he repeats, revealing to him her ‘barren 
soul and mean thoughts’ (19). His future wife (for at this point, Bertha is affianced to Alfred, 
though he is soon to be killed in a riding accident) shrouds him in her pestilent thoughts. By 
illuminating the image with Bertha’s candle, Eliot suggests the sense of enforced seeing typical 
of the narrative, this invading light piercing the membrane of Latimer’s circle of self, Bertha’s 
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green and white dazzle forcing him to constrict his sphere of subjectivity, in the same way that 
the room’s delimitations become starker. The prevision recurs with startling precision, 
throwing him ‘into a tumult of mind’: ‘this hideous vision made me ill … and it recurred 
constantly, with all its minutiae, as if they had been burnt into my memory’ (20). No longer a 
transient experience, the image comes with such force that it sears his mind’s eye, infinitely 
reproducing, the very threat that attended the seeming banality of reproducible image that 
characterised the age. This is grief as ocular pain: ‘[I] winced as inevitably under every offence 
as my eye winced from an intruding mote,’ Latimer says, opining his inability to alter his fate 
even in the face of such damning knowledge of futurity.    
His fate, he reasons, rests on an as-yet un-encountered view: of the real Prague, the city 
which he has never visited, which will prove or not the truth of his visions. If the city is as it 
appeared to him in imagination, then surely, he concludes, his visions are correct. As Latimer 
insists, he ‘had seen no picture of Prague: it lay in my mind as a mere name, with vaguely 
remembered historical associations – ill-defined memories of imperial grandeur.’ His first 
instinct is to hope it is a picture of his newly-liberated creative powers ‘had painted in fiery 
haste, the colours snatched from lazy memory.’ An experiment is duly set, to fix his mind on 
Venice: 
I stimulated my imagination with poetic memories, and strove to feel 
myself present in Venice, as I had felt myself present in Prague. But in 
vain. I was only colouring the Caneletto engravings that hung in my 
old bedroom … the picture was a shifting one, my mind wandering 
uncertainly in search of more vivid images; I could see no accident of 
form or colour without conscious labour after the necessary conditions 
(10-11). 
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Bemoaning this ‘prosaic’ materialisation of the sought-after view, Latimer voices the very 
paradoxes of the mid-century image, the conditions of which amounted to an inhibiting of the 
cultural imagination – the viewer became attuned not simply to see the world as lens-produced, 
but also to see in a uniform mode; the contours of what was seen, the ‘form or colour’ was pre-
empted by what had been seen.364 The likening of Latimer to a lens, or a metallic optical 
instrument, then, is an effect of the text. His mind searches for ‘more vivid images’ like a 
roving camera eye and he demands cleaner, ever more lurid reproductions to substitute the real.   
Views of Prague were a popular subject of microphotographs, inexplicably tiny pictures 
mounted on a glass plate, often resembling a small black dot, but in fact containing 
magnificently detailed, ‘fine-grained reproductions’.365 As yet, Latimer’s visions are merely 
restless signifiers, with no temporal referent: ‘The future, even when brought into the compass 
of feeling by a vision that made me shudder, had still no more than the force of an idea’ (20). 
Arriving in Prague under night skies, the moment of revelation is delayed (‘I was glad of this, 
for it seemed like a deferring of a terribly decisive moment, to be in the city for hours without 
seeing it’ [22]), also allowing Latimer to indulge in the fantasy that Bertha returns his love; for 
if one image finds its correlate in reality, then so too does his envisioning of her hatred for him. 
He maintains ignorance for another half-day, hiding in Prague’s buildings, where, ironically, 
the architectural decay evokes something of his prevision; surrounded by ‘shrunken lights,’ he 
recognises pieces of his pre-imagined Prague. All is confirmed when he reaches the bridge and 
searches to locate ‘a small detail which I remembered with special intensity as part of my 
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vision. There it was – the patch of rainbow light on the pavement transmitted through a lamp 
in the shape of a star’ (23). This is the novella’s climactic picture – the sealing of Latimer’s 
fate, as he understands it – and Eliot chooses as its symbol a bent and refracted light, pushed 
into the shape of a star (an astronomical omen of visual distortion), itself a copy. Latimer 
misapprehends the image, finding in its mediated rainbow glimmer a link of continuity between 
past and present, as if the light-chain held together his notion of being. But this light, like all 
light, is without matter, and thus his revelation, his self-fulfilling prophecy, is substance-less. 
The image is too insubstantial a surface on which to found a sustainable ontology. 
Misinterpreting it in a slippage from self to displaced light-image, he internalises the  
spectral 366.   
 
In Eliot’s dialect of seeing as it is expressed in The Lifted Veil, the trompe l’oeil effect 
of the micrographia (and phantasmagoria) – the black dot that in fact conceals an entire 
universe of colour and things – is at work in Latimer’s mode of perception (and we might even 
stretch this concept to account for his previsionary facility). It is a question of desire, the same 
drive that compels Latimer to locate the most ‘vivid’ image, an appetite for the picture that will 
best partner his need. ‘I have often been humiliated,’ he writes, because his imaginings have 
been ‘disjointed and commonplace,’ mere copies of familiar scenes, ways of seeing that have 
become ‘common’ and banal. But he knows the trick of the eye involved in the seeming 
gratification of visual desire; as he admits in one of his rare moments of insight, ‘our sweet 
illusions are half of them conscious illusions, like effects of colour that we know to be made 
up of tinsel, broken glass, and rags’ (30). Here the whole, when broken down into its constituent 
parts, is revealed as sordid in its transparency, mere detritus.  
                                                        
366 Goethe was fascinated with refracted light, particularly those ‘displacements’ that resulted in refractions 
of colour and devoted a chapter to it in his Theory of Colours. 
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Latimer’s mode of seeing takes on new, dangerous sophistication following the Prague 
visit, changing in substance and visitation. He begins to dream only of decay, and feels himself 
corroding. Any cruel word from Bertha would ‘fall upon [him] like corrosive acid’ (24). He 
has used such figuration throughout, describing the poisonous effects upon him of touch, gaze, 
or more often, words. He mounts in this second section a turn against language, an assault on 
the meagre forms of expressing pain that are at his disposal: ‘The course of life which I have 
indicated in the space of a few sentences filled the space of years. So much misery … may be 
compressed into a sentence!’ He is left to explain via ‘this summary medium,’ of ‘neat syntax’ 
and ‘well-selected predicates,’ which give no nuance of the agonies of despair (34). Railing at 
linguistic obliquity, Latimer articulates his dioramic drama in habitual terms of light and dark; 
but this, too, begins to fail him. Where once his visions put a sliver of space between present 
and past, now they intrude in to his conversations with Bertha. ‘For a moment,’ he writes, ‘the 
shadow of my vision [of Bertha’s hatred of him] passed between me and the radiant girl,’ the 
vision now ‘the object nearest to’ him. A past image is lodged in his eye, as if it were a piece 
of grit, tarnishing what is before his gaze – a slow-forming after-image, creeping, disease-like, 
into his present (26). Latimer deteriorates into a living corpse, propelled downwards by a 
diminution in his visionary capacities, which are now dislodged from any referent, free-
floating, ‘dimmer and fitful’; ‘all that was personal in me seemed to be suffering a gradual 
death’ (35). His imaginings become ‘external,’ alive not to the living but to the ‘inanimate’ -  
sights of ‘strange cities … of gigantic ruins, of midnight skies with strange bright 
constellations,’ and other ‘mighty shapes,’ -  weighted down, he says, by a larger presence: 
scenes of his own imminent death.  
It is Meunier, his childhood-friend, now a well-regarded scientist and doctor, who 
revives Latimer to the ‘passing moment’. Meunier is called upon to minister to the dying needs 
of Mrs Archer, Bertha’s maid, who is locked in a mysterious, and bitter power struggle with 
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her mistress. Mrs Archer, it seems, has been poisoned, dying with a secret of Bertha’s left 
unexpressed, failing in her final, gasping attempts at speech. The deathbed scene marks the 
revolution of the novella’s figuration of eyes, as here it is Mrs Archer’s gaze that is the object 
of greatest terror and crude anxiety. All the horror and violence of the story concentrate in this 
woman’s roving eyes, tracking her victims across the room. The drama of the secret fluctuates 
with her eyelids’ motion: Bertha ‘looked round at the ghastly dying face … when for a moment 
the eyelids were raised again, and it seemed as if the eyes were looking towards Bertha, but 
blankly … [then] the eyelids were lifted no more’ (40). The terms of such ocular haunting, the 
eerie autonomy of Archer’s dying eyes, are the distillation of all the moments of looking, all 
the moments of projection upon which this story has been screened. Fluttering with the 
susurration of lips, the eyelids, ‘lowered so as almost to conceal the large dark eyes,’ make a 
desperate attempt to speak a language, an ocular dialogue of secrecy and deception; the roar of 
the world translated as visual imagery in the account of the narrator’s childhood is here 
reversed, as Archer’s eyes mutely scan the minds of her witnesses, a dumb dialect. After she 
is transfused with Meunier’s blood, revivifying her for a brief and chilling moment, the dead 
woman’s eyes are startled open, meeting Bertha’s ‘in full recognition – the recognition of hate’; 
and, her target sought and found, the words are freed. ‘You mean to poison your husband … 
the poison is in the black cabinet … I got it for you’ (42). The eye is no longer innocent in the 
age of spectacle and ocular deception.367 
Archer’s revivification has inspired critical opprobrium. The sensationalism of the 
event, however, is fitting when considered as the culmination of the violation that has been 
Eliot’s concern throughout; this is simply violation as spectacle, and on a much more visible 
stage. As Latimer describes it, ‘this scene seemed of one texture with the rest of my existence: 
horror was my familiar, and this new revelation was like an old pain recurring with new 
                                                        
367 Benjamin, “Sliding Scales,” 121.  
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circumstances’ (42). The maid’s shocking return to life is ‘of one texture’ with Latimer’s 
experience in material terms, too. In a moment neglected in the criticism, he describes that ‘it 
was my task at first to keep up the artificial respiration in the body after the transfusion had 
been affected’ (41): thus it was Latimer’s breath that restored Mrs Archer’s consciousness. 
Such an exchange of precious substance renders ambiguous the dead woman’s words – by 
whom are they spoken? Latimer’s mouth literally gives oxygen to her hate-filled utterance, 
gives a new, abysmal manifestation of Spinoza’s concept of the affects igniting under the 
pressure of other bodies’ affects, and the sustenance generated from the other (‘The human 
body, to be preserved, requires a great many other bodies, by which it is … regenerated’). The 
transference of breath that dissolves the boundaries of corporeality strengthens Latimer’s 
fantasies of omnipotence. He has controlled others’ speech acts throughout and thus, despite 
its ghastliness, his puppetry of Mrs Archer is unsurprising.  
After the exchange of fluids, the narrative draws swiftly to its end, the vampiric effect 
turned back upon the story’s momentum. Temporal perspectives touch as the narrative time 
meets the story’s present, and the death Latimer foretold at the beginning is now upon him:  
  
It is the 20th of September 1850. I know these figures I have just written, 
as if they were a long familiar inscription. I have seen them on this page 
in my desk unnumbered times, when the scene of my dying struggle 
has opened upon me… 
 
His sentences are contracted, at this critical moment, as if death is merely perfunctory; he is re-
tracing letters already shaped, lending an inevitability to this final horror, which he has 
envisioned ‘continuously,’ ‘beyond’ all other insights (36). In these spare sentences, death is 
figured as a vision of text, an image of inscription, because Eliot has taken Latimer and her 
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reader to the very edge of textual experience and expression, and the final act of dying can be 
only a reflexive one, taking us back to the rehearsal of death with which the story began. It is 
a dizzying spectral chain in which, as Julian Wolfreys points out, the suspension between the 
visible and the invisible becomes the sign of that spectrality.368 This is in fact Latimer’s moment 
of greatest calm, resembling in its rhythm of acceptance an ‘open[ing]’ into transcendence. The 
ellipsis takes Latimer to an unknowable space, certainly beyond the confines of his text. In a 
final coup, he stages a charismatic exit, the opening into an undefined space of non-existence 
setting in motion a haunting of his own story.  
    
Understanding the undulations of specularity in Eliot’s aesthetic as the operations of an 
anguished consciousness, then, reveals a new dimension in considering Latimer’s condition, 
making it rather difficult to dismiss his pain as does Terry Eagleton, for whom the narrator is 
‘just monstrous … an uncouthly virile bourgeoisie’.369 Eliot’s epistemological ambition in The 
Lifted Veil is far more substantial than an ambivalent skewering of the bourgeoisie. We have 
seen that Latimer binds his experience of grief to specularity. Constructing himself exclusively 
from ocular fibres, his body ‘finely organised for pain’ (24), he is trapped in an ever-shifting 
web of transparencies, the same predicament of Gwendolen Harleth, caught in a room of 
reflections that echo only with the chatter emerging from the mind. Gwendolen escapes, and 
so too does Dorothea, and Maggie Tulliver in an absolving death; Latimer’s response, however, 
is to internalise the spectre of other minds and by ‘an irrational instinct, draw the shroud of 
concealment more closely around’ himself, a premature death shroud that suffocates him (38). 
                                                        
368 Julian Wolfreys, Victorian Hauntings: Spectrality, Gothic, the Uncanny and Literature (Hampshire: Palgrave, 
2002), 76. 
369 Eagleton, “Power and Knowledge in ‘The Lifted Veil,’ 55. I do not wish to dismiss in its entirety Eagleton’s 
important argument, but question his view of the narrator-figure. Eagleton’s full quote runs thus: ‘Latimer 
has the abnormality of the Lukáksian ‘typical’, which is never the average: he is a dreadful image of where, 
given a little extrapolation, the whole of bourgeois knowledge could land up. His 
monstrousness…reproduces itself daily in the laboratories.’  Neil Hertz recognises in Latimer the vestiges of 
Eliot’s sage and omniscient narratorial voice, quipping that he ‘does sound rather like the narrator of 
Middlemarch, but often he just sounds like a kvetch.’ Hertz, George Eliot’s Pulse, 43. 
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Stuck at the level of surface, what Eliot describes elsewhere as the choice between reflection 
and feeling,370 he is unable to read the substratum of the world and its objects. In the words of 
Terry Castle, it is ‘the luminous figure of thought itself’, not a supernatural suffering, which is 
in fact the disease most crippling for Eliot’s strange, tormented protagonist.371 Intuiting the 
parallels between Spinoza’s imagistic subjectivity and her contemporary moment’s fixation 
with the eye as a mode of feeling, Eliot writes a nightmare tale of unbounded specular 
projections, which, seeding discursively from her translation of the Ethics, grows into a unique 
exploration of the phantasmal power of loss and the articulation of grief in a world wherein the 
visual and the virtual have permeated ontology.  
Eliot pursues the destructive solipsism that can come from ‘drawing the shroud’ of 
suffering round oneself in the novel that she would begin one year later, in 1860, Romola. Yet, 
unlike Latimer, the heroine of this next novel is able to glean an essential knowledge from the 
nightmarish visions that threaten her world.  
  
                                                        
370 Eliot, Middlemarch, 229. The choice here is Dorothea’s, who was yet to ‘conceive with that distinctness 
which is no longer reflection but feeling – an idea wrought back to the directness of sense, like the solidity of 
objects’.  
371 Castle, “Phantasmagoria,” 61. 
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Speaking Brokenly: George Eliot’s Romola 
 
The light can be a curtain as well as the darkness     
George Eliot372 
 
Seeing is a dangerous act 
- Jean Starobinski373 
 
 
George Eliot’s historical romance Romola (1862-3) has long been considered a novel 
of dead things. An ambitious revivification of Renaissance Florence, brimming with historical 
facts (down to the habit of providing first the Italian and then the English term for items of 
dress and other uniquely Florentine quirks of tongue or ritual), Romola has often been judged 
by Victorian and modern readers alike as a failure of style and story. Much of the derision has 
centred on the eponymous heroine, a Madonna-incarnate, in the words of one critic, ‘a lifeless 
paragon of virtue’, shallow and ‘disengaged’.374 Indeed, some readers have found parts of the 
novel — most notably Romola’s single-handed salvation of a plague-ridden village — as 
ridiculous, an embarrassing misstep in Eliot’s soberly realist project.  
One of her most astute readers, Henry James, insisted that the pulse of the story was 
quashed beneath the weight of scholarship and historicity. ‘A twentieth part of the erudition 
would have sufficed,’ he wrote in The Atlantic Monthly, ‘if there had been more of the breath 
of the Florentine streets, more of the faculty of optical evocation, a greater saturation of the 
senses’.375 James concluded that the author ‘is deficient in imagination,’ that her ‘prosaic’ 
characters exert ‘no demand upon the imagination of the reader’.376  George Levine is more 
                                                        
372 Eliot, Romola, ed. Dorothea Barrett (London: Penguin, 1996). All further references use this edition and 
pagination will be incorporated parenthetically.  
373 Starobinksi, The Living Eye, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1989), 4. 
374 Kucich, Repression in Victorian Fiction, 173.  
375 Quoted in George Levine, ‘‘Romola’ as Fable,’ 78.  
376 Henry James, “The Novels of George Eliot,” Atlantic Monthly 18 (October 1866), in A Century of George Eliot 
Criticism, ed. Haight, 53. The Saturday Review similarly remarked on the shallowness of Florentine life in 
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sympathetic in his reading, but ultimately concurs with James’s assessment, concluding that 
‘the initial and inescapable fact about Romola is that of its failure,’ quoting James’s feeling 
that the novel “does not seem positively to live.”377 R. H Hutton’s review in The Spectator (to 
which Eliot famously replied in defence of her heroine), while largely sensitive to the novel’s 
brilliant scope, issued the same charge of affective lack: ‘[Eliot] has Sir Walter Scott’s art for 
revivifying the past, but not Scott’s dynamical force in making you plunge into it with as 
headlong an interest as into the present.’378  
The same terms of critique thus reappear: atrophied imaginative power; too contrived. 
The inference is that intellectual robustness subtracts from the novel’s emotive force. Yet 
Romola is rich in imaginative feel: it is crucially, however, an imaginative force defined on 
other, perhaps unfamiliar ontological terms. Its plot traces the heroine’s passage from 
passionate naïf through her sexual, political, and psychological maturation. Eliot’s fiction has 
long been interpreted as a conflict between Romanticism and intellectualism, and Romola 
seems to epitomise that aesthetic struggle, guided by the sibyllic tones of an omniscient 
narrator. Yet, as Valerie Dodd points out, this dichotomy is unnecessary and misleading.379 
Contrary to most assessments of this heroine as moulded from passive materials, sexless in her 
saintliness, I suggest that Romola is one of the most affectively intelligent of Eliot’s fictional 
                                                        
Romola, observing that, though the historical detail was seemingly flawless, ‘a lesser hand might have been 
employed to collect these simple treasures’, 21. 
377 Levine, “Romola as Fable,” in Critical Essays on George Eliot, ed. Barbara Hardy (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 
2016), 78.  
378 R. H Hutton, The Spectator, 18 July 1863, in George Eliot and her Readers, eds. John Holmstrom and Laurence 
Lerner (London: The Bodley Head, 1966), 57. Lerner adds that ‘[t]here is a feeling that by setting the story in 
fifteenth-century Florence, George Eliot hung chains round her own powers. Determined to have in this 
book the realistic dialogue, the feel of daily life, that are so powerful in her English stories, she is forced to 
build them up from her reading instead of her memory. The result is a forced spontaneity, an academic 
recreation of what in the other novels is immediate and genuine’ 64. 
Eliot’s letter to Hutton displays her habitual modesty in discussing her work. ‘The psychological causes 
which prompted me to give such details of Florentine life and history as I have given, are precisely the same 
as those which determined me in giving the details of English village life [in her pastoral novels] …. But with 
regard to [Romola’s characterisation] and my whole book, my predominant feeling is – not that I have 
achieved anything, but – that great, great facts have struggled to find a voice through me, and have only been 
able to speak brokenly.’ See Selections from George Eliot’s Letters, ed. Haight, 287-8. 
379 Valerie A. Dodd, George Eliot: An Intellectual Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 2.  
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characters.380 She imagines deeper than any of her counterparts what it might mean to live with 
the endlessness of mourning; further still, she embodies it, expressing through the modality of 
perception a condition of unending loss, and the demands upon the body and psyche that such 
a suffering exacts. Denied the absolution (in narrative terms) of either heterosexual love, or the 
martyrdom of death, Romola, like Lucy Snowe before her, must live with the banal fact of 
grief, a sacrifice that, in the logic of the text, is demanded of her.  
In this chapter I want to draw out the complexity with which Eliot depicts the instability 
of the optical in Romola. In its deployment of versatile visual metaphors, and a structure 
premised on a struggle to conceal, Romola is composed of two major movements: the first half 
a heady saturation of the senses, and the second, in the wake of cataclysmic losses, a rigid 
restraint of the sensory. The tension between the two corrupts “successful” narrative drive, 
culminating in a climax of opposing visual impulses. The project of Victorian empiricism, with 
its drive toward materialist perfectibility becomes, in Romola, a confession of the inherent 
instability of empirical data derived as sense impressions. Observation, the faculty of realist 
narrative, is mired in the deep memory of the body, the body that for Spinoza, ‘forgets 
nothing’.381 This novel allowed Eliot the scope to push to its farthest limit the implications of 
Spinoza’s corporeal imagination; the result is a thrilling portrait of a mind feeling itself at work 
in heightened sensory incarnation. 
     
Romola’s character is inseparable from our sense of her corporeality and her powerful, 
unsettling consciousness. This heroine gives rise to an exploration of expansive, and 
destructive intellectual and emotional capacity, and Eliot draws upon Spinoza in crafting its 
                                                        
380 Dianne F Sadoff’s psychoanalytic reading of Romola, otherwise fascinating in its Freudian insights, too 
hastily casts Romola as a passive heroine, who ‘dedicates herself to self-repression,’ accepting the finality of 
the word of the male-authority figures around her. Sadoff, “Romola: Trauma, Memory and Repression,” in 
George Eliot, ed. K. M. Newton (London: Longman, 1991), 138.  
381 This is Michèle Bertrand’s phrase, quoted in Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present, by Moira 
Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd (London: Routledge, 1999), 23. 
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phenomenological contours. The daily work of translating the Ethics that I described in the 
previous chapter was therapeutic for Eliot, providing ‘a kind of meditation, a support for her 
mind and feeling and a focus for her attention,’ at a time of trauma and isolation.382 Despite its 
personal significance, there remains scant attention given to the novelist’s treatment of 
Spinoza’s theory of the affects, and even less examination of Eliot’s Spinozistic discourse in 
her Italian novel. Gatens is alone in considering Romola at any length through the framework 
of the Dutch philosopher’s work. As she remarks, it is in this novel that ‘Eliot gives clearest 
expression to some major themes in Spinoza’s political and ethical philosophy … offer[ing] us 
a literary portrait of one who comes to possess knowledge of the third kind [Spinoza’s concept 
of intuition] and who comes to achieve blessedness’.383  
Romola does indeed attain a higher condition of self-awareness than any of her fictional 
counterparts. Eliot’s modest judgement, however, that through her pen great ideas were able to 
speak only ‘brokenly,’ is my own point of departure when considering not only the influence 
of Spinoza’s thoughts on grief, but the coalescence of loss and vision in the text. Despite the 
general critical consensus of Romola’s eventual fulfilment and personal maturation, there is an 
undeniable brokenness to the heroine. Like the other novels examined in this thesis, Romola is 
steeped in personal loss, and this condition radiates out beyond her figure to implicate the 
narrative’s spatial, temporal and aesthetic structure. Romola’s maturation is essentially a 
protracted surrender to pain.  
 
We have seen in the preceding chapter the centrality of the mind’s imaging both in 
Eliot’s aesthetic and Spinoza’s theory of the imagination. In The Lifted Veil a phantasmagoric, 
                                                        
382 Elizabeth Deeds Ermath describes the depression that led Eliot to Spinoza’s work, as translator. Having 
eloped with Lewes, Eliot was sacrificed by family and friends to the strictures of social propriety. Translating 
the Ethics was ‘a kind of meditation, a support for her mind and feeling and a focus for her attention’. 
Ermath, George Eliot (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1985), 32.  
383 Gatens, ‘George Eliot’s ‘Incarnation of the Divine’ in Romola and Benedict de Spinoza’s ‘Blessedness’: A 
Double Reading,’ George Eliot – George Henry Lewes Studies, 52-53 (September 2007), 84. 
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haunted perception gave rise to a troubled narrative of regressive repetition and despair: 
Latimer was driven to self-destruction by his inability to regulate and cohere his cognitive and 
sensual drives. In Romola Eliot redeems the senses, granting to them extraordinary palliative 
capacity, but leavens this treatment with a warning of the inevitable threat of delusion.  
 
 
 
I 
Revivification and the archive 
 
  Romola presents a teleology of character garnered from an experiential reality that 
resists conventional temporal sequence. The characters must contend with the indefatigable 
urgency of desires, which are animated by a trans-temporal vitality. Writing of what he reads 
as the novel’s nostalgic project, Nicholas Dames remarks: ‘A particularised recovery of the 
past, the genesis of Romola, becomes in its negotiation through narrative a nostalgic retrospect, 
which eliminates a “useless” past into a present perception and present value’.384 The site of 
the present, however, is not as smooth as Dames’s reading implies; while I agree that the text 
thematises characters’ intellectual impotence in various ways, I am unconvinced that there is a 
corresponding shucking off of the needless past; or, in any case, that this kind of historical 
splicing is enacted with any success. To argue that the novel unfolds by forsaking the particular 
for the symbolic, as Dames does,385 risks missing the problematic dialectic between these two 
                                                        
384 Dames, Amnesiac Selves, 209.  
385 Dames argues impressively for a unique strand of ‘recognition’ at work in Romola, ‘recognition-as-
memory,’ which ‘achieves a washing-out of the past’s specificities …. Recognition does not merely save the 
novel and its inhabitants from antiquarian, particularised, painful, or perilously attractive memories; it also 
opens the novel up to [an] overtly symbolic texture’. Amnesiac Selves, 226. While I am critical of certain 
aspects of his reading, Dames’s interpretation of mnemonic function in Romola opens up exciting 
possibilities for scholarship.  
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terms, one that is never successfully resolved. One of the enigmas of this text is its symbolic 
play, weighting its objects (Tito’s ring, Bardo’s books, Dino’s crucifix) with accretions of 
memory that cling to items of precious value. These objects are not so much nostalgic — placed 
‘in a very general realm of symbolic connotation,’386 — as they are unpalatable reminders of 
the spectral. It is more useful to diagnose a failure of abstraction (the symbol does not function 
effectively as nostalgic prophylactic): it cannot be neutered of its historical threat; the particular 
is simply too potent. There are two oppositional strands to this dynamic: in the character of 
Tito, there is a flight from the painful particular, manifesting in an eschewal of the demands of 
the visible; yet in the figure of Romola, we can recognise a hunger for the specific, the atoms 
of experience that invoke a history of pain to which she is oddly attached. Out of this 
interchange of symbol and detail arises Eliot’s investigation into the process of mourning, as a 
discursively formed visual experience. 
The writing of the novel was an anguished process for Eliot. The text bears the marks 
of its author’s incredible labouring after historical veracity, the trauma of research and infinite 
remembering. ‘Reading Romola,’ Dames observes, ‘we are very quickly taught the value of 
textual transmission … so much so that critics have not hesitated to accuse Eliot of a Casaubon-
like narrowness.’387 That struggle for an impossible fidelity to the past — which as we know 
from Eliot’s letters and journals of the period, entailed a very physical and psychological 
anguish, poring over texts in Florence as her diaries document, walking the streets of the city 
in an effort to imagine as deeply as possible what the conditions of life really were — bears 
obvious and important traces in the portrayal of the heroine’s lived torment, her sheer 
physiological awareness of loss. We watch Romola ‘straining after something invisible,’ (R, 
178) just as her author peered relentlessly back into a past that often seemed to her helplessly 
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distant from her Victorian perspective. David Kurnick astutely remarks on the doubled 
phenomenology of the reading process, our consciousness of Eliot’s excessive reading 
inescapably informing our own labours.388 That doubleness extends to encompass the 
transmission, the inheritance, of writer to reader, of a sense of textual regression: the layers of 
textual history altering the linguistic surface, so the texture becomes one of irreducible depth, 
built on a structure of inaccessibility. No other novel of Eliot’s figures the process of impossible 
scholarship with the concerted intention of Romola. In the novel it is books that are the source 
of the heroine’s greatest anxiety and most pressing grief. The reader of Romola does not feel 
herself in close proximity to the object (the realist device of representation), but looking instead 
at the world through opaque lenses.  
The tremendous effort of casting her mind adrift in an Italian world of 300 years past 
to order the events of the period into a sequence of meaning was the greatest emotional and 
intellectual struggle of Eliot’s career; no book wrung from her so much energy and despair. ‘I 
began it [Romola] as a young woman, — I finished it an old woman,’ she famously reported.389 
Her journals of 1861-2 are punctuated with repetitions of anxiety and depression. Swamped in 
ancient texts, she was almost manic in her hunger to imbibe every written account of Italian 
history that she could, sending Lewes (‘a sort of Italian Jackal’) on almost daily expeditions to 
London bookstores in search of ‘rare books, and vellum bound unreadabilities in all the second-
hand book stalls of London.’ ‘Mrs Lewes is very well,’ Lewes wrote to Blackwood in 1861, 
‘buried in musty old antiquities, which she will have to vivify.’390 Lewes’s choice of verb 
indicates something pertinent, a process of resurrection, with the hint of a pejorative, that other 
readers, such as James, have taken as the most salient feature of Romola. Resurrection is 
                                                        
388 David Kurnick writes ‘one’s reading of the text feels continually haunted by the prior reading that has 
produced it,’ noting that ‘this novel…is perhaps the most laboriously researched of all Victorian historical 
fictions’. Kurnick, ‘Abstraction and the Subject of Novel Reading: Drifting through Romola,’ NOVEL: A Forum 
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389 Quoted in Haight, George Eliot: A Biography, 362. 
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precisely the action of this text, not least in its plot twists: a lost brother restored; a father’s 
hopes revived by the hope of producing one last masterpiece of scholarship; Baldassare’s 
reappearance after his supposed death at the hands of slave-traders; and the heroine’s futile 
quest to resurrect all three of these men, before at last undergoing her own process of 
resurrection. The repeated staging of revivification demonstrates the necessity of it as event, 
so that Eliot’s act of restoring the moribund to life bears a similarity in function to Spinoza’s 
concept of the body’s replenishment: the unending passage of one form opening out into 
another, one desire grafted onto the next, in a monistic vision of subject-hood. The premature 
aging, the corpse-like figurations of the text as needy of the fresh blood of life; such notions 
seem to invoke the Gothic vision of The Lifted Veil. Most interestingly, it characterises the 
text’s diction of mourning and cryptography. Its production involves a communion with 
spectres rather than an oxygenised past; a live burial. Unlike her successful pastoral romances, 
in writing this novel Eliot could not rely on her phenomenal imagination of rural England, yet 
she persisted in her labours to transfer from archival texts the precise textures of Florentine 
life.391 In other words, representation needed to be extracted from the purely representational, 
a turning on its head of the terms of Victorian realism.   
In a self-reflexive gesture, the suffocation of textual burial is a burden shared by Eliot’s 
Florentine heroine. Romola endures an isolated and confined existence, as assistant to her blind 
humanistic scholar father, Bardo di Bardi. Oppressiveness, especially of a textual and dialectic 
kind, is what the novel most powerfully articulates. While Neil Hertz rightly argues that for 
Eliot, ‘representing life … necessarily involved engaging the proto-novelistic: the expressive, 
projective, inscriptive, and representational components of life,’ there is also in Romola a 
conflictual thrill of aversion to textual knowledge and inscription..392 As I will show, this 
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materialises in a flight from the hegemony of a dry hermeneutics to a pre-conscious, pre-verbal 
purity of sensation. Romola’s ‘truth of feeling,’ fleetingly discovered in the climactic chapters 
of her sea-drift towards death and her strange waking in a mysterious village, is at least made 
manifest, given space to emerge; and on grounds other than the books of Bardo’s library. It is 
a phenomenological knowing, an ontology rising out of Romola’s carefully refigured 
imaginative capacity, forged from the matter of mourning.  
 
 
 
II 
Romola and Spinoza’s Ethics 
 
Romola explicitly foregrounds the limits of perception. As I have noted, the model of 
phenomenal consciousness is Spinozistic in its structure, but in its exploration of sensation the 
novel goes beyond any formulation found in the Ethics. In her portrait of Bardo, Eliot writes 
her most explicit treatment of physical blindness. There is also the psychic blindness of the 
novel’s other mistreated father, Baldassare, whose great intellectual capacity is crippled by 
sharply defined sorrow. Any claims to knowledge in Romola are derived from 
phenomenological (re)orientation.   
As Gatens has persuasively shown, Spinoza’s concept of the imagination has largely 
been misconstrued, dismissed as a purely inadequate, dangerous form of engaging with the 
world, a necessary evil that must be passed through on the way to rationality and divine 
intuition. The extent to which Spinoza held our sense-impressions as purely destructive is a 
point of contention amongst scholars. Much of the critical opprobrium against the first kind of 
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knowledge stems from a single claim in the Ethics: that sensations are ‘the only cause of falsity’ 
which pertain ‘to all those ideas which are inadequate and confused’ (E, II, P41).  
 From this proposition Stuart Hampshire provides a portrait of sensory knowledge as 
irredeemable: ‘In so far as we are not engaged in pure thought, our mental life is a succession 
of ideas reflecting the successive modifications of the body in its interaction with other bodies, 
these ideas being logically unrelated to each other. Because such a sequence of ideas is never 
a logical sequence, sense-perception can never yield genuine knowledge’.393 Roger Scruton 
shares a similar view, because, as Spinoza closes the gap between the world as it objectively 
is, and our confused apprehension of it, most of us remain mired in ignorance: ‘a prime example 
of inadequacy [in Spinoza’s sense of the word] is sense-perception. … The ideas of imagination 
are the illogical reflections of processes that are inadequately comprehended.’394 Spinoza was 
emphatic that the affects must be cured and tamed ‘by the mind’s reasoning alone’ (E, 1v, 246), 
but he understood that most, if not all, of a life was lived precisely in the realm of the passions. 
His theory of knowledge rests upon these illogical impressions of things, which as Spinoza 
points out, are not in themselves false: ‘the mind does not err from the fact that it imagines’ 
(words that Eliot underlined in emphasis in her manuscript translation of the Ethics.)395 One 
must strive to understand and discipline the senses, however, pursuing an active rather than 
purely passive engagement with impressions. Romola’s experience suggests that that 
distinction is not so well-defined as Spinoza’s dichotomy suggests.   
The Ethics insists that the mind-body problem is a false schema: there is no such split, 
for the mind can know itself only through the body and vice versa.396 This new model leads 
Spinoza to what I suggest is a phenomenological grounding of intellect: ‘The human body does 
                                                        
393 Hampshire, Spinoza (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1951), 86.  
394 Roger Scruton, Spinoza (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986), 67.  
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P17, 130. 
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not know the human body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except through ideas of 
affections by which the body is affected’ (E, 11. P19, 131). What both Hampshire and Scruton 
imply is that on the road to the freedom of reason and intuition, one somehow leaves behind 
the plight of sensation; instead, the emotional capacity of the body is essential to the formation 
of true ideas, although they are certainly not synonymous.397  
 By bringing together passion and reason, Spinoza grafted the truest experience to forms 
of love. For all his geometrical plotting of emotion, feeling is the stuff of Spinoza’s 
metaphysics. Yet the breach between the world and our fallible notion of it is exploited by 
Eliot, who probes the problematic space between sensation and logic. Eliot’s own translation 
of this part of the Ethics provides the firmest evidence of her interpretation of Spinozistic 
imagination. Her rendering of Spinoza’s explanation of the three tiers of knowledge is less 
abrasive and uncompromising than other translations: she writes, ‘it clearly appears we 
perceive many things and form universal notions: 1. From individual things presented by the 
senses to the intellect in a mutilated, confused, unorderly manner and such perceptions I call 
cognitions from vague experience’. In Eliot’s parsing the next two levels, reason and intuition, 
are both categorised as cognitions, but different in kind: Eliot significantly groups all three 
modes of apprehension as cognitions, using the word ‘unorderly’ to better emphasise the 
vagueness of raw perceptions.398 The implication is that it is in the passage from perception to 
cognition that a breakage occurs, a disorder of images, resulting in a confusion of referents. 
The ‘fault’ then, lies not in the passivity of perception, but in the individual’s failure to cohere 
that quale: a question of matter and form. Her own characters’ struggles to synthesise sensory 
data attest to this, and Eliot’s novel can be thought of as an ekphrasis of the mental pictures 
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that in the Ethics crowd our subjective reality.399 I do not intend to suggest that in Romola we 
see a clear progression from one stage of knowledge to another; on the contrary, I would argue 
that Eliot does not depict any such concise stages available to us. I do wish to argue, however, 
that in her novels it is pain, deep psychic suffering, in which self-forming truths are incarnate. 
The novelist inverts the philosopher’s disciplinary emotions by portraying a character who 
finds truth in a kind of affective surrender (even a passivity), what David Carroll has described 
more broadly as the heroine’s penetration of a new fictional reality.400 Only by giving herself 
entirely to loss, acceding to a new intimacy with dead things, does Romola acquire affective 
intuition, or, what is perhaps better described as a state of sensory grace.    
I want to draw attention to a related strand of imagination, the dialectic of optical 
imagery we find in Spinoza that I pursued in the previous chapter, which gives added pathos 
to the complex interplay of visible and invisible in Romola. If Romola does indeed come at last 
to acquire Spinoza’s apotheosis of knowledge, as Gatens argues, it is crucially only through an 
unabated state of loss: Romola’s ascension to any reliable interpretation of the treacherous 
world in which she finds herself is essentially the consequence of refining her sensory faculty, 
which involves a blunting of her sensations in such a way as to prevent her from drowning 
(literally and metaphorically), a phenomenal sophistication that tragically eludes Maggie 
Tulliver, for example.401 Dorothy Atkins observes that Eliot’s ‘successful’ characters attain 
Spinoza’s ideal of freedom from bondage to the passions, ‘only because they understand the 
source and nature of their emotions’.402 Romola’s success, if we can indeed call it such, is by 
virtue of her acceptance of the limits of what she can see, an acknowledgement of the body’s 
                                                        
399 I am employing here Thomas C. Connolly’s broader definition of ekphrasis, which he argues is the usage 
now most common. Connolly, “Primitive Passions, Blinding Visions: Arthur Rimbaud’s “Mystique” and a 
Tradition of Mystical Ekphrasis,” PMLA 132.1 (2017), 105. 
400 Carroll, Conflict of Interpretations, 2. 
401 Gatens, “George Eliot’s Incarnation of the Divine,” 83. 
402 Atkins, George Eliot and Spinoza (Salzburg: Institut Fur Englische Sprache und Literatur, 1978), 11. Atkins’s 
book is the only monograph on the subject, but, while her work is seminal, she considers Romola only in 
passing.    
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volatile, ‘mutilated’ awareness (in Spinoza’s term), and a leaning upon that ignorance to form 
empathetic community with the other. Having once experienced a purity of sensation, she 
relinquishes its cupola of freedom, choosing instead the bonds of duty and filial memory.   
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III 
Blindness and the mnemonic image 
 
Eliot begins Romola with a ‘Proem’, an imaginative exercise of quasi-mystical 
dimension. It is 1492, and the reader is enjoined to look back from her Victorian moment, out 
over the beauty of Florence, a surrogate for our reading self. Seeing through this ghost’s eyes, 
we traverse the River Arno with its bridges, the outline of San Miniato, the sturdy walls of the 
city that remain unchanged. The images of Florence, too, are the same, the ‘sunlight and 
shadows on the grand walls,’ which retain their beauty. The city Eliot conjures is eternal in its 
imagery, despite the welter of change. The Proem, often ignored altogether in the criticism, 
clearly establishes the terms of Eliot’s experiment of embodiment. First is the expansion of a 
singular vision into the depth of field of a heterogeneous, encompassing perspective, in which 
the reader’s gaze merges with that of the spectral narrator. In animating the ghostly past with 
the pulse of the present, Eliot also signals her interest in the state of the individual’s sensory 
condition, our lives as they are felt through time. Florence is a symbol, its structural integrity 
necessary to the author’s project of telescoping the particular amidst the abstract, the transient 
amidst the eternal. Proto-cinematic visual tracking of the city-space is also a psycho-
geographic exercise, grounding awareness in the specificities of place. Despite her Comtean 
positivist inheritance, Eliot here establishes no less than a metaphysical framework, locating 
the individual in a distinct spatio-temporal sphere, anchoring awareness to finite substance, but 
also to a vision of transcendence. The reader looks through dead eyes. The Spirit yearns to 
match remembered images of life with the view of the city as it is now, beginning the leitmotif 
of imagistic correspondence and dissonance, the ancient partnered with the incipient state of 
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things. The word image appears countless times in this novel, Eliot continually recurring to it 
as a touchstone.  
 The heroine is a beautiful, intellectually precocious young woman, who, after the early 
death of her mother, and the disappearance of her brother, Dino, lives with her father in the Via 
de’ Bardi. As amanuensis to the blind Bardo, Romola spends her days beside him in the villa’s 
library, transcribing for him, reading to him, seeking out whichever books memory yields up 
to him. In consequence ‘she is in a state of girlish simplicity and ignorance concerning the 
world outside her father’s books’ (R, 58). Bearing up patiently beneath Bardo’s testiness, 
Romola must soothe his sense of impotence now that blindness has forced him from active 
scholarship. They live in a state of obsoleteness, with little relation to the city outside the 
decrepit walls of their home. Romola’s duty is to maintain for her father the link of connection 
between the world as he remembers it and as it is: he ‘perpetually seek[s] the assurance that 
the outward fact continued to correspond with the image which lived to the minutest detail in 
his mind’ (R, 49). The library of paternal affection and tyranny (they are almost 
indistinguishable in the text), is the single most important textual space, in which is played out 
a primal scene of light through darkness.403 Here she must be the spatial and temporal 
touchstone for her father, compensating for his sightlessness by mapping the geometry of his 
remembrance through her body’s movements around the room as he directs her to this or that 
book on the shelves (49), the umbilical link between Bardo’s cryptographic correspondences 
and the facticity of the present. It is a dynamic that I pointed to in the final portrait of Jane and 
the blinded Rochester in Jane Eyre, and here retains its psycho-gothic implications.  
Portraying father and daughter bent over their books, Eliot crafts an impression of 
doubleness. Father and daughter are both pale, like every other object in the room, and 
                                                        
403 Isobel Armstrong, ‘‘The Lady of Shalott,’ Optical Elegy,’’ Multimedia Histories, ed. James Lyon, et al., 
(Exeter UP, 2014), 181.   
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perpetually fading into indistinctness. To Bardo’s vacant eyes, his daughter is a refracted 
vision, ‘a glimmering of something bright when she comes near him’ (39), as though she were 
out of focus. Living in a state of etiolated light, all objects are ‘livid with long burial’. Coupled 
through their occupation and their common loss, they form a similar outline: 
The blind father sat with head uplifted and turned a little aside towards 
his daughter, as if her were looking at her. His delicate paleness … 
made all the more perceptible the likeness between his aged features 
and those of the young maiden … There was the same refinement of 
brow and nostril in both, counterbalanced by a full though firm mouth 
and powerful chin, which gave an expression of proud tenacity and 
latent impetuousness: an expression carried out in the backward poise 
of the girl’s head, and the grand line of her neck and shoulders. … The 
question [of character] must be decided by the eyes … But the eyes of 
the father had long been silent, and the eyes of the daughter were bent 
on the Latin pages of Politian (48-9).  
Romola’s physical inheritance is matched by the intergenerational transmission of knowledge, 
but this is of a rigid order. Sightlessness symbolises the mystery of individual consciousness, 
and the darkened library tropes on what Isobel Armstrong describes as ‘the new science of 
seeing,’ referencing Newton’s splitting of light out of the lens; the eye, frequently described in 
Victorian optics as a chamber, is signified by this gloomy space, too.404 Romola is afflicted by 
a type of blindness: her father’s voided eyes are equal to her learned myopia, seeing only what 
he has conditioned her to see. The pair exist in a sphere of mutual anticipation of need (just as 
Brontë’s Jane and Rochester become a single perceptive body), albeit one that is inequitable, 
                                                        
404 Armstrong, ‘Optical Elegy,’ 181-2. 
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as Bardo is the more dominant corporeal presence, Romola the imitation.405 As copy, Romola 
is repeatedly sketched as mere form and outline: she walks ‘with the queenly step which was 
the simple action of her tall, finely-wrought frame, without the slightest conscious adjustment 
of herself’ (49). Fluid as her drapery, her ignorance of her body is a part of her function, for 
she is no more than shell, her perspective shaped entirely by her role as daughter and 
replacement son. Romola must strain to be her father’s perceptive translator, in the process 
nullifying her own sensory individuation. Yet Eliot’s narrator makes clear the unnatural burden 
of deprivation: while she may look like a vision of immovable, brilliant marble, ‘the most 
penetrating observer would hardly have divined that this proud pale face, at the slightest touch 
on the fibres of affection or pity, could become passionate with tenderness’ (58). In her 
obsessive veiling, Romola signals her father’s blindness, inheriting his non-recognition of her 
as a refusal to admit subjective projection. This self-abnegation is amplified by the fact that 
she exists only as a dulled, historical image in her father’s imagination: ‘it seems to me I discern 
some radiance from thee,’ he cries. ‘Ah! I know how all else looks in this room, but thy form 
I only guess at. Thou art no longer the little woman six years old, that faded for me into 
darkness’  (55). Withno one to reflect her body, she reneges possession of her image. Bardo 
tries to read his daughter through touch, discerning her height and figure, but evincing little 
interest in her thoughts. Romola’s weak glow is a “light to the [blind] mind” which he translates 
into an anachronistic text of memory, reading her form selfishly in an effort to see the past he 
has lost.  
Swiftly interpreting her father’s memories into movement, Romola’s gestures are like 
braille, but the objects under her fingers speak only of abeyance: ‘clasping her fingers tightly 
she looked with a sad dreariness in her young face at the lifeless objects around her – the 
                                                        
405 Bardo is highly sensitive to Romola’s presence, as suits their doubling function; he is ‘usually susceptible 
to Romola’s movements and eager to trace them’. Although he forgets her presence altogether in reminiscing 
about Dino, ‘too entirely preoccupied by the pain of rankling memories to notice her departure from his side’ 
(52).  
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parchment backs, the unchanging mutilated marble, the bits of obsolete bronze and clay’ 
(52).406 Made painfully aware of her unsuitability to her father’s purposes, she is a victim of 
his intractable grief: as she kneels to comfort him, Bardo’s hand, ‘with its massive prophylactic 
rings, [fell] a little too heavily on the delicate blue-veined back of the girl’s right [hand], so she 
bit her lip to prevent herself from starting’ (53). The resonance of masochism is unmistakable.  
 Romola is a study in haptics: the touch of fingers upon the page (with echoes of Eliot’s 
own hands searching ancient texts), Romola’s heightened sensitivity to textures, the 
synonymity of touch and visual perception, and hands glittering with rings, the novel’s most 
significant symbol. The discretion between tactile and specular loses distinction as each 
character grapples with the impairment of one or more of the senses, compensating by the 
creation of a new sensory combination. The result is a plurality of sense-perception, 
undetermined by traditional categories, functioning as a radar of self-governance. Sensory 
filtering and organisation become existential, a primary mode of survival.  
This is made poignant in the entrance of Tito to the Via de’ Bardi, a set-piece of 
complex tactile-visual associations. Introduced to his new amanuensis, the old man yearns to 
touch Tito’s hand: ‘Bardo had stretched out his aged white hand, and Tito immediately placed 
his dark but delicate and supple fingers within it. Bardo’s cramped fingers closed over them, 
and he held them there for a few minutes in silence.’ He progresses to Tito’s face and hair, 
sparking a visual exchange of entreaty between the young man and woman: 
 ‘Bardo passed his hand again and again over the long curls and grasped 
them a little, as if their spiral resistance made his inward vision clearer; 
then he passed his hand over the brow and cheek, tracing the profile 
                                                        
406 Brail books first appeared in England in the 1820s, making their way from the Continent, in the hope that 
blind readers would now be able to access the same forms of learning – books, periodicals, sermons – as 
sighted people. For a brief but fascinating introduction to the subject, see Vanessa Warne, “Blindness and 
Design: Kneass’ Philadelphia Magazine for the Blind (1899),” Cahiers victoriens et édourdiens 84 (Autumn, 2016): 1-
11.  
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with the edge of his palm and fourth finger... “He must be very unlike 
thy brother, Romola: and it is the better. You see no visions, I trust, my 
friend?’ (71-2).  
The scene references that earlier, violent moment of touch between father and daughter, and 
here, it is physical difference that Bardo seeks. With hands that remember the painful memory 
of his son, he traces an outline that both breaks with and preserves his pain, joining the young 
incipient lovers together under the aegis of his suffering. It is an encounter of tragic irony: Tito 
will betray both Romola and Bardo with a callousness that Dino never possessed. Lost in 
ancient grief, Bardo’s touch misinterprets one body for another, a faulty transmission of the 
past as present. It is a deceptive braille of the flesh, too, for Tito’s greatest skill (accounting for 
much of his charm) is his illegibility: his face is repeatedly described as uniformly smooth and 
pleasant. It is a non-signifying, endlessly malleable face that, as Piero di Cosimo exults, is ripe 
for the painter’s brush (42). Meechal Hoffman argues that in Romola Eliot shifted the stakes 
of her psychological portraiture, concentrating attention on those moments when the other 
remains unknowable.407 This is one such moment in a series of instances of resistance that mark 
Tito’s evil, belying any clear pursuit of materialist truth.  
 Bardo admits that ‘even when I could see, it was with the great dead that I lived; while 
the living often seemed to me mere spectres – shadows dispossessed of true feeling and 
intelligence’ (51). Bardo’s language insistently links sight and pain, whereby the terms of the 
seen are distorted: the living is ghostly, while the dead are potently visible. His learning is his 
one consolation, his one link to the sightedness he has lost. And Eliot foregrounds a different 
model of the acquisition of learning, through Bardo’s touch (relayed first through Romola’s 
fingers). Like Tito’s adopted father, Baldassare, Bardo clings to his intellectual earnings, as a 
                                                        
407 Meechal Hoffman, “Her soul cried out for some explanation”: Knowledge and Acknowledgment in 
George Eliot’s Romola, ‘George Eliot-George Henry Lewes Studies, vol. 68.1 (2016), 45. 
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buttress against the vertigo of his blindness (51). He is Orpheus, fatefully and irrevocably 
looking back and unable to direct his gaze to the future: ‘for blindness acts like a dam, sending 
the streams of thought backward along the already-travelled channels and hindering the course 
onward’ (52).  
This is a curious interweaving — the irresolvable connection of physical sight, and a 
consciousness of the spectrum of memories and time. Spinoza accounts for this indelible 
association of ideas in the imagination, whereby the image memory invokes is static and a-
temporal, leading one inexorably along the chain of memories that gather round the body’s 
remembered affect: ‘in this way,’ he writes, ‘each of us will pass from one thought to another, 
as each one’s association has ordered the images of things in the body.’408 Bardo’s blind gaze 
is forever directed inwards and to the past. The causal chain of imagery is complicated by his 
visual deficit: with no new images to supplant the line of his plangent mnemonic trajectory, it 
retains its original, now tautological order.409 His head poised ever upwards ‘gave the idea that 
behind the curtain of his blindness he saw some imaginary’ figure, a gesture of searching and 
‘straining for the invisible’. His body manifests the missing object, his loss of sight a signifier 
of his mourning. It is evocative of Eliot’s plagued writing process, her struggle to create a vivid 
sensory life out of the archive. The scholar’s portrait begins to look rather like Eliot’s self-
conscious wrestling with the realist form itself, an allusion to the inherent failures of writing 
the world as it truly is (or was). The dissatisfactions in Romola suggest that, as George Levine 
writes, Eliot ‘understood the limits of a naïve representationalism and the carceral implications 
                                                        
408 Spinoza furnishes this proposition with the well-known example of a soldier who spies some horse-hoof 
prints in the sand and thus ‘will immediately pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, 
and from that to the thought of war, and so on’. Ethics, II. P18, 131.  
409 Hume makes some interesting remarks on blindness in passing, in an attempt to refute the objection to his 
precedence of the senses in the order of thought. ‘If it happens, from a defect of the organ, that a man is not 
susceptible of any species of sensation, we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent 
idea. A blind man can form no notion of colours…[but] restore…that sense in which he is deficient by 
opening this new inlet for the ideas, and he finds no difficulty in conceiving these objects.’ An idea, he 
continues, ‘can have access to the mind’ only ‘by the actual feeling and sensation’. Bardo would seem to fall 
in his category of exceptions to this rule, however, being a blind man whose approximation of sight is 
uncanny. Inquiry, 28.   
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of her narratives.’ Her Italian novel was the first, continues Levine, ‘to face directly, in its form 
and subject, the crisis of realism.’410 Levine’s notion of the carceral nicely captures the novel’s 
multi-faceted figuring of entrapment and resistance, of escape and return.  
  
                                                        
410 Levine, ‘Introduction: George Eliot and the art of realism,’ in The Cambridge Companion to George Eliot, ed. 
Levine (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001), 9-10.  
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IV 
In sympathetic vertigo 
 
The portrait of the city that emerges from Eliot’s prose is not realised in pictorial 
affinity. Its architecture is instead structured entirely by her characters’ perceptions. Florence 
is felt rather than objectively drawn, all details assimilated into subjective experience. This 
sensory aesthetic establishes the terms of embodiment that Eliot is interested in exploring, re-
shaping the chaotic urban space as lived experience. Florence is habitually painted in festival 
costume, so that we rarely see the sky above a city that seems to be in perpetual party mood. 
The colours of San Giovanni’s festa, for example, are lurid, blue draperies hanging from every 
window, ‘providing another tent than the sky’ in a trompe l’oeil effect. Every available wall is 
‘covered, at the height of forty feet or more’ with ‘this superincumbent blue’.411 The panorama 
of city-life conspires in a specular tumult of sensory chaos, the collision of colours, sounds, 
masked faces, and costumes, while identities are chameleonic and unstable. The impression is 
one of artificiality, a virtual space of screens and reflected light, turned upon the crowd as 
intoxicating colour. Tito, ‘bright in the midst of brightness,’ is high above the festival lined 
passageways, commanding a broad view from the window, his body positioned both in and 
outside. He is thus ambiguously placed, as is the character of the city-space, wherein ‘private 
and public spaces run into one another’.412 The dissolution of intrinsic and extrinsic subjective 
space involves the merging of the interior and exterior in the physical realm too.  
                                                        
411 In chapter 22 we find the same description of the Piazza del Duomo, ‘covered in its holiday sky of blue 
drapery,’ with colourful banners on display’, marking out a distinct juxtaposition of light where ‘the artificial 
rainbow light of the piazza ceased, and the grey morning fell on the sombre stone’ 213.  
412 This is Shona Elizabeth Simpson’s description of Eliot’s Florence. Simpson, “Mapping Romola: Physical 
Space, Women’s Place,” in From Author to Text: Re-reading George Eliot’s Romola, ed. Caroline Levine and Mark 
W. Turner (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 58.  
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The new optics of mid-century saw colour as another reflective surface, as unstable as 
glass.413 In this scene, Eliot plays with two of the primary colours of the spectrum of light — 
red and blue — manipulating the riot of colour into a disorder of the psyche. This draws us 
back to Goethe’s colour theory and his hypotheses of the eye’s sensitivity to movement. In 
Goethe’s formulation, colour is a trick of the eye: ‘If we transmit a luminous image through 
concave glasses, it is dilated,’ he writes, ‘the image appears edged with blue’, a description that 
captures the homology of eye and colour distortion; both dilate in accordance with light.414  
Piero di Cosimo, often the mouthpiece of wisdom in the novel, lies ‘in wait for the secrets of 
colour that [are] sometimes to be caught from the floating banners and the chance groupings 
of the multitude,’ watching ‘the endless play of light and shadow’ (85). That endlessness of 
immaterial hues is haunting for Tito, who is sickened by ‘those whirling towers, which would 
soon make me fall from the window in sympathetic vertigo.’ The ‘towers,’ giant circles of 
hollow wood, are painted with ‘successive circles … the hollowness having the further 
advantage that men could stand inside these hyperbolic tapers and whirl them continually, so 
as to produce a phantasmagoric effect, which, when considering the towers were numerous, 
must have been calculated to produce dizzinesss on a truly magnificent scale.’ The ‘hollow’ 
and ‘hyperbolic’ circles recall Brontë’s carnival phantasmagoria during Lucy Snowe’s drugged 
night-walk, and here the effect is similarly sinister in its expression of consciousness. The 
towers are a medieval ‘philosophical toy,’ punning on the Victorian thaumotrope and its class 
of optical entertainments. Wheatstone’s stereoscope, ‘the most significant form of visual 
imagery in the nineteenth century,’ introduced depth to the viewer,415 a hypnotic depthless-ness 
in fact. Tito’s ‘sympathetic vertigo’ pairs him figuratively with the men spinning their hollow 
devices, as though the visual stimulus merges incontestably with the observer’s experience, in 
                                                        
413 Armstrong, ‘Optical Elegy,’ 184.  
414 Goethe, Theory of Colours, 130-1. 
415 Crary, Techniques of the Observer, 116 and 119.  
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a stereoscopic perspective. The binocular parallax of the stereoscopic view is inverted, though, 
pushed back upon Tito as a delusional scene, as the image he observes resists unity. Like 
Newton’s reflexible rays of light, which are turned back upon themselves by the medium upon 
which they fall,416 the surface of the world operates as a repressive subjective field for Tito, 
giving back to him what he yearns to evade.  Tito’s optical sensitivity is proof, Bonaparte 
writes, of his inability to live on any other level than the purely empirical, or as Spinoza might 
describe it, his sinking deeper into the immersive illusions of the imagination.417 In this 
transposition of surface and subject, Eliot signals her interest in retinal disorder and its psychic 
implications, plotting an uneasy synthesis of the optical and affective planes.418  
The circle is the most significant form in the novel, most notably in its appearance as 
rings worn and exchanged, but also in more abstract appearances. The roundness in the festival 
scene is repeatedly recreated, and Tito, the character whose very fate in the novel will prove to 
be horrifyingly circular, whose wearing and then selling of Baldassare’s ring motivate the plot 
proper, is particularly conscious of it as form. Contrived mercurial optics and vertigo betray a 
weakness in him, the first sign of a flaw in his visible world, frustrating his desire to control 
his perspectival frame. The immateriality of colour and form make him feel his alien quality 
(he is uncomfortable about his Greek heritage), and the ungovernable patterns reveal his eye’s 
vulnerability. Something at the margins of vision threatens — the threat of Baldassare’s return, 
whom Tito wishes dead. Baldassare’s figure comes to haunt at the corners of every frame as 
he stalks his son through the streets, the malevolent, yet abstract visual frisson of the festa 
resolving into the older man’s form. Tito has ‘an unconquerable aversion to anything 
unpleasant,’ and Baldassare’s suffering, of which he is keenly aware, is one such distasteful 
                                                        
416 Isaac Newton, Opticks (Canada: Dover, 1952), 3. 
417 Bonaparte, The Triptych and the Cross, 50. 
418 The experience of viewing the stereoscopic image, composed of two separate images, one for each eye, is 
disturbing, yet seductive, and my own impression is of an utterly immersive vision. Isobel Armstrong 
describes the three-dimensional picture as having a ‘preternatural solidity … we see in, round, beyond and 
almost behind stereoscopic images’. See ‘Optical Elegy,’ 186.  
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association. In his anxiety, Tito spies Tessa, recognising ‘the sweet round blue-eyed face under 
a white hood — immediately lost in the narrow border of heads, where there was a continual 
eclipse of round’ features (92). Tessa’s desirability consists in her quality of roundness, which 
is repeatedly invoked at her every appearance, another figure of the circle pattern that shapes 
Tito’s fate.  
Each object in the parade is displaced by another. Spinoza claims that visual 
impressions act on the mind, forcing the body into a passive condition, in which delusive 
passions gain precedence. The arbitrary composition of images is the cause of our inadequate 
and confused ideas, leading us to fall victim to illusions: ‘The human body, being limited, is 
capable of forming distinctly only a certain number of images at the same time. If that number 
is exceeded, the images will begin to be confused, and if the number of images the body is 
capable of forming distinctly in itself at once is greatly exceeded, they will all be completely 
confused with one another’ (E, II, P40, 140). Tito is unable to order the panoply of objects his 
eye takes in, so that he groups them into one fateful idea: fear, his governing emotion. Tessa’s 
round loveliness is ‘eclipsed’ by another, more searing impression, the face of a monk peering 
up at Tito from the crowd and ‘fixing on him a gaze that seemed to have more meaning in it 
than the ordinary passing observation of a stranger …. there was a faint suggestion in it’ (86). 
Once within the mass of people, Tito is assaulted by the recurring image of the friar, ‘whose 
face had some irrecoverable association for him: Why should a sickly fanatic, worn with 
fasting, have looked at him in particular … Folly! Such vague memories hang about the mind 
like cobwebs … best to sweep them away at a dash’ (94). The friar is in fact Romola’s lost 
brother, now dying, a man whom Tito has never seen, but whose resemblance to his sister 
sparks an unconscious recognition. The fleetingly spectral image thus stands in for plot nodes, 
so that the story gathers a nebulous atmosphere, the portrayal of the concrete dogged by an 
apparitional volatility.     
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The pressures wrought upon Tito’s senses, his ‘oblique view’ of things (150) and the 
physical, spatial, temporal energies that dog him, force him, albeit incompletely, to 
acknowledge painful sensations. Eliot displays keen awareness of how incendiary sensations 
function as a vice upon Tito, exerting pressure with each new twist of deceit: ‘He must feel the 
smart and the bruise in spite of himself’ (150). Illicitly ‘married’ to Tessa, he is relieved by her 
of the pressures of identity, a man without ‘detail’. Tessa sees his face as an emblem of 
abstracted goodness, ‘he [is] simply a voice and a face to her, something come from paradise,’ 
not a particular man, with a particular history. Accustomed to harshness, Tessa could be said 
to give birth to Tito as a remedy for her intense aloneness, an ‘imaginary companion … born 
of her own lovingness’ (107).   
As his returned father tracks his every movement through Florence with the tenacity of 
a starved hunter Tito feels himself prey in the city streets, his paranoia expressed in his visceral 
spatial alertness. He attempts to narrow his gaze to eliminate the shadows of that threatening 
figure, but ‘[o]ur eyes are so constructed … that they take in a wide angle without asking any 
leave of our will’ (194). This portrait is in stark contrast to the sleek youth who first entered 
Florence, with his untarnished ‘well-opened eyelid with its unwearied breadth of gaze … 
perfectly pellucid lenses [and] undimmed dark of a rich brown iris’ (102). As Starobinski 
writes, ‘sight opens all space to desire, but desire is not satisfied with seeing. … The gaze, 
which enables consciousness to escape from the place occupied by the body, is an excess in the 
strict sense of the word. … To feel and to see are often the same thing.’419 Although Tito has 
‘refused to see more than the shadow of’ his guilt, the ‘inward image’ he would suppress 
emerges all the more violently as his lines of vision begin to lose their singular track, giving 
admittance to the ugly facts of his hidden life (96-7). In the days after encountering Baldassare 
on the steps of the Duomo — a recreation of a primal scene, as the father grabs his son, and 
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Tito is aghast with horror at the sight of the other man’s face — his path through the streets is 
notably encumbered: he lurks, losing all the arrogance of his former posture. While Baldassare 
‘wants putting into a cage,’ (222) it is his son who is prisoner. Tito’s city begins to grow 
strange, alien in its temporality, its indifferent vacancies filled now with renewed images of 
intimate fears:  
It was not a long walk, but, for Tito, it was stretched out like the 
minutes of our morning dreams: the short spaces of street and piazza 
held memories, and previsions, and torturing fears, that might have 
made the history of months. He felt as if a serpent had begun to coil 
round his limbs. Baldassare living, and in Florence, was a living 
revenge, which would no more rest than a winding serpent would rest 
until it had crushed its prey (222)  
Once again, we can see the phantasmal narrative, a ‘history’ of shadowy frames, taking up a 
nightmarish correspondence with the primary plot events, one story-line haunting the other, 
just as one face over-writes and eclipses the first. That imbrication is a manifestation of the 
antagonistic dynamic that structures Eliot’s exploration of optics. Tito’s negation of the visual 
signs of his crime, his wilful blindness to his other textual plot, acquires a murderous force, the 
‘memories and previsions’ threatening to extinguish his very life. As he becomes more 
solipsistically sighted, the city space constricts in metaphors of strangulation. Tito’s senses lose 
their shielding quality (Romola always feels that her husband ‘had the power of seeing 
everything without seeming to see it’ [383]), and his world implodes. His navigation of space 
is suddenly compromised, as the city he has confidently wandered, repeatedly naming the 
streets he walks each day with careful control, denies his freedom of linear movement. 
Moments after deciding to sell his father’s ring — the greatest symbol of his betrayal — he 
finds himself ‘pushed towards the middle of the piazza and back again, without the power of 
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determining his own course. In this zigzag way he was carried along to the end of the piazza,’ 
pushed into ‘a deep recess formed by an irregularity in the line of houses’ (141). From this 
imprisoning pocket he is forced to look up to gather his bearings, but ‘the dim waving lanterns 
[left] all objects indistinct except when they were seen close under the fitfully moving lights’ 
(141). All elements conspire to enforce the fatality of Tito’s choices, the creeping myopia of 
his perceptions aggravated by his eschewal of duty to his father and his wives. After denying 
Baldassare on the steps of the Duomo, every facet of Tito’s perception communicates fear, a 
sensation so palpable that he understands it as a ‘blighting disease’, a ‘pain’ that lacerates body 
and mind (223). Tito has ‘a face that expresses fear well,’ a point brought into focus by Piero 
di Cosimo’s portrait: ‘[Tito] saw himself … with his face turned away … and an expression of 
such intense fear in the dilated eyes and pallid lips, that he felt a cold stream through his veins, 
as if he were being thrown into sympathy with his imaged self’ (186). That doppelgänger is a 
mise-en-abyme, the effect of which is to heighten almost to exactness the two images — the 
man and the painted image, for, in beholding it, Tito’s face begins to visibly merge with his 
portrait. The spectre of his past, the symbol of aggressive mourning that Baldassare represents, 
is continually pressed upon Tito’s perception. ‘Tito had begun to dislike recognition, which 
was a claim from the past’ (140); likeness is rendered an importunate visual threat. Tito is the 
novel’s blind spot: for Dino he is a man effaced, for the Florentines of his circle, he is slickly 
beautiful, all surface, and he dies an enigma.  
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V 
 
The unreturned gaze 
 
Baldassare has returned to seek his beloved adopted son, the ‘helpless child’ whom he 
fostered, and his grief is revealed to have a long gestation in unrequited love:  
‘I was a loving fool … I watched [Tito] … to see if he would care for 
me over and above the good he got from me. I would have torn open 
my breast to warm him with my life-blood if I could only have seen 
him care a little for the pain of my wound … Fool! … And yet I 
watched till I believed I saw what I watched for. When he was a child 
he lifted soft eyes towards me, and held my hand willingly: I thought, 
this boy will surely love me a little: because I give my life to him and 
strive that he shall know no sorrow, he will care a little when I am 
thirsty – the drop he lays on my parched lips will be a joy to him … 
Curses on him! … It is all a lie – this world is a lie’ (270).  
The terms of Baldassare’s rage are structured by an optically transactional drive, a visual deficit 
of love to recompense his own surfeit of affection. Verbs of sight work here to fuel the violence 
of his grief, which ironically has its source in a failed visual reciprocity: Tito would not see the 
father’s pain. His anguish is provoked by his sense of Tito’s disaffection, for his son has failed 
to deliver on the implicit promise of sacrificial devotion that Baldassare’s solicitude demands. 
He figures his psychic wounds in biblical proportions, in which love is ‘crushed out’ of life, 
extracted with all the violence of rage. The tender supplication of the child’s gaze, which held 
a promise for Baldassare of his son’s continued recognition of love, is now, in the light of 
Tito’s disavowal, conflated with the son’s blind gaze of indifference. The terms of this optical 
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mourning are strikingly similar to that of Latimer’s vanished maternal gaze in The Lifted Veil. 
A whole history of grief is thus brought together in two contrary actions of vision.  
The image of his loss springs from a failed visual encounter: Tito’s gaze has not only 
looked upon him without that requisite love, but with a feigned unrecognition. On the steps of 
the church, Tito repudiates his father’s gaze, rejecting the parent’s claim upon him. Baldassare, 
then, must look elsewhere for the gaze of a loving other, and he finds it in the tragedy of his 
own mourning image. In a pool of water that he hopes might be a ‘mirror for him,’ he wishes 
to ‘contemplate himself slowly,’ to ‘look earnestly at the image of himself,’ and detect any 
traces of imbecility that might explain his son’s rejection. The arbitrary amnesia from which 
he suffers, ravaging his intellectual abilities and much of his memory, has given to his 
appearance ‘a blank confusion … as of a man suddenly smitten with blindness.’ The terms of 
his affliction are deep indeed, for it is impossible to distinguish between his ontological loss 
— his identity wasted, his mind ‘stunned and bewildered’ by a non-recognition of self — and 
his sense of betrayal. He wants only to ‘meet with eyes that will remember me,’ to know that 
‘I am not alone in the world.’ His reflection in the pool, the unrecognisable, sorrowing man, 
merges with ‘that self from which his revenge seemed to be a thing apart; and he felt as if the 
image too heard the silent language of his thought’ (270), the image giving a dualistic identity 
that is then abstracted. His ‘primary need and hope’ is to ‘see a slow revenge,’ which must 
unfold ‘under the same sky … where he himself had been forsaken.’ His self-reference 
becomes impersonal: he is solely ‘an undying hate,’ a despised body merely, ‘which was to be 
the instrument of a sublime vengeance’ upon Tito. The imagistic sequence of uniting one 
abstract image of self to another creates a substitute personhood, emptied out of all substance 
other than overriding pain. Premised on another’s destruction, de-personalised in the extreme, 
Baldassare’s virtual selfhood is vapidly unaware of anything but the exigencies of the body’s 
needs. He becomes the image of his hate, given back to him in the water’s visionless gaze.  
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Intriguingly, Baldassare’s vengeance gathers to its purpose his own parental 
resentment, in this case a maternal sundering. His mother’s lost affection is symbolised by an 
amulet, given to him as a child. ‘He might long ago have thrown it away as a relic of his dead 
mother’s superstition; but he had thought of it as a relic of her love, and had kept it’ (271). 
Now, though, his urge to destroy his son occupies the place where affection once was — ‘all 
piety was transmuted into a just revenge’. That transmutation will be literally enacted, again in 
the terms of economy: ‘He bit and tore [it],’ until the little bag is emptied of its prize, a jewel 
worth the price of a dagger, ripe for pawning. A maternal love becomes a paternal hatred, 
familial inheritance reduced to objects of monetary value. Yet the gravitational morality of 
George Eliot’s fictional universe blunts Baldassare’s dagger at the moment of attempted 
murder, just as Tito’s profiting from the selling of his father’s ring instigates his own downfall. 
It is clear that all suffering is not alike in Romola, for Romola’s paternal bonds, symbolised in 
Bardo’s vast library, are sold off without her knowledge, and this marks the crucial difference 
between the contrasted family couples. Romola’s love does not inhere solely in those books, 
despite her father’s insistence that her homage must be an intellectual one, forged in the 
language of the relic. Relics are de-sacralised throughout the novel, most spectacularly in 
Savanarola’s ‘bonfire of the vanities.’420   
Simone Weil’s distinction between suffering and affliction is useful in understanding 
the various experiences of loss Eliot explores in the novel. ‘In the realm of suffering, affliction 
is something unique, specific and irreducible. It is quite a different thing from simple suffering. 
It takes possession of the soul and marks it … with its own particular mark, the mark of 
slavery’. For Weil, loss is an experience of God, a mechanism that blinds the sufferer, 
                                                        
420 There is much more to be said on the fate of the object as relic in Romola, and if here I have hazarded a 
rather sweeping designation of certain artifacts, it is simply that the focus of my discussion here does not 
allow for space to pursue this further.   
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presenting her with a choice of the image or the void, ‘to keep their eyes turned towards God 
through all the shocks,’ or to look away:  
It is not that God’s providence is absent, it is by his Providence that 
God willed necessity as a blind mechanism. If the mechanism were not 
blind there would not be any affliction. Affliction is above all 
anonymous; it deprives its victims of their personality and turns them 
into things. It is indifferent, and it is the chill of this indifference – a 
metallic chill – which freezes all those it touches, down to the depth of 
their soul. They will never find warmth again. They will never again 
believe that they are anyone. 
Weil continues in a dialect of submerged light: ‘Affliction causes God to be absent for a time, 
more absent than a dead man, more absent than light in the utter darkness of a cell … During 
this absence there is nothing to love. What is terrible is that if, in this darkness where there is 
nothing to love, the soul ceases to love … The soul has to go on loving in the void, or at least 
to go on wanting to love’. This description reads uncannily like the conditions of Baldassare’s 
anguish, symptomatic of affliction, rather than suffering (in Weil’s binary formulation). The 
darkness recalls Milton’s blindness, yet Milton affirms the creative act despite, or even because 
of his suffering, while Baldassare rejects all possibility of love, or, following Weil’s 
description, his soul refuses to go on loving in the silence of affliction. What prevents Romola 
from falling into murderous affliction? While I will return to Romola’s case in detail, for now 
it is sufficient to place her in Weil’s category of the sufferer who is prepared to endure 
mourning, where Baldassare is representative of those ‘plunged into affliction before they are 
ready to receive it,’ who become ‘killers of souls’.421 To ‘accept the existence of affliction as a 
distance,’ claims Weil, is to survive it; those who listen for God’s voice, which is a vibration 
                                                        
421 Simone Weil, On Science, Necessity and the Love of God (London: Oxford UP, 1968), 170-3.  
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of silence, and marry that note to a capacity to love, can avoid the self-hatred of the deepest 
mourning.422 It is only Romola who gives herself up to the silent voice of the world. I do not 
here wish to fold Eliot’s complex explication of psychic agony into Weil’s dualistic structure 
(the elision of general suffering as immaterial is just one problem to note in passing), but to 
point out a resonance in their respective gestures towards a kind of submissive mourning, 
which resides in non-resistance, in the subduing of the ego’s vanities. For both thinkers, a state 
of grace is engendered out of an acceptance of distance, although Eliot’s heroines are imbued 
with the author’s cognisance of the self-abnegation and masochism implicated in surrender. 
Gilbert and Gubar interpret Romola’s response to Tito’s perfidy as unnecessary martyring, 
transforming her rage into divine submissiveness, and ‘enthrallment’ to male authority. ‘Such 
modern-day Antigones are lonely, ineffective creatures, whose acts of loyalty are invariably 
suicidal’. They suggest that Baldassare acts out the revenge of which his betrayed wife is too 
afraid, representing the ‘Satanic’ extension of Romola’s ‘angelic passivity’423  
I think the models of mourning that Eliot sets out possess a nuance that is disallowed 
by that interpretation. Most notable is the tincture of religious eroticism (I am thinking here of 
Bataille’s concept of erotism) in Baldassare’s lust to assassinate Tito. Any one of his 
monologues on his unrequited passion shows the complex taboo of their relations: ‘His whole 
soul had been thrilled into immediate unreasoning belief in that eternity of vengeance where 
he … might clutch for ever an undying traitor, and hear that fair smiling hardness cry and moan 
with anguish’ (270). Bataille stresses the religious origin of our carnal inner life, and 
Baldassare’s existential passion flirts with transgression and taboo, manifesting incestuous 
desire (a feature, too, of the proto-Gothic elements in Romola).424 In Romola notions of sacrifice 
are complicated by Eliot’s explication of a primal wound, the wound particular to being a child 
                                                        
422 Weil, On Science, 174-5.  
423 Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman, 494-5. 
424 Georges Bataille, Erotism: Death and Sensuality, trans. Mary Dalwood (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 
1986).  
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and the obligations attendant on that identity. As I have shown, these are concepts that Brontë 
also articulates in her portraits of Pauline Home and the child Jane Eyre. To better understand 
this inherent loss, we need to look more closely at Romola’s heroine.         
   
 
 
VI 
Romola and the ghosts of recognition 
 
Romola’s affective life is premised on the imagistic imagination. Just as the sensory 
life proves dangerously permeable in the novel, so too does individual identity become plural, 
electrically perceptive to the body. Romola desires Tito because he fills the place of absence 
left by Dino, restoring to her father and herself the shape of a man loved, yet representing 
enough difference to make him a safe object of affection. Dino, or Fra Luca as he is now under 
his new guise as monk, is restored to her, however; briefly resurrected in the narrative for the 
purposes of imparting a vital warning about the true nature of the man Romola is engaged to 
marry. Bardo strictly forbids his daughter from seeing her brother, citing his delusional 
imagination as proof of his loss of clear-sightedness: Dino ‘was like a flame fed by some fitful 
source; showing a disposition from the very first to turn away his eyes from the clear lights of 
reason and philosophy, and to prostrate himself under the influences of a dim mysticism’ (127). 
Bardo’s language is symptomatic of the ocular diction that constitutes much of the dialogue in 
Romola, metaphors that align sight and a restrictive epistemology. Bardo speaks in binary, 
conventional terms of clear-sightedness and reason, whereas the novel’s plot forces its heroine 
to question the bluntly rational account of sight her father habitually schematises. The 
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perceptual work of the text is to un-do the blinkered ‘modes of seeing’ and feeling promoted 
by paternal affection and control (209).  
Romola’s voice is confined to a selfless channel, transmuted as an ocular instrument 
for her father. ‘Thy voice has been to me instead of the light in the years of my blindness’ 
(128). The heroine, whose ‘self-repressing colourless young life … had thrown all its passion 
into sympathy with aged sorrows,’ has never allowed herself to contemplate voicing her own 
desires, speaking a language that is not borrowed from paternal texts, but is instead a vessel for 
her body’s expressiveness. Dino’s death under the care of Savonarola shakes to the core her 
nascent sensuality. Her first glimpse of the dying man strikes her as uncanny in its foreignness: 
her brother is unrecognisable, emaciated and clutching a crucifix. The light is dim and Romola 
faintly discerns another monk’s figure in the room. The dissimilarity between memory and 
present reality is briefly reconciled upon seeing the patient’s eyes: ‘she was absorbed in that 
pang of recognition which identified this monkish … form with the image of her fair young 
brother’ (152).  
Dames observes that in Romola ‘a past image or field of images is activated in the 
present simply through perception,’ for the ‘present [is] mirror image of an abstracted, 
activated past’.425 Yet I think that Eliot’s contemplation of ‘recognition’ exceeds the terms of 
replication that Dames’s metaphor of the mirror implies. There is always the jolt of dissonance, 
a particle that resists the integration of past and present pictures. Romola has the empathic 
depth to accommodate, albeit passingly, the connection of Fra Luca with Dino, but crucially, 
they are to her eyes not the same man. Any coalescence grows out of Romola’s desire for that 
sameness, and her gaze implores him to yield to her the memory she retains. But to no avail: 
 ‘She had no ideas that could render her brother’s course an object of 
any other feeling than incurious, indignant contempt. Yet the 
                                                        
425 Dames, Amnesiac Selves, 226-7. 
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lovingness of Romola’s soul had clung to that image [of Dino] in the 
past, and while she stood rigidly aloof, there was a yearning search in 
her eyes for something too faintly discernible’. 
The shade of recognition is too slight, for ‘there was no corresponding emotion in the face of 
the monk’: his gaze is unseeing (153). Not so much a mirror, then, as a friction of a past 
sequence of imagery cathected to something sorely resistant. Fra Luca’s dying words are not 
of personal intimacy, but of abstracted images. What he sees is a vision, a recurring prophecy 
of Romola’s fate in marriage. Crucially, the image stands in for the longed-for utterance. Dino 
defends his faith in visionary perception in language that invokes Spinoza, for ‘in the painful 
linking together of our waking thoughts we can never be sure that we have not mingled our 
own error with the light we have prayed for; but in visions and dreams we are passive and our 
souls are as an instrument in the divine hand’ (156).426  
What happens next is startling, as Romola submits to the passivity of imagination. At 
Savonarola’s command to kneel, she crumples to the floor and ‘in the renunciation of her proud 
erectness, her mental attitude seemed changed, and she found herself in a new state of 
passiveness’ (157). This is typical of what I will call Eliot’s affective parallax: altering the 
angle of view, here Romola moves from sitting with a view of Savanarola at her left, to kneeling 
before him, angling her face up towards his. Consciousness clearly adheres in the body and its 
movements. Relinquishing verticality brings about a swift psychic alteration. In such moments 
of crisis, the forced adoption of a different physical posture startles the impressible mind-body 
with a new attitude. Savonarola’s hands worked the effect of bringing her to her knees. His 
face is yet veiled, hidden from her, but his hands exude an awesome power. ‘They had a marked 
physiognomy … very beautiful and almost of transparent delicacy. Romola’s disposition to 
                                                        
426 The language is Spinozistic, the passive perception of dreams and illusions contrasted with the rigorous 
placing and ordering of experience to reach reasonable thought.  
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rebel against any command … would have fixed itself on any repulsive detail as a point of 
support. But the face was hidden, and the hands seemed to have an appeal in them against all 
hardness’ (156). It appears that, as John Kucich observes, ‘the course of Romola’s submission 
to Savonarola is a gradual development of [her] private potential for self-negation.’427 Yet 
Romola’s exquisite susceptibility to the medium of perception is misconstrued as 
submissiveness. I would classify it as a sensory activity so eagerly interpretative that it is a 
hyper-activity, a capacity for imagination (not in the least hysterical) that leads Romola 
irresistibly into a chain of feeling. There is an uncanny transmission of personal information, 
as the private loses its boundaries, merging, frighteningly, in accord with the gestures of the 
body. In fact, thought acts as a sensation in this encounter, disturbing Spinoza’s dichotomous 
separation of passive and active ideas, or image-affects.428 Savonarola’s face is hidden, while 
his body is abstracted as a tactile gesture, and thus Romola is denied the mark of the particular 
that she seeks. Yet there is a sinister effect in Savonarola’s masking. The elegant hands 
hypnotise her mind, lulling her into acceptance, and she is thus able to listen to Dino’s voice, 
which begins immediately to speak of his terrible vision.  
The substance of Dino’s dream is startling in its prophetic picture of Romola’s 
imminent marriage to Tito: 
 Romola, I saw my father’s room – the library – with all the books … 
and I saw you … And at the leggio stood a man whose face I could not 
see. I looked, and looked, and it was a blank to me, even as a painting 
effaced; and I saw him move and take thee, Romola, by the hand … 
And you stood at the altar in Santa Croce, and the priest who married 
                                                        
427 Kucich, Repression in Victorian Fiction, 174. While Kucich is right to highlight the heroine’s attraction to self-
negation, I disagree with his broader assessment of her as disengaged and lifeless (173).  
428 Spinoza distinguishes between the passive sensory world of imagination, the body impressed by random, 
inchoate images, which need the refining power of reason to order them into active concepts of intellect.   
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you had the face of death; and the graves opened, and the dead in their 
shrouds rose and followed you like a bridal train (157). 
Romola ‘was not one to be assailed by sickly fancies; she had the vivid intellect and the healthy 
human passion, which are too keenly alive to the constant relations of things to have any morbid 
craving after the exceptional. Still the images of the vision … jarred and distressed her like 
painful and cruel cries’ (158). The narrator emphasises that Romola possesses a ‘healthy’ 
passion, not a passive and confused idea, yet the imminence of death, the frescoes of suffering 
on the wall opposite, with ‘faces of sorrow,’ and the image produced by Dino’s vision, combine 
to assail her ‘like a sudden awful apparition from an invisible world.’ Her body is acted upon, 
as Spinoza would say, by the bodies of Dino and Savonarola. The chain of sensation from the 
friar to Romola, to Dino, who is given space to tell his vision in the first-person, is a 
communion, albeit a desolate commonality. Romola has never ‘known acute suffering — heart-
cutting sorrow,’ and under its influence she becomes vulnerable to illusion, as the haunting 
frescoes appear to crowd in upon her, making one image with the dying face in the bed. Does 
her suffering express anything other than her passive impotence, as Deleuze describes 
Spinoza’s account of trauma? ‘In Spinoza,’ Deleuze observes, ‘the power of suffering 
expresses nothing positive. In every passive affection there is something imaginary which 
inhibits it from being real … [O]ur force of suffering is simply the imperfection … the 
limitation of our power of action.’429 
Romola’s grief is refined sensorily, worked upon by experiential stimulus, and becomes 
a motivating force for much of her action. Eliot makes clear that pain cannot be geometrically 
plotted, neatly formulated into a philosophy of stoic order: ‘human pain refuses to be settled 
by equations’.430 She thereby exceeds the structural bounds Spinoza places on violent emotion 
                                                        
429 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 
224. 
430 Suzy Anger, The Cambridge Companion to George Eliot, ed. George Levine (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2001), 2.  
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to vitiate or destroy its source.431 Much of the heroine’s phenomenal knowledge is derived from 
her experience of pain, what Brian Fay describes as Eliot’s account of ‘intuitive perception’, 
contrasted with Spinoza’s ‘intuitive intellection’.432 The sensory information conveyed in the 
deathbed scene becomes intriguingly dialectical, as the pitch of grief grows out of and is 
heightened by the dialogue of imagery in the room, merging and rising with the modulation of 
voices, climaxing in a sharp wail of grief from the heroine. With her brother’s death, Romola’s 
‘empty’ cry of his name hits vacant space, the spatial given new structure by the tonal, ‘as the 
certainty broke upon her that the silence of misunderstanding could never be broken’ (159). 
Fra Girolamo urges her to take Dino’s crucifix, as ‘his eyes behold it no more’. By keeping in 
sight what is now invisible to her brother, Romola somehow embodies him, translating his 
vision, the bond between them, now re-forged in loss and clearly identified as issuing from a 
sensory inheritance. The act of touching the crucifix ‘relieve[s] the tension of her mind,’ and 
tears heave forth. ‘It seemed to her as if this first vision of death must alter the daylight for her 
for evermore’. This change, while subtle, is immediately apparent. Romola’s spatial and 
temporal perspective, as well as her apprehension of objects, is undeniably different, as if a 
‘disease of the retina’ afflicts this heroine, too. Her perceptive field is heightened at once, and 
experience of space is not banal, but hyperreal. Sensation becomes a mode of haunting, and 
she is beleaguered by ‘a dull continuous pain’ (311) as the world outside becomes newly 
oppressive. Not until chapter 68, ‘Romola’s Waking,’ does her sensory life provide her once 
more with solace.  
                                                        
431 In part V of the Ethics, Spinoza sets out a clear, step-by-step approach to utilise the mind’s power to reason, 
so as to defeat passive endurance of emotion and sensation, those ‘evil’ images that crowd out logic.  
432 Brian Fay argues for the striking cleavage in Eliot’s and Spinoza’s respective concepts of morality and 
perception. His main proposition is that Spinoza’s moral system of intuition is built upon ‘intuitive 
intellection,’ which renders people as mere essences, denying their particularity and emotional uniqueness. 
‘In this way, the Spinozan intuiter never really comes to grips directly with the concrete entities around him, 
but retreats to a realm devoid of the messiness … [of] the actual world of temporally embodied beings.’ While 
I find Fay’s discussion of the dissimilarities between the two writers compelling, I have argued throughout 
this thesis for Spinoza’s phenomenological sensibility. See Fay, “What George Eliot of Middlemarch could 
have taught Spinoza,” in Philosophy and Literature 41.1 (2017), 125-6. 
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VII 
A requisitioned gaze 
 
 Several objects in Romola, particularly Dino’s crucifix, gather to them complex 
networks of sensation, facilitated by the dramatic acts of exchange that allow their movement 
amongst characters. The crucifix, which retains the traces of her brother’s touch and recalls to 
Romola his ‘eyes that seemed to look towards [it], and yet not to see it,’ and the horrifying 
vision of her future, haunts her in its obstinate resonance; it refuses the ambivalence of a banal 
thing. The images of Dino’s prophetic dream of Tito with his face erased, ‘which [Romola] 
seemed not only to hear uttered by the low gasping voice, but to live through as if it had been 
her own dream,’ has ‘made her more conscious than ever’ (174-5). Romola recreates for Tito 
the scene of her brother’s dying, reciting Dino’s words, which ‘had burnt themselves into her 
memory as they were spoken. But when she was at the end of the vision, she paused; the rest 
came too vividly before her to be uttered, and she sat looking at the distance, almost 
unconscious for the moment that Tito was near her’ (176). Her repetition of Dino’s words has 
the potency of joining the living woman with the dead man in a distressing super-sensory 
mingling of subjective borders. The lapse from Dino’s sensory experience to Romola’s that 
began in the death-bed scene proceeds to a new pitch here. She loses her sense of the present, 
inhabiting two temporal moments — the death scene and its recreation, the morbid walls of the 
chapter-house searing Romola’s vision, transfixing her as if she stood now before it.. The 
affective senses operate with what amounts to a mystical power, destabilising subjectivity, 
indeed entirely distorting it. Eliot emphasises that there is no immunity against the impressible 
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nature of the body, what Spinoza describes as the imprinting upon us of another body’s 
condition.433      
She turns to Tito, gazing at his beauty (175), to resist ‘the impressions that will not be 
shaken off by reason’. Yet the memory of Dino’s face has shattered her singleness, her 
experiences have stretched to incorporate her brother’s pain, and she is fatefully encumbered 
with his words: ‘I shall never forget [his death]; it seems as if it would come between me and 
everything I shall look at.’ This memory has transfused her consciousness, transmuting every 
object; she sees now ‘only the pale images of sorrow and death’ (177). Her mourning is evoked 
in confused perceptions, which she can no longer cohere: ‘strange, bewildering transition from 
those pale images of sorrow to [the] bright youthfulness,’ of Tito’s beauty. How to reconcile 
the contrary images, and ‘make it intelligible that they belonged to the same world?’ (178) 
Romola suddenly ‘felt this questioning need like a sudden uneasy dizziness and want of 
something to grasp’ (178).  
The indomitable crucifix sets in motion the novel’s most complex entanglement of sight 
metaphors. It is a mode of hypnosis for Romola: ‘[Dino’s] yearning look at the crucifix when 
he was gasping for breath — I can never forget it. Last night, I looked at the crucifix a long 
while, and tried to see that it would help him,’ and, as the light bends, she catches a glimpse of 
her own grief (177). Thought and affect are a disequilibrium of being. The mind as a space is 
implied by Tito’s act of shutting up the crucifix in a tabernacle, troping on Descartes analogy 
of the eye as a locked and darkened chamber.434 The sealed tabernacle, with its repressed object, 
signifies Romola’s optical unconscious: if she cannot see it, proceeds Tito’s logic, then she will 
no longer know it. Tito speaks of Dino’s dream as if it were a cross, something that encumbers 
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his beloved: ‘And now, my Romola … you will banish these ghastly thoughts. The vision … 
surely has no weight with you’ (176 [my emphasis]), a figuration that he uses repeatedly, 
lending a physical force to the image. Tito wants to ‘dip [Romola] in the soft waters of 
forgetfulness’ (281), to insulate her mind from any importunate images that threaten his power. 
To ‘guard’ her thoughts, he devises a tabernacle painted with his own image, ‘which is to hide 
away from you for ever that remembrancer of sadness. You have done with sadness now; and 
we will bury all images of it … He opened the triptych and placed the crucifix within the central 
space; then closing it again, [took] out the key’. This tabernacle, painted with a portrait of the 
lovers, is the substituted vision, ‘hidden by these images of youth and joy,’ by ‘their imaged 
selves’ (198-9). Yet Romola knows the image of her grief ‘is still there – it’s only hidden’ 
(201). For, as Bachelard notes, all caskets can be opened: Romola’s troublesome interior life 
cannot be locked away, made an exterior object. The locked object ‘contains the things that are 
unforgettable … Here, the past, the present, and the future are condensed,’ rendering the little 
tomb of secrets ‘a memory of what is immemorial’.435  Metonymically shifting from Dino’s 
gaze to Romola’s grief, and Tito’s beautiful body, the crucifix is a labile symbol of the 
conflictual dialect of invisibility and visibility. Tito vows to drown the cross in the Arno, 
lending to that object an irony of prolepsis, as this will be the very fate to which he succumbs.     
The inefficacy of Tito’s manufactured tomb is made apparent during the couple’s 
wedding procession. As the lovers walk towards the church, a religious procession confronts 
them. Rising up above them is the foretold figure of Time, with scythe and hour-glass, followed 
by ‘what looked like a troop of the sheeted dead gliding above blackness … it seemed as if her 
brother’s vision, which could never be effaced from her mind,’ is made manifest. The 
obsessional force of Dino’s death-bed vision, its lingering memory continually invoked, works 
to counteract the enforced veiling of the heroine, who is for most of the novel enclosed in 
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domestic spaces, hidden from view, her head or face shrouded by a veil. It disrupts Tito’s plot, 
which relies on relieving Romola of weighted images, for he desires his wife to be psychically 
weightless, disrobed of her mourning. Characterising her mind as failing to discriminate 
between fantasy and substance, Tito claims Romola lives ‘in misery under the mere 
imagination of weight’ (283). This is his reasoning for breaking apart Bardo’s library, selling 
the books to the highest bidder to relieve his daughter of their heavy bond (283). Tito’s greatest 
betrayal is the attempted appropriation of Romola’s losses, his re-shaping of the (visual) terms 
of her mourning. Romola’s eyes are blind, so he ‘must see for them, and save my wife’ (281), 
in effect restructuring her visual field.     
The breaking-up of Bardo’s library is the climax that provokes Romola’s revolt against 
her husband and her city. As her losses compound Romola becomes ever more sympathetic to 
the sensations of other bodies, palpably vulnerable to Spinoza’s imitative affects. Her 
awareness of her body’s movements is transmuted almost entirely into a deep imagining of her 
father’s grief at the destruction of his life’s work. ‘Instead of shutting her eyes’ to the work of 
the library’s destruction, she forces herself to watch as it is disassembled and carried away. 
The picture is, like the other scenes discussed so far, not visually graphic, but impressionistic, 
flowing from Romola’s sensory experiences. There is a strong flavour of masochism in her 
faithful adherence to suffering, which she recognises: ‘this vivifying of pain and despair about 
her father’s memory was the strongest life left to her affections’ (315). She forces herself to 
watch as the load of books vanishes, ‘like a cruel, deliberate fate, carrying away her father’s 
lifelong hope to bury it in an unmarked grave. Romola felt less that she was seeing this herself 
than that her father was conscious of it … She stood still even after the load had disappeared, 
heedless of the cold, and soothed by the gloom which seemed to cover her like a mourning 
garment’ (315). As the passage progresses, this uncanny sensory mimicry graduates into a 
physical unawareness, or trans-individual embodiment. Romola becomes corpse-like in her 
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imaginative identification with Bardo’s lifeless body. Her response climaxes in a synaesthetic 
shock of light and sound: ‘suddenly the great bell in the palace-tower rang out a mighty peal 
… and every other bell in every other tower seemed to catch the vibration and join the chorus. 
And as the chorus swelled and swelled till the air seemed made of sound — little flames, 
vibrating too, as if the sound had caught fire ... That sudden clang, that leaping light, fell on 
Romola like sharp wounds’ (316). As Barbara Hardy notes, the ‘disenchanting illumination’ 
of this novel is significant in that it forces the heroine to recognise the ‘indifferent world outside 
the self’.436 Romola’s sense of self has wasted with the loss of the books, those icons of her 
inner myth-making and self-reflection, and her only recourse is to cultivate ‘rude sensations’. 
Her white silk wedding clothes are likened to a corpse, and she touches in grief ‘the shroud of 
her dead happiness’ (318). The texture of the silk recalls her loving illusions of Tito.  Rubbing 
her hands on the ‘coarse roughness’ of a nun’s tunic, the feel of the serge fabric kindles an 
awareness of the barren present, ‘from which love and delight were gone,’ with the effect of 
inoculating her against sadness. The juxtaposition of the materials, one imbued with the love 
that the feel of the other arrests in grief, makes her revolt against the interiority of touch. ‘She 
put off her black garment, and as she thrust her soft white arms into the harsh sleeves of the 
serge mantle and felt the hard girdle of rope hurt her fingers as she tied it, she courted’ the 
abrasive sensations (318). She relishes a feeling that emphasises self-alienation, a severance of 
affect and sensation. ‘That heart-cutting comparison of the present with the past urged itself 
upon Romola till it even transformed itself into wretched sensations: she seemed benumbed to 
everything but inward throbbings, and began to feel the need of some hard contact’ (321).   
There is a perverse eroticism in Romola’s ritualised internalisation of violence, 
reminiscent of Jane Eyre’s various acts of self-punishment, and in this reversal of the terms of 
pleasure, the body must undergo the stigmata of the mind. In the coarseness of textures Romola 
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finds a sensory accomplice to her mourning, a renewal by which the body is shocked out of 
mortification, so that sensation and the grief become synonymous, one term conditioned by the 
other. This is, in part, the consequence of her emotional inheritance, mimicking her father in 
his obstinate grief. Eliot is everywhere interested in ancestral continuity, and inherited affective 
instincts are of no less interest to the author than those of a pecuniary nature. Yet feeling is 
unwieldy matter, and Romola’s morphing phenomenal history threatens to vitiate the desiring 
drive forward that narrative feeds upon. Subjectivity becomes tethered to a notion of 
consciousness as horizontal (thus contingent, at the interface of memory, sensory organs, and 
other mercurial spectres), rather than the verticality of an epistemological mastery of certain 
knowable entities. Can fiction accommodate the subversions that phenomenological 
psychology generates? Or does a pacification of the body need to take place in order for a 
‘successful’ textual conclusion?   
Romola’s sordid interaction with everyday objects links her with the novel’s other 
bereft character, Baldassare, similarly betrayed by Tito. Baldassare clutches with all the force 
of his life to his poniard, continually fondling it, ‘taking refuge in that sensation from a hopeless 
blank of thought that seemed to lie like a great gulf between his passion and its aim’ (306-7). 
Once a great scholar, whose intellect is now lost to amnesia, he has etiolated feeling to the 
point of the merely transactional. Baldassare is a fantastically rich character in the context of 
literary phenomenology; his consciousness is figured as a slate, scrawled with untranslatable 
text. Tito’s disavowal of him, leaving him to die at the hands of slave traders, has precipitated 
him into self-alienation, de-ontologised by his fevered grief. Memory is ‘little more than the 
consciousness of something gone’ (334), his mind ‘a dreary conscious blank’ (335).  He is the 
victim of sudden thrusts of rage, which come upon him as vertigo, as when he confronts his 
son dining with the Florentine elite, and accuses him of treachery: ‘the new shock of rage he 
felt as Tito’s lie fell on his ears brought a strange bodily effect with it: a cold stream seemed to 
  261 
rush over him, and the last words of [Tito’s] speech seemed to be drowned by ringing chimes. 
Thought gave way to a dizzy horror, as if the earth were slipping away from under him’ (351). 
Here, Baldassare’s efforts of intellectual recovery are centred on the translation of Homer’s 
text, which, if successful, will also prove his identity; yet the attempt feels to him like 
wandering through a space that is unmapped, and he can ‘form no distinct idea of the details’: 
‘Lost, lost!’ (352). In Romola Eliot continually stages such moments of psychic anguish, which 
double as corporeal imbalance and loss of agility. The hold over one’s subject-hood is fragile, 
in a dangerous contingency with the ungovernable sensory body, which makes a mockery of 
knowledge.  
The only sensory organ Baldassare trusts is touch: ‘He had clutched and unsheathed his 
dagger, and for a long while had been feeling its edge, his mind narrowed to one image, and 
the dream of one sensation’ (307). The terms of the suffering are the same as Romola’s in the 
scene above: the intense attraction to sharp, piercing sensations, and the parallel simplification 
of perspective, so that one idea expands to overwhelm entirely any other image. Baldassare’s 
quest for vengeance consumes him, however; a mode of self-destruction to which Romola does 
not fall prey. His insatiable drive to kill Tito becomes a ‘thirst’ so voracious that he can no 
longer distinguish between the dream of water on his lips and its illusion (307). Like an addict, 
he hungers continually for the rawness of anger, needing to reaffirm his aliveness by the touch 
of his steel blade. Sensation becomes externalised in the form of the dagger, and with it the 
body’s pain is abstracted into something concrete. The affect and the sensation become so 
interchangeable, that ‘no thought could athwart his eager thirst.’ His past identity is contained 
in one of his only belongings, a Greek book which once he would have read with ease, and 
poring over the text, now illegible to him, feeds his anger; the names and symbols on the page, 
‘all gone into darkness,’ are a haunting script of his losses (307). Suffering is rendered as a 
failure of interpretative power, where Baldassare’s lens-like focus on the unfamiliar markings, 
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his objectivist attempts to return to his now darkened interior world, express a larger concern 
cautioning against the spectral imaginative terrain mapped out by the new optics. Perhaps the 
distance between illusion and matter, brought together in Spinoza’s metaphysics, the aleatory 
nature of mental images, operates under the membrane of consciousness — in other words, our 
optical unconscious betrays the geometry of rational formulations. As Simon During notes, the 
secular magic of the lantern show presented ‘a danger to [Spinoza’s] philosophical system’. 
‘Lenses,’ writes During, ‘enable that concentration of vision which becomes an analogue not 
only for “the light of reason” whereby we grasp [Spinoza’s theory of] “adequate” ideas, but 
also for the spiritual “inner light” of Protestantism, which Spinoza presses into the service of 
his rationalism’.437 What then of the fate of the specular imaginary, the sensorium itself, in the 
Victorian age of visual distrust and uncertainty, when optical technology is put in the service 
of illusion, of undermining rationality? Romola stages the collision of these two visual strands, 
and the unresolved paradoxes of the visual are at the heart of the text’s air of dissatisfaction.   
Baldassare’s desire climaxes in what Bataille describes as a ‘white heat,’ the ‘blind 
moment when eroticism attains it ultimate intensity.’438 Watching as Tito’s unconscious body 
drifts towards the bank of the Arno, Baldassare grasps him with the force that his body has 
waited in preparedness to exert. Using his own body as a weight (a comment upon Tito’s 
obsession with weightlessness), his manic suffocation of his son ends in his own death, the two 
bodies interlocked, so stiffened in their embrace that they are inseparable (548). Before the 
moment of death, Tito’s eyes meet his father’s, and his last vision is of ‘the hideous past 
hanging over him forever’. The older man gleefully attains his wish — that his son would see 
him, know him once more.  
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Romola’s second flight from home, culminating in her suicide attempt, is the emotional 
crisis of the novel. Drifting in a purloined fishing boat, she passes through a cycle of deep sleep 
to vivid dreaming, until the rising sun wakes her, and the ‘darkness was blotted out with light’ 
(550). The watery scene that Eliot describes is Rousseau-like in its maternal resonances, the 
body of water curving to hold the heroine’s body in restfulness, cupped in forgetfulness. This 
is Eliot’s invocation of sublime oblivion and it is, crucially, the cessation of perception for 
Romola — she drifts in languorous indifference, unaware of what she sees, ‘rather feeling 
simply the presence of peace and beauty’. It is the most sublime moment of the novel, and its 
gloriousness consists in pure, uncensored feeling, a moment, as the narrator says, of ‘mere 
passive existence ‘when the exquisiteness of subtle, indefinite sensation creates a bliss which 
is without memory and without desire’ (550). The prose is free of sharp sensory points, as 
forms merge in easy harmony. Imminent death is a reversal of the illumination of Romola’s 
long night, as ‘the flickering flames of the tapers seemed to get stronger and stronger till the 
dark scene was blotted out with light’ and ‘the agitated past had glided away like that dark 
scene’ (550). Phenomenal awareness is equivalent to epistemic reality: ‘She did not even think 
that she could rest here forever, she only felt that she rested’ (551 [emphasis added]). Trusting 
utterly to her sensory capacities, Romola leans in to an atavistic harmony with the natural 
world. She yearns to remain in this ‘gently lulling cradle’ of non-thought, of non-being, in that 
unmediated phenomenal experience.  
Yet Eliot knows she cannot, and ‘oblivion [is] troubled’ by the returning rush of vision 
and the sound of a child’s piercing cry. Cleansed of her sensory past, albeit briefly, she wakes, 
however, into perceptive maturation. Rather than drifting ever onward to death, she is 
confronted with the inexorable solidity of life. Eliot’s heroines never relinquish entirely their 
bonds, no matter how painful, with Maggie Tulliver’s experience as perhaps the most tragic 
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example of that struggle. Building upon Spinoza’s associationist theory, Eliot illustrates that 
there are particular patterns of knowing embedded in corresponding modes of being, which are 
impossible to disassociate. If we are ever to reach the noumenal, it is through the phenomenal, 
which, in Romola requires living with loss, with the endlessness of mourning. For Romola, 
certain impressions linger — Tito’s betrayal of her father, her uncle’s murder — and awareness 
of pain becomes a shock requisite in feeling alive. Romola embodies the Spinozistic affective 
imagination, but it is compounded with the truth discovered in a penetrating cognisance of loss, 
in itself an aspect of the reasoning intellect.  
In the fifth part of The Ethics, ‘Of Human Freedom,’ Spinoza clearly sets out the step-
by-step process through which one is to ‘destroy’ the passions that weaken us. We must 
uncouple the affect from the image of loss, he says, and teach the mind to associate the feeling 
with images of freedom. To do this we must render the affect pellucid: ‘An affect which is a 
passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it,’ for ‘[t]he more 
an affect is known to us, then, the more it is in our power, and the less the mind is acted on by 
it’.439 Eliot shows the power of reason in refining the senses, but this process does not overcome 
perceptive fracture, nor does it categorise passivity as inutile. By rendering thought as a 
sensation, Eliot illustrates that integrity of experience is a kind of brokenness. Romola cannot 
drift towards death, so she must surrender the possessive exclusivity of her body and realise 
the need of the other’s body. To visualise her personhood, Romola acknowledges her trans-
individuality, evidenced by her return to Florence, and to the head of an unconventional family 
nucleus.  
 Romola’s trajectory, like that of Tito and Baldassare, is a return to origins, her past 
elegantly, if lugubriously, meeting her future as she becomes the maternal guide to Tessa and 
her two children born from her marriage to Tito. ‘It is only a poor sort of happiness that could 
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ever come by caring very much about our own narrow pleasures,’ she instructs her adopted 
children. The greatest happiness, that of understanding the self in relation to the alterity of the 
other, ‘brings so much pain with it, that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we 
would choose before everything else’ — that is, silently enduring suffering. Romola chooses 
mourning as one would choose a possession. Like Eliot’s experience of intellectual and 
emotional fracture in the composition of Romola, her heroine retains all the traces of her loss.  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Hypnogogia 
 
The endlessness of loss in Romola is perhaps the inevitable ‘work’ of mourning. For 
Jacques Derrida, for whom mourning became an obsessive point of philosophical return in his 
later writing, there can be no way of talking about mourning, ‘since it cannot become a theme, 
only another experience of mourning’; for ‘whoever works at the work of mourning learns the 
impossible – that mourning is interminable. Inconsolable. Irreconcilable.’ In this thesis I have 
explored the dilating force (to evoke Derrida) of mourning and loss, or as loss, the expansion 
of the image that represents what it is to talk of this dynamic. For Derrida, when we speak of 
mourning, ‘[w]e are speaking of images.’ The field of the subject in representing loss to the 
self is structured by vision, it is a ‘reorganisation of space and of visibility,’ a ‘visibility of the 
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body … an orientation of perspectives.’440 The pain that resides in the subject is reduced to no 
more than the image in us, he writes, yet this image is not simply what is seen; ‘the image sees 
more than it is seen. The image looks at us.’ The self is seen in the space of mourning, then, a 
mirroring effect that I have noted in the modalities of grief depicted in the novels I have read 
here.  If my critique has seemed at times impressionistic, as Derrida reminds us, to speak of 
mourning is to re-create it, re-image it. Fictional images have an uncanny tautology, and I have 
attempted to gain distance from the blind spots of these narratives, in order to listen to what 
their protagonists have to say about what they see.   
 
There is a story, sometimes thought apocryphal, but included in Juliet Barker’s 
biography of the Brontës, that Patrick Brontë, long before his cataracts besieged him, enjoined 
his four remaining children to play a game of masking. As Patrick relates the story, he wished 
the children to ‘speak with less timidity’ and ‘deemed that if they were put under a sort of 
cover, I might gain my end – and happening to have a mask in the house, I told them all to 
stand, and speak boldly from under cover of the mask’.441 I find this anecdote fascinating not 
in establishing any kind of precedent of sublimation instigated in Charlotte Brontës childhood, 
but in respect to the novels that she would go on to write as an adult. For the heroines of Jane 
Eyre and Villette do ‘speak boldly’ of grief, but it is from under cover of a mask, a wanting-to-
be-seen that is also paradoxically, a need to remain unseen. In these novels, grief is relayed as 
hypnogogia – those ‘quasi-hallucinatory images’ that crowd the retina in the immediate 
moments between falling into sleep or waking, as writers such as Merleau-Ponty, Henri 
Bergson and Nabokov have defined it; a phenomenal set of imagery, Schwenger writes, 
‘generated by something other than the perceiver, who can watch images suspended before the 
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closed eyes, changing rapidly according to a logic of their very own.’442 While I do not want to 
go so far as to claim that these texts have an unconscious (a discussion beyond the purview of 
this conclusion), I have suggested that representations of grief and mourning in both Brontë 
and Eliot move to a kinetic rhythm that is like peering in upon a shadowy retinal scene. The 
autonomous logic and mechanics of their scenes of loss are explicated by the optical 
technologies of mid-century: ubiquitous tropes that creep into their fiction, consciously or 
otherwise, and are grafted onto modes of mourning. This thesis has interrogated the 
metaphoricity of sight in these narratives, to reveal the inextricable logic of seeing and feeling, 
states of blindness and conditions of mourning and loss. Techniques of visualisation moved 
beyond their function as rhetorical figurations of mid-century spectacle, to evoke a 
phenomenology of grief, giving life to a subtler expression of what it means to inhabit a space 
without correlate: the peculiar dimness of psychic suffering. The cultural is fused with the 
private in my analysis, as both novelists translated the anxiety about the nature of the image, 
the very nature of vision, into a codified diction of the intimate sensory life. Were we to read 
their imagery apart from the social spectacle, I suggest that the phenomenal imperative behind 
their scenes would be minimised, and certainly changed. When the terms of visualisation alter 
radically, they filter into the domestic space; they are privatised, made intimate. In our 
contemporary moment, we can observe the ways in which the excess of the visual creeps into 
and transforms our very language, our fiction, our mode of inhabiting the world, indeed, our 
very consciousness.  
The un-representable nature of mourning, as I argued in the introductory chapter, yet 
demands signification. The elision between cultural visual practices and the private sensorium 
in grieving has offered me a unique means of approaching textual emotional life. One set of 
visual exigencies opens up and feeds into the aporias of the other, instituting not a causality of 
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models of envisioning, but a connection, a contiguity of terms and experiences. The 
diffusiveness and ambiguity of the Victorian optical dialectic meets the inchoateness of 
mourning’s phenomenal feel and its re-shaping of consciousness.  
In her study of Victorian optical entertainments and narrative, Helen Groth describes 
the way ‘nineteenth-century writers explored the psychological aesthetics of moving images 
produced by new visual media,’ drawing upon ‘an enduring philosophical tradition of enlisting 
familiar optical devices to materialise the mechanisms of perception’.443 While Groth’s interest 
tends toward emphasising the educational, didactic nature of the new ‘way of seeing images’, 
her focus, like my own, is on the kinetic, volatile image, those of the magic lantern or the 
kinetoscope, for instance, and the alterations in the human sensorium that such optical devices 
engendered in the observer’s subjectivity. The ‘newly labile concept of the image,’ Groth 
writes, was manifest in ‘the proliferation of optical tropes and metaphors in the work of writers 
compelled by the aesthetic and psychological effects of a heightened sense of visual 
contingency that pervaded the cultural landscape’. Most important for this thesis is Groth’s 
highlighting of the currency of these textual images, the way early to mid-century writers such 
as Eliot, ‘reproduced the phenomenology of perception,’ projecting psychic images across the 
space of the textual scene. There was an isomorphic relation between the external, simulated 
image and the internalised projections of the conscious or unconscious mind, a cross-
fertilisation that, as Groth observes, is ‘far from a speculative connection.’444 Eliot, and Brontë, 
however, cannot be said to be writing a conventional ocularcentric narrative, and while Groth 
rightly points to a ‘naturalising of the connection between optical devices’ and the psyche, I 
have suggested that their visual poetics are paradoxical, with both novelists simultaneously 
foregrounding a de-naturalising effect. Eliot and Brontë draw on optical tropes most frequently 
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in moments of crises of consciousness, rendering the emotional fracture of the character in 
terms that emphasise spectrality. The labile image of early to mid-century provided a space to 
re-think fictionalisations of loss, and Eliot and Brontë attempt to find new perspectives of 
viewing grief that avoid conventional patterning and consolation, which open out the sensation 
to evoke the disorientation of suffering, the sense of being unmoored. Yet, by rendering affect 
in ghostly figures of illumination, projection and oneiric fantasy, a partition is implemented, at 
times creating distance for the protagonist, as in Lucy Snowe or Jane Eyre’s frequent glass-
moments, mediating the gaze from the suffering body. The volatility of mourning lends itself 
to the proto-cinematic, to the ‘curious illusion of vision’ (V, 430). Lucy describes the 
fluctuations of her feelings as she realises the strength of M. Paul’s affection for her as follows: 
‘Countless times it had been my lot to watch apprehended sorrow close darkly in; but to see 
unhoped-for happiness take form, find place, and grow more real as the seconds sped, was 
indeed a new experience’ (V, 485). Brontë casts Lucy’s burgeoning joy as imagistic formation, 
tenuous, yet the outline growing stronger, contrasting with the contractions of sorrow; its 
reality moves ‘as the seconds sped,’ with the temporality of a newly-formed projection, more 
solid with the passing moment. The dramatic phenomenology of this new thing of happiness 
is abundantly optical, making it all the more fragile.   
I want to close by turning to a text that has been a spectral presence in my own work 
on this thesis, The Mill on the Floss, the shadow-text to The Lifted Veil and Romola. Maggie 
Tulliver’s drowning is a set-piece of envisioned loss, where the heroine is both subject and 
object in the perspectival field as the oppositions collapse with her death. Drifting alone in the 
night, desperately hoping to reach her mother and brother at the mill, whose faces she can see 
‘looking for help into the darkness, and finding none’: 
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She was floating in smooth water now – perhaps far on the over-flooded 
fields. There was no sense of present danger to check the outgoing of her 
mind to the old home; and she strained her eyes against the curtain of gloom 
that she might seize the first sight of her whereabout – that she might catch 
some faint suggestion of the spot towards which all her anxieties tended. 
Oh, how welcome, the widening of that dismal watery level – the gradual 
uplifting of the cloudy firmament – the slowly defining blackness of objects 
above the glassy dark! […] But now there was a large dark mass in the 
distance, and near to her Maggie could discern the current of the river. The 
dark mass must be – yes, it was – St. Ogg’s. … But there was no colour, no 
shape yet: all was faint and dim (The Mill, 593-4). 
 
Eliot strips Maggie’s conscious world of colour, as her life moves inevitably toward that final 
opening out, the river expanding before her, into death. Maggie’s passive passage along the 
water echoes Romola’s drifting, and Latimer’s Rousseau-like waters, yet to return to The Mill 
is to over-write the sublimity of Romola’s accession to pure sensation, as the dawn wakes her 
to her new life, her new self; Maggie’s drifting is sinister and takes place entirely through 
obscured vision. The slow-forming horror of the final moments before her death, as the river 
betrays her, and the shapes she longs to see fatally deceive her, is the staged deterioration of 
seeing. Her visual instinct, so keen throughout the narrative, is broken apart, piece by piece, 
just as the ravaged machinery of the mill fragments and ultimately destroys her. Maggie’s 
resistance to death is a ‘straining of the eyes,’ a poignant urgency to see the only forms that 
could soothe her, which are the very forms that kill her. As Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar 
observe, ‘[w]hen the waters break, there can be no rebirth for Maggie.’445 Eliot’s syntax stays 
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faithful to her heroine’s fitful perception (‘the dark mass must be – yes, it was – St Ogg’s’), 
remaining with her at the retinal level of watery confusion, to amplify the futility of her gaze. 
‘This is George Eliot’s dramatic use of scenery,’ writes Barbara Hardy, ‘often carefully 
rationalised by the general explanation which makes the visual association appear as the natural 
act of the character’s mind, but at the same time chosen with feeling for the appropriate lights 
and properties. … [I]t is a recurring way of presenting character and crisis … a crisis of 
disenchantment described in images.’446 
Some critics have understood Maggie’s renunciation of Stephen Guest and her return 
to the mill and to her brother, as a triumph of passion over conformity, a self-destructive urge, 
as Dorothea Barrett describes it, ‘a masochistic self-repression,’ that is also ‘self-assertion over 
male domination.’447 Maggie chooses to suffer, then, and there is a transcendence, even a 
perverse strength in this wilful choice to determine her fate. It is preferable to the life of 
acquiescence that awaits the heroine if she allows herself the less painful option of marriage to 
Stephen. In this sense her death, foretold from the beginning, is theoretically harmonious: 
Maggie chooses death because it is preferable to a life that would be a subjugation to male 
desire. Yet the wastefulness of Maggie’s death and the bleakness with which Eliot watches her 
move inexorably toward her final act of atonement, complicates this view. What Eliot gives us 
in The Mill on the Floss, as Elizabeth Ermath argues, is the protracted movements and counter-
movements of Maggie’s ‘long suicide’. Through an entrenched habit of ‘self-denial’ and a 
yearning for love, Maggie ‘learns to distrust her own powers and to develop a fatal sense of 
the sweetness of submission,’ an ‘ontological threat’ so great that it leads her to death.448     
The last act of mourning is an end to the seen world, a rejection of the visible, and Eliot 
takes it up again in Romola, pushing her heroine towards the same fate, then suddenly rescuing 
                                                        
446 Hardy, The Novels of George Eliot, 189.  
447 Dorothea Barrett, Vocation and Desire: George Eliot’s Heroines (London: Routledge, 1989), 68-9.  
448 Elizabeth Ermath, ‘Maggie Tulliver’s Long Suicide,’ Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 14.4 (Autumn, 
1974), 587 and 594. 
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her. When Romola decides to die, it is like Maggie’s wish to return home to her child’s 
consciousness, because ‘she long[s] for that repose in mere sensation which she had sometimes 
dreamed of in the sultry afternoons of her early girlhood … [t]he imagination of herself gliding 
away … on the darkening waters was growing more and more into a longing’ (R, 502-3). 
Unmooring her boat in the darkness Romola ‘was alone now’: 
 
She had freed herself from all claims …. Had she found anything like the 
dream of her girlhood? No. Memories hung upon her like the weight of 
broken wings that could never be lifted. … Romola felt orphaned in those 
wide spaces of sea and sky. She read no message of love for her [there]. … 
She drew the cowl over her head again and covered her face, choosing 
darkness rather than the light of the stars, which seemed to her like the hard 
light of eyes that looked at her without seeing her.    
 
Here, too, Romola’s disillusioning pain, her mourning for her lost girlhood, her father, her 
husband, her brother – all this pain is held suspended in the visionless gaze of the world: death 
would be a sundering of the visual indifference she finds, an anti-optical turn inwards to the 
darkness of the self. She covers her face, making sight impossible, but her text still speaks of 
grief: a Brontëan mask, then. Illuminating the affectivity of chiaroscuro effects brings out the 
nuances of suffering in ways that might otherwise go unseen. Unlike the vividly energetic 
optics of Charlotte Brontë, Eliot’s reflexive imagery in these passages of emotional turbulence 
is slow-unfolding in rhythm, with an oneiric, quiescent visuality.    
   
 If we grant that these novels foreground loss - which I think we should – then it does 
not implicate a siphoning off of one emotional frame from other, equally present emotions. 
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Spinoza’s organic system of interrelated emotions might serve as analogous to the way I 
understand mourning in these novels, as an amorphous state that moves between loss and grief, 
in which there is no distinct separation of these conditions at the experiential level. And why 
mourning? My interest in psychic pain arose out of the sense that existing critical methods of 
approach to the Brontëan or Eliot novel were lacking in the full realisation of the emotional 
heft of the texts, the way they keep coming back to a brokenness and absence felt at the 
corporeal level of the subject. A common feature of all four texts – and they are not unique in 
this fashion -  is that the narrative shuttles between the visualised social space, and the 
interiorised, unseen sensorium. In this sense, my own critical practice is analogous to my 
chosen texts, expanding out to the abstractions of cultural ways of seeing, and drawing in to 
the deeply felt images of private life, so that there is a doubleness to the spectrality of their 
imagistic lenses. If I have granted Victorian optical tropes a certain mobility between spheres, 
it is because the texts themselves deploy this rhetoric in interesting and uniquely autonomous 
ways. In any case it stimulates a different discussion about how the most painful of human 
sensations is experienced, produced and conceptualised discursively.  
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